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Abstract
Scholarly and political interest in the Muslim population in Britain has greatly increased since
the 1970s. Issues such as the Rushdie affair and the Gulf war brought Muslims into the
media spotlight, and provided focal points for the mobilisation of Muslims committed to
maintaining Islamic values in Britain. Most research on Muslims in Britain has focused on
Asian groups. While these may represent the majority, generalisations about Islam and
Muslims in Britain are not possible without examining the experiences of other Muslim
communities. This thesis, therefore, sets out to improve social scientific understanding of the
varied experiences of Muslims in Britain by comparing women from two Muslim groups:
Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots.
The aim of the thesis is to examine the significance of religion and culture in the lives
of Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot women in London. The principal objectives are to show (a)
how these different and often competing elements are involved in identity formation and
transformation, and (b) how they influence, and are influenced by factors such as race, class
and gender. My research is based on two years of fieldwork with a variety of different
community organisations catering specifically for Muslims, Pakistanis, or Turkish speakers.
In addition I carried out thirty in-depth interviews with women who were actively involved in
these communities. The aim was to examine the major issues relevant to each of these two
groups, as well as to assess the importance of the organisations for Turkish Cypriot and
Pakistani women in London.
My research found firstly, that despite the vast diversity evident among my informants
in terms of their identity and the individual strategies they choose to adopt, their community
organisations had a vital and significant role to play in the development and empowerment of
women across the generations. Secondly, my findings revealed the complex and changing
nature of social identities, as well as the ability of second and third generation Pakistani and
Turkish Cypriot women actively to select and interpret competing cultural systems, and to
adopt, incorporate or abandon specific elements in their search for an appropriate individual
strategy. Young Turkish Cypriots and Pakistani women are shown to be actively defining and
redefining themselves as a result of the multifarious cultural and structural factors that they
experience both on an individual and group level. 'Race', class and gender are crucial to this
process of cultural redefinition, as women's cultural beliefs necessarily reflect the structural
forces that affect their lives. The intersection of 'race', class and gender locates individuals in
their social positions and subsequently elicits considerations of beliefs and identities.
Iv
Introduction
Muslims are the largest minority faith group both in Britain and Western Europe. The Muslim
population in Britain is estimated to be between one and one and a half million, and includes
migrants from Asia, Turkey, Cyprus, the Middle East, Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia (Weller
1997, Anwar 1998). However, the majority of Muslims in Britain are Asian from Pakistan,
India, Bangladesh and East Africa.
Although the Qur'an outlines the basic guides to life that must be adhered to by all
Muslims, there is no common Muslim 'culture'; as with all religions, there is an element of
interpretation involved. Thus within the various Muslim countries across the world, although
the basic values and principles might be the same, the customs and cultures vary
considerably. Elements of the national cultures in such countries as Pakistan, Iran and
Turkey are distinguishable in many ways from Islamic values and norms. Although Islam
dominates these countries, many aspects of social life are not directly determined by the
religion. Hence a Muslim from Pakistan can vary quite considerably in dress and customs
from a Muslim in, say, the Egypt or Syria. It would be a mistake, therefore, to consider the
Muslim population in Britain as a homogeneous community. British Muslims continue to
socialise and organise along lines of nationality. Furthermore, as Samad (1 992:508) points
out, British Muslims adopt different identities according to political circumstances:
'Consequently working class Mirpuris from Bradford can see themselves as British, Pakistani,
Muslim, or Punjabi depending on the political and social circumstances which depress or
elevate various strands of identity'.
Nevertheless, despite this diversity the notion of a single Islamic community in Britain
is receiving more attention. Events such as the Rushdie affair and the Gulf war provided
platforms for increased co-operation and collaboration between Muslims, as different groups
joined forces in defence of Islam and their rights as a religious minority in Britain. This
increase in Islamic activity in Britain has had a significant impact on the younger generation,
abating tendencies towards westernisation and secularisation. Increasingly, young Muslims
are coming to see themselves as first and foremost Muslims, and emphasising the
importance of a united Umma (community of fellow believers) to defend their position in
British society.
The findings from research that I carried out previously among Pakistanis and
Bangladeshis in Coventry and Bradford showed that many young Asian Muslims were using
Islam as a guide to redefine their identities in Britain, producing a synthesis of Islamic,
Pakistani and British cultural forms. For women in particular, adherence to Islam enabled
them to construct roles that gave them more freedom and choice. By taking a more
conscious Islamic approach they were able to utilise the rights that their religion gave them
as women in the search for freedom from some of the cultural restrictions previously
imposed. However, the research also emphasised that this process of cultural redefinition
could not be understood without examining the intersectionality of 'race', class and gender
and its influence on the lives of Asian Muslim young people. Such factors inevitably limited
the cultural resources available to these young people.
The overwhelming majority of research on Muslims in Britain had tended to focus
exclusively on Asian groups, so for the purposes of this thesis I particularly wanted to study
two Muslim populations in Britain. The first aim was to examine the level of diversity that
exists among various Muslim groups (in much of the existing theory the concept of 'Muslim' is
almost taken to be synonymous with that of 'Pakistani'). The second aim was to analyse the
elements that these two groups share, not merely as a result of their religion, but also as a
result of their position and status within British society. I therefore chose to study Pakistanis
and Turkish Cypriots because the former represent an Asian population and the latter a
European one. This again has implications for their position in British society, and therefore
inevitably has a significant effect on their lives in Britain. The exclusive focus on women in
these two communities was dictated by my theoretical interest in the ways in which ethnicity
and religion intersected with social class and gender. Although this intersection of social
factors had been the object of other scholars' research, I chose to add a novel dimension by
examining it in a comparative framework.
The women I interviewed were chosen because they worked directly or indirectly
within the Pakistani or Turkish-speaking populations. I was interested in their views and
observations about the two populations, as well as their own experiences of being a second-
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generation Pakistani or Turkish-speaking Muslim women in London and more widely in
British society. These women can be seen as 'mediators' or 'intermediaries', which refers to
their professional and/or personal role of mediating between the migrant community and the
wider society (Lutz 1993). For Lutz such mediators can be seen as advocates for their
communities, who manage their role despite the limits and restrictions of operating on the
margins of wider society. Second generation women in particular can experience difficulties
working in these areas because their education and training has been undertaken in a
western society with a 'western agenda'. This includes the valuation and definition of their
ethnic identity and cultural background. They therefore rely on the dominant society's
discourse in order to represent themselves as 'spokespersons' for 'their' group, even though
they have no official status to do so within their own communities. Their ethnicity is not an
automatic guarantee of acceptance by other members of their communities. Boundaries can
arise from within and from outside. Many of these women have to challenge sexism from
within their own communities as well as structural and personal discrimination on the part of
wider society.
The aim was to examine the significance of religion and ethnicity for the maintenance
and transformation of individual and collective identity, and how they are experienced and
evaluated in relation to factors such as 'race', class and gender. The accounts of mediators
gives a good indication of the subtle differences in meaning and the intersectionality of 'race',
class, gender and ethnic relations on both the structural (collective) and individual level.
Ethnicity needs to be examined with reference to social structures, 'discursive constructions',
and identity formations and at the level of concrete social practice. In this way, ethnicity can
be seen to be appropriated and transformed by both the individual and the group. This thesis
therefore aims to provide a greater understanding of the complex and contradictory factors
influencing Muslim women in Britain.
Chapter one sets out the theoretical perspective of the thesis by providing a critique
of the concept of ethnicity and questioning whether it can provide a useful theoretical tool for
empirical analysis. This chapter aims to clarify many of the terms that are used in my analysis
and to examine the way in which the meanings of these terms has evolved over the last few
decades. It concludes by suggesting the ways in which a more complex representation of
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culture and ethnicity can be adopted for sociological purposes; one that allows for social
change and the influence of structural factors such as 'race', class and gender, yet at the
same time acknowledges that some individuals wish to maintain a sense of common 'identity'
and cultural exclusion.
Chapter two examines in detail the situation of Asian Muslims in Britain. It focuses on
the notion of Muslim unity that continues to dominate much of the discussion of Muslims in
Britain. It examines the factors that have served to promote cultural cohesion among the
Asian Muslim communities as well as those factors that produce and maintain internal
differentiation. They demonstrate the complex and shifting nature of religious and ethnic
variables, and the social identities that are constructed out of these variables, as well as the
influence of structural factors such as race, class and gender.
Chapter three examines the literature on Cypriots in Britain, both Turkish and Greek,
and the factors that influence the creation, maintenance and transformation of ethnicity and
identity. It compares the experiences of Cypriots in relation to other New Commonwealth
migrants in Britain, the extent to which they experience similar ethnic disadvantages and
what particular cultural resources they have utilised in an effort to overcome some of these
disadvantages. It also explores the maintenance of ethnic identity among Cypriots in Britain
and their relationships with other ethnic groups, demonstrating the way in which ethnic
identity is created and sustained by these relations, as well as transformed in the British
environment. It also examines the maintenance and transformation of ethnicity among the
second generation and the importance of the position of women to the re-creation of
patriarchal norms and values among Cypriots in Britain.
Chapter four deals with methodological aspects of the research, including details of
my participant observation in a number of Turkish speaking, Pakistani and Muslim
organisations and my in-depth interviews with some of the female workers in these
organisations and other women active in their communities. It also discusses the influence of
feminist research on methodological debates, and in particular the focus on feminist
objectivity. Finally, it also describes the practice and principles of my research, and analyses
my experiences of being a white researcher and a woman in light of the discussions outlined.
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Chapter five provides a brief overview of the literature on Pakistani, Muslim and
Turkish community associations in Britain, together with a description of the roles and
objectives of the various organisations that I worked with during my field research. It also
examines in more detail the views and experiences of my respondents on the organisations
for which they worked and their experiences of working within the Turkish speaking and
Pakistani communities.
Chapter six examines social interactions in terms of internal and external relations,
through the attitudes, opinions and experiences of the women interviewed, and how these
influence the creation, maintenance and transformation of notions of difference and
commonality/ethnicity. The area in which my informants live is assessed in terms of its
influence on the maintenance of religion and culture, together with the perceived divisions
among Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain and their interactions with other groups. It
also looks at intergenerational relations and the opinions and experiences of my informants in
relation to their own parents and family. Finally, it examines the women's experiences of
racial and ethnic prejudice and discrimination, and the influence of these experiences on
Turkish Cypriots and Pakistanis in Britain.
Chapter seven considers the position of women within the Pakistani and Turkish
Cypriot communities and within British society in general. It examines the informants' views
on the position of women in Islam, as well as in relation to Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot
traditional norms and values. It explores their opinions on the changing experiences of the
first, second and succeeding generations. These changes are believed to be greatest in
relation to marriage, education, and employment choices. The aim is to paint a broader
picture of the experiences that influence Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women in terms of
identity formation and their commitment to the maintenance of ethnicity.
Chapter eight examines the importance that my informants placed on religion for
themselves and for the second and third generations as a whole. The influence of Pakistan
and Cyprus are examined together with the women's attitudes towards the maintenance of
traditional values and customs in relation to both themselves and others. The maintenance of
mother tongue languages is also explored in relation to ethnicity. Finally, the chapter
examines how these different elements influence the respondents' assessments of their
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identity and the significance of these to the maintenance of ethnicity among Pakistanis and
Turkish Cypriots in Britain.
In the conclusion I summarise my research findings in the context of a theoretical
analysis of ethnicity and hybridised identities. I explain some of reasons for the contrast
between Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women, whilst also noting the diversity that was
evident within these groups. The concept of 'hierarchies of experience' is deployed to provide
a theoretical understanding of how individuals make sense of their contrasting and conflicting
experiences. This concept seeks to outline how individuals make sense of the world they live
in and how they can prioritise different dimensions at different times, in different contexts.
I include a glossary of Turkish, Urdu and Arabic words at the end of the thesis.
Words included in this glossary can be seen in the text in Italics. Sources have been
referenced in the text by author and year of publication, and appear in the bibliography at the
end of the thesis.
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Chapter One
Theoretical Issues in the Study of Ethnicity
Since the 1960s there has been increasing emphasis in the social sciences on the
importance of 'ethnicity' as an explanatory concept. While some commentators take a
positive attitude to the existence of 'ethnic' differentiation, others feel that it is merely another
form of potential conflict that cannot be resolved. However, the existence of various ethnic
cultures in Britain is clear; the question is how should they be perceived.
The criticisms of ethnicity principally focus on its inability or failure to account for the
power relations operating within society and their influence on individual and collective
identity. However, despite these criticisms it is clear that an emphasis on culture cannot be
abandoned. The existence of cultural differences is essential for understanding questions of
belonging, identity and politics. New conceptions of ethnicity aim to provide a radical
reworking of the term which takes account of these cultural differences whilst separating
ethnicity from the dominant discourses of 'race' and 'nation'. Thus they highlight the
importance of placing ethnicity within the context of globalisation and focusing on the
interaction between the local and the global. In this way, it is argued, the concept of ethnicity
can be used to explore the question of power in terms of its influence on both individuals and
groups. Such an approach takes account of the intersectionality of different forms of social
differentiation and their influence on culture and identity formation.
This chapter has three main purposes. Firstly, it aims to clarify many of the terms
that are used in my analysis of identity formation among Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot
women in Britain. Secondly, it analyses the way in which the meanings of these terms have
evolved over the last few decades. And thirdly, it indicates how my own research is related to
preceding conceptual and theoretical debates. The discussion does not pretend to be
exhaustive; it merely covers a selection of the contributions that I consider to be significant in
themselves and directly relevant to my research.
The chapter begins by exploring the concept of ethnicity: how it is defined, what it
entails and why it has come to be seen as such a major feature of British society. It then goes
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on to examine some of the problems surrounding the notion of 'ethnicity', and its alleged
inability to account for the influence of 'race', class and gender. More recent attempts to
study the interplay between 'cultural' and 'structural' forces are highlighted, which emphasise
the need for a more complex interpretation of culture and ethnicity. The chapter concludes by
examining new conceptions of ethnicity which attempt to acknowledge the influence of these
often conflicting and contrasting forms of social relations.
Ethnicity in Theory and Practice
The arrival of New Commonwealth migrants into post-war Britain initiated countless public
disputes and media debates about the likely future outcome of these 'minority groups', but
there was a particular 'model' or framework of assumptions which tended to dominate the
debates. This was referred to as the 'immigrant-host' model, and whilst its origins lay within
the social sciences it was also depicted in the media and in general political discussion. The
immigrant-host model centred on the belief that migrants from the Caribbean and the Asian
sub-continent would eventually become 'acculturated', gradually shedding their distinctive
identities and cultural norms, and slowly becoming socialised into the dominant values and
customs of the host society. Whilst the model admitted that only very limited cultural
assimilation was likely for 'primary' settlers, and that racial discrimination was likely to
continue to be a barrier as far as the second generation was concerned, it still maintained
that eventually New Commonwealth migrants would become completely integrated into
British society.
However, by the late 1960s and 1970s there was a gradual realisation that migrant
cultures were not simply short-lived phenomena destined to disappear under the dual impact
of disruptive migration and the alluring attractions of the host culture. On the contrary,
migrants and their descendants appeared to be persistently retaining many elements of their
'original' cultures, modifying them to only a limited extent, and sometimes emphasising them
even more fervently with the passage of time. It became increasingly obvious, therefore, that
those cultural allegiances warranted special attention. Thus from the 1960s onwards there
was a concerted effort to outline the distinguishing cultural features of selected groups of
New Commonwealth migrants, charting the ways in which these groups differed in such
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things as language, religion, core values and social attitudes, kinship patterns, diet and
routine life styles. This marked the beginning of 'ethnic studies' as a framework of analysis.
Milton Yinger (1981:250) has defined an 'ethnic group':
A segment of a larger society whose members are thought, by themselves
and/or by others, to share a common origin and to share important segments
of a common culture, and who, in addition, participate in shared activities in
which the common origin and cultures are significant ingredients.
Thus the key features of ethnic groups would seem to be: shared culture, regular interaction
and a sense of 'belonging', accompanied by an almost 'cult like mystique', which secures the
bonds of unity between the members (Schermerhorn 1970). The key term in ethnic studies is
'culture', which is seen as the distinctive 'design for living' that a group possesses, the sum
total of its rules and guides for shaping behaviour and patterning its way of life. These cultural
bonds can be so strong that when members move from one country to another they
frequently make determined efforts to sustain their ethnic identity by pursuing traditional
religious and cultural customs, maintaining dietary habits, and keeping alive the languages
and dialects of their homelands. It has also been suggested that certain types of social
experience and group formation are particularly conducive to the emergence of clearly
defined ethnic groups, and the most familiar examples of ethnic groups are usually
considered to be based on nations, territorial units, religious codes, common language, and
tribal or clan membership.
Some writers have further suggested that 'race' is another likely source of 'ethnicity',
so that one might expect the boundaries between 'races' to coincide with the boundaries
between ethnic groups. However, Michael Lyon (1972) argues that a clear distinction can be
made between a 'racial category' and an 'ethnic group'. Firstly, he argues an ethnic group is
defined culturally, whereas a racial group is physically defined. Secondly, he states that an
ethnic group actively erects barriers between itself and other groups, whereas a racial group
tends to be forcibly excluded and prevented from freely interacting with other groups. Thirdly,
Lyon argues that ethnic groups display a sense of solidarity that provides a substantial
capacity for mobilisation of their collective interests, whereas racial groups can only be
considered to constitute 'residual categories' with little or no prospects for collective action.
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Accordingly, Lyon argues that African Caribbeans in Britain constitute a racial
category, for although they possess some common cultural characteristics they are the
consequence of slavery and colonialism. The negative connotations that such a past holds
means that these characteristics cannot provide the basis for positive group identity in
reaction to their racial categorisation within Britain, and they therefore lack any means to
challenge their socio-economic position in society. Migrants from the Asian subcontinent,
however, according to Lyon, constitute a number of different ethnic groups, the three main
ones being Pakistanis, Indian Gujaratis and Indian Punjabis. All of these groups possess a
strong historic culture and sense of cohesion that provide a basis for positive group
identification. Such identification, Lyon argues, provides these Asian 'ethnic groups' with a
means to resist racial categorisation by British society.
According to Robert Miles (1982), Lyon has clearly taken the notions of boundary
and ethnic group from Fredrik Barth's (1969) work; but his analysis differs from that of Barth
in two fundamental ways. Firstly, Lyon states that social boundaries can be established and
maintained both internally and externally. Secondly, he claims that social boundaries that are
established and maintained externally can be formed only through the identity of phenotypical
criteria. However, Miles argues, in this way Lyon ignores the most innovative characteristic of
Barth's analysis, that is, his claim that ethnic groups are defined by the process of boundary
maintenance and not by the fact of cultural difference per Se. Lyon's conceptualisation
represents an attempt to sort out important terms and to avoid confusion, but ultimately it fails
to establish a clear distinction. For example, there is no convincing reason why a racial group
cannot be 'self-defined', possessing a positive sense of its own identity and purpose, and
displaying considerable potential for political and social mobilisation. The experience of
racism itself may help produce a unifying cultural identity, as in the case of black people in
the United States and Britain. Moreover, members of a racial group tend to live in the same
areas and grow to share the same economic and social experiences, and from this a
common culture may develop. Consequently, the rigid separation of 'race' and 'ethnic group'
cannot be sustained.
Previous definitions of ethnicity tended to emphasise a group's distinctive culture as
marking it out as different or distinct from other members of society. Fredrik Barth (1969)
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however, highlighted the limitations of such an approach. He argues that cultural
characteristics cannot be considered adequate signifiers of an ethnic group, for such cultural
traits are not fixed and impermeable but are constantly being changed and modified by the
group itself. It is therefore impossible, Barth argues, to define an ethnic group and explain its
separate status by the cultural characteristics it displays, as those characteristics are likely to
change over time. Instead, he argues, it is necessary to examine the power relationships
between different 'ethnic groups' and the factors which help in the maintenance (or loss) of
cultural characteristics.
Patricia Jeffery's work (1976), one of the earliest in the 'ethnic studies' framework,
marks a return to Barth's analysis, by focusing on the social processes involved in non-
assimilation and the maintenance of ethnic boundaries. Like Barth, she argues that cultural
differences and similarities are not necessarily compatible with the way social relationships
are patterned, and it is therefore necessary to concentrate on the structural aspects of the
situation. It is the social (or structural) processes that enable distinct ethnic groups to co-exist
through time, even when they occupy the same territory and when their members have social
relationships not only within the ethnic group but also with members of the other group. Thus
for Jeffery, an important factor for Pakistanis in Britain is the links which extend outside
Britain to the sending country. Such elements, previously ignored by ethnographic studies,
encourage Pakistanis to maintain their culture, as their desire is to eventually return home.
However, while Jeffery feels that Barth has made an important contribution to the study of
'ethnic relations' and the ways in which social factors help to maintain cultural differences,
she believes that he deals only superficially with the factor of power. Thus, in her view,
maintaining an ethnic identity may for some individuals merely represent a poor substitute for
their unfulfilled desire to be accepted by the wider society. However, she states that this
particular 'drawback' to Barth's analysis is not crucial for her Muslim informants since they
wish to maintain their separation from British people, and do not want to be merged with
them.
A similar but more detailed analysis is offered by Sandra Wallman (1979, 1986). She
states that (1 979:ix), 'Ethnicity refers generally to the perception of group difference and so to
social boundaries between sections of a population. In this sense ethnic difference is the
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recognition of a contrast between "us" and "them". For Wallman, social boundaries can be
marked by a number of different criteria and these can change from one social context to
another. It is not the source of differentiation between groups that is important, as these
merely represent potential boundary markers; it is the perception and attributions of
significance to such difference which is the foundation of ethnicity. In addition, she claims that
ethnicity can be viewed in a number of ways. It may be regarded as a resource which can at
times be used to the advantage of 'a social, cultural or racial category of people'; it can have
no meaning or value at all at other times; and it can, at still others, be considered a 'liability'
to be avoided or denied as far as possible. However, Wallman argues (1979:14), 'All the
evidence points to the conclusion that ethnicity will only be manifest where it is useful; and
that it will only be useful and manifest in contexts appropriate to it'.
James Watson (1977) takes what he calls the 'political approach' to ethnicity, found
in the work of Cohen (1969). Cohen argues that alliances based on ethnicity function like
'informal interest groups' and should therefore be seen as political entities that operate
through the identity of shared 'culture'. According to Watson, ethnicity in this context only has
meaning when two or more groups are interacting and competing for control over scarce
resources. Like Wallman, he believes that ethnicity can change and be modified according to
political and economic circumstances. However, Watson states that one of the limitations of
the ethnicity studies to date is their inability to sort out the interconnections between class
and ethnicity, and he admits that the contributions to 'Between Two Cultures' are no
exception.
In an attempt to deal with the notion of power, Verity Saifullah Khan (1982) argues
that the relationship between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups is a relationship of
power that is manifest in, and maintained by, the economic and social order. Thus Saifullah
Khan defines culture as 'the system of shared meanings developed in a social and economic
context that has a particular historical and political background' (1 982:1 97). Culture only has
reality within the social context from which it is derived and which it helps to structure. What
is of interest for Saifullah Khan is not the fact of cultural difference, but the process by which,
for example, migrants from the Indian sub-continent become aware of their difference once in
social contact with sections of the majority population. Saifullah Khan uses ethnicity,
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therefore, to refer to the development and maintenance of ethnic awareness and identity.
Thus she claims that one cannot speak of 'Pakistani ethnicity' in any meaningful sense
because migrants from Pakistan rarely consider themselves as sharing common
characteristics. Rather, the sense of difference with the majority population in Britain is
perceived in relation to their family and fellow villagers from the same region. This subjective
component ref racts the considerable social differentiation within the population of Pakistanis
in Britain.
For Saifullah-Khan, therefore, the main focus should be on the perception of
difference, which is dependent on how individuals and groups define a system: what the main
components of culture are and how they relate to the social environment and the economy. It
is the lack of fit between these two notions that to Saifullah-Khan is of prime importance to
ethnicity. However, having stressed the importance of structural determinants in the process
of 'ethnic identity', she still focuses on culture as her prime concern. Hence she talks about
majority/minority relations in terms of the influence of the 'dominant culture' on the 'social
interaction' of 'ethnic groups'. The existence of racism is acknowledged, but only in its
cultural form. As Lawrence (1982) argues, what seems to go unnoticed is the fact that the
communities that 'ethnic minorities' live in and the culture they operate under, are subject to
conditions which are not of their own making. Thus the problem for Saifullah-Khan and for
ethnicity studies as a whole is that they tend to obscure the relationships of power and treat
ethnicity as a meeting of cultures on equal terms.
Ellis Cashmore and Barry Troyna (1990) argue that whilst they acknowledge the fact
that Asians and blacks in Britain form a disadvantaged class due to their exploited positions
in the division of labour, both groups have developed unique customs, practices, beliefs,
languages, diets and leisure activities, that may be considered ethnic responses. Thus
although the position of blacks and Asians in inner city areas was assisted by employment
markets which more or less determined which part of the country they could settle in and
housing policies consigning them to specific zones of the cities, the migrants' 'obvious' desire
to avoid feeling estranged and different combined to produce a ghettoization of the inner
cities.
13
Inside the zones, distinct immigrant communities developed. It gave Caribbeans
a feeling of separateness that they perhaps didn't crave when they first set foot
in the UK. The hostile reception would have promoted experiences of isolation;
grouping together with others that had undergone similar experiences would
have served to use this. At the same time, this provided emotional support, a
feeling of group solidarity or togetherness and a sense of community.
(1990:149)
Cashmore and Troyna believe that there is no meaningful way of defining ethnicity apart from
its being a reflection of 'the positive tendencies of identification and inclusion'. They argue
that ethnicity cannot be seen as only r&ated to class. Instead they attempt to relate the
different forms of ethnicity to changes in group consciousness and social condition. Thus
they state that at first conditions in Britain allowed ethnic groups only limited scope and that
ethnicity was designed more for promoting 'cohesion, solidarity and comfort', although the
later industrial disputes, particularly amongst Asians, affirm their potential for resistance.
However, they argue, it was the rise of the Rastafarian movement in the mid-i 970s and
1980s and the 1981 Riots that can be seen as the beginning of more formative action and
heralded the complete rejection of society and its values by the second generation, which
was subsequently adopted by 'similarly disposed' white working-class youth.
Roger Ballard's (1994) edited collection 'Desh Pardesh' represents one of the most
recent attempts to sort out some of the problems in ethnic studies. He attempts to locate
common strategies used to create 'Desh Pardesh' ('home from home' or 'at home abroad')
amongst 'ethnic minorities' generally. With reference to the second generation, he argues,
there are two important factors to consider: first, they employ a similar strategy to rejecting
assimilation by relying on their own meaning for creating 'Desh Pardesh'; second, each group
has its own specific human and cultural resources. Hence each community is different, the
overall result being 'steady progress and ever-growing diversity'. According to Ballard, the
second generation participates more fully in the wider social order and is therefore subject to
different moral and cultural conventions. As a result they are skilled 'cultural navigators'. For
Ballard, the problem with the notion of 'culture conflict' stemmed from the mistaken notion
that culture is the comprehensive determinant of behaviour. Instead, Ballard conceives of
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culture as codes, and individuals possess the ability to switch from one code to another. In
conclusion, Ballard states that the second generation are well aware of differences between
the majority society and their parents, and therefore are strongly committed to ordering their
own lives on their own terms; yet their commitment to 'Desh Pardesh' remains. Ballard's work
represents an important contribution to the analysis of culture, and to an understanding of the
way in which individuals make sense of different and often competing cultural systems.
However, what Ballard fails to explain is why it is that the second generation continue to build
a 'home from home', and the factors that influence this phenomenon.
A Critique of Ethnicity Studies
The preceding ethnographies by no means exhaust the entire repertoire of available studies,
but they do illustrate the general direction and familiar preoccupations of this approach. The
framework of assumptions involved in such analysis, according to Miles (1982), in many
ways represented a breaking of the mould of 'race relations' research. Firstly, by
concentrating attention on the perception that a particular ethnic group possesses of the
cultural characteristics that mark it off from the rest of the population, it also takes account of
ethnic groups whose phenotypical characteristics are very similar to those of the majority
population (such as the Irish, the Italians and the Cypriots). Such groups, although similar in
appearance to the majority of the population, have experienced a degree of ideological,
political and economic exclusion similar to that faced by New Commonwealth migrants. This,
Miles argues (1982:64), would seem to support the notion that 'skin colour or any other
phenotypical characteristic is not itself an active determinant of social conflict, but such
differences can serve as a focus for or symbol of conflict which has an origin in other, quite
distinct characteristics'. Thus, where a group possesses no distinct phenotypical differences,
other cultural characteristics may be given social significance to mark off that group from the
majority population. Consequently, Miles argues, what is of prime importance is the way in
which phenotypical difference is perceived and given significance rather than the actual
characteristics of that difference.
Secondly, ethnicity studies have encouraged an awareness of the nature and extent
of cultural heterogeneity amongst New Commonwealth migrants. Thus although it can be
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demonstrated that New Commonwealth migrants share a common experience of racial
discrimination there are also major differences between the various groups. This difference,
expressed in cultural terms, can act as a major barrier to the development of a sense of
cohesion and solidarity between these different groups based on an awareness of their
common experience of racial discrimination. The chances of mass black political mobilisation
are therefore severely limited. Thirdly, the emphasis on ethnicity has had the effect of
restoring the ethnic minorities to the position of 'active subjects', fully human beings with their
own aspirations, allegiances and consciousness (Miles 1982). If nothing else, ethnicity
studies have successfully challenged the notion, previously neglected by 'race relations'
research, of migrants as mere empty vessels or passive victims without a history and
consciousness of their own.
Fourthly, because of its concern with the actor's definition of the situation, 'ethnic
relations' research breaks with the notion of 'immigrant' in preference of 'migrant'. This
distinction is significant because the term 'immigrant' refers to an individual who moves to
another country with the intention of settling there permanently, whereas the term 'migrant'
simply denotes an individual who lives in another country. Thus emphasis is placed on the
fact that New Commonwealth citizens who came to Britain in the 1950s and 1960s did not
intend to settle permanently in this country, but rather their aim was to gain sufficient money
to improve their social, political and economic position back home. Consequently, the
migrants maintain considerable links with the areas from which they migrated and this has
considerably influenced their attitudes towards participation in British society. Their whole
way of life consists of preparation for return to their home country, a desire to increase their
savings and an unwillingness to participate in British culture for fear of weakening their own
culture and identity (Anwar 1979; Robinson 1986). Fifth, and following from the previous
point, 'ethnic relations' research points to the significance of studying the political economy of
labour migration. By conceiving migration as a chain that connects the country of the
migrant's origin with Britain, there is a clear suggestion that the reasons for and effects of
migration have to be considered in relation to both ends of the chain (Miles, 1982; Watson,
1977).
16
Part of the theoretical problem consists in explaining why ethnic groups achieve
prominence in the first place. James Mckay (1982) identifies two opposing schools of
explanation for the importance of ethnic groups in modern industrial societies: the
'primordialist' and the 'mobilisationist' arguments. Primordialists contend that the strength of
ethnicity derives from the way it meets the human need for deep-seated, sacred, non-
contractual attachments. Ethnic allegiances answer our 'natural' need for belonging and
community, and so ethnic groups emerge spontaneously from the innermost recesses of
human nature. A more technical version of primordialism is afforded by 'sociobiology' (van
den Berghe, 1978) which suggests that ethnic or racial attachments are coded in the genes.
Ethnicity is explained in sociobiology as a particular example of 'kin selection', or the
tendency to show favouritism to people of similar appearance or kin networks, in order that
the common genes have a better chance of evolutionary survival.
The 'mobilationist' school, on the other hand, suggests that ethnic loyalties are
peripheral rather than primordial, and so groups only mobilise ethnic symbols when it offers
them some strategic advantage in obtaining access to social, political or economic resources.
In the British context, these mobilisationist arguments are usually translated into the concept
of 'reactive ethnicity', which conveys the tendency for ethnic groups' members to construct
ethnicity as a defence against racism and discrimination. Thus, Ballard and Ballard (1977)
describe the ethnic ties of first-generation Sikhs as little more than a somewhat muted
expression of their cultural traditions; the second-generation, however, attempted to strike
compromises with British society, but were stung into 'reactive' pride in ethnicity because of
the continuing experience of repeated rebuffs and racist humiliations. Moreover, this
victimisation created a greater awareness of the similar problems faced by other ethnic
groups, and so the second generations are increasingly reaching beyond the more over-
arching pan-Asian identity. As members of single ethnic groups of cross-alliances, the
members manipulate ethnic symbols to build a positive identity and to engage in political and
economic activity to promote their material interests.
These mobilisationist views helpfully avoid the rather mystical and circular arguments
of the primordialist approach, and they appear more useful in understanding the ebb and flow
of ethnic loyalties. However, it is not always clear what particular 'interests' are being
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promoted or defended. If the interests involved are not just material, but include identity, then
this merely seems to take us back to primordial arguments. Also, just how strong are the
tendencies to 'race' (or 'Black' or 'Asian') alliances in comparison with specific 'ethnic' ties or
even broad 'class' groupings? How much is the stress on ethnicity due to 'reaction', and how
much to a more straightforward 'choice' to follow cultural traditions? Ethnicity obviously
involves both 'emotional' and 'strategic' factors, and it would be premature to claim that these
questions have been resolved.
For ethnicity studies researchers, what is of importance is not 'racially defined
groups' and the effects of racism and discrimination, but 'ethnic groups' who are self-defined
and whose attitudes and values have to be assessed in terms of their distinct culture. Thus
their cultural distinctiveness becomes the primary object of inquiry. In this way, ethnicity
studies claim to be able to account for the contrast between 'strong' Asian cultures on the
one hand, and 'weak' African Caribbean cultures on the other. The key term here according
to Errol Lawrence (1982:100) is 'acculturation', which refers to the 'culture stripping' or
'cultural castration' which African slaves supposedly underwent during slavery. Ken Pryce
(1979) argues that African Caribbean cultures are derivatives of European cultures and it is
partly for this reason that he views them as being weak. They are 'weak' because they
cannot give African Caribbeans a sense of their 'true' identity; these cultures reproduce
'anomic' personalities. Asian cultures on the other hand, are not seen as having undergone
the traumatic process of acculturation and their languages, religious and social institutions
and family systems are, consequently, viewed as having remained more or less intact.
However, as Lawrence (1982:112) points out, studies so far have failed to examine the
impact of British imperialism on the experiences of Asian people:
What is implied if this is not taken into account is that the Asian subcontinent
has enjoyed an uninterrupted historical development. Such an omission is, to
say the least, misleading and can only serve to fuel the commonly held
belief ...that the poverty and hardships of these 'underdeveloped' regions are the
result primarily of their 'backward' and 'rigid' social and cultural institutions.
According to Miles, what is most striking about the majority of the groups of migrants that
came to Britain is not so much their cultural difference from each other and from the 'majority'
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population but rather the similarity of the material circumstances that they experienced before
their migration and the experience of the migration process itself.
Thus one of the major inadequacies of 'ethnic studies' research is its failure to make
connections at the structural level between the home country of the migrants and the wider
world economy. They see 'culture' as a distinct entity, unconnected with other social
processes. The effect of this, according to Lawrence, is to produce a static and idealised
vision of migrant cultures which cannot account for class, caste or regional differences and
which cannot explain the changes that have occurred within these cultures. In addition,
Lawrence states, ethnicity studies are unable to deal with the question of power. For them
power is not an issue, for they see all sections of society as being subject to the same
political and economic pressures. However, he argues (1 982:116):
It seems to us that there are power relations in operation here that limit the
range of choices black people can make. They do not 'choose' to live in
inadequate housing any more than they 'choose' to do 'shift-work'. Given the
frequency, for example, of violent physical attacks upon them, and the
reluctance of the police to investigate these attacks, it makes a good deal of
sense to remain within the community where support, protection and mutual
defence can be relied on. This cannot be characterised simply as a 'cultural
preference' interacting with 'external determinants'.
One of the major criticisms voiced against ethnicity studies is that they attach ultimate 'blame'
to the minority ethnic groups themselves. It is argued that these studies, by focusing their
attention on the migrants' cultural distinctiveness from the 'indigenous' British population,
tend to emphasise the 'pathological' or 'inappropriate' nature of these cultures. For example,
crime amongst West Indians is seen as resulting from their 'weak' family structures rather
than their depressed position in society; the disadvantaged position of Asian women in the
employment market is attributed to their traditionally 'subordinate' role rather than from the
exploitation of their labour in Britain. The predominant emphasis on ethnic cultures
conveniently deflects attention away from the racism endemic in British society. 'Race'
problems are subsequently framed in terms of 'mutual misunderstandings' and the solutions
are posited along the tame lines of 'multi-cultural education' and 'cultural pluralism'. Jenny
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Bourne (1980:346) bitterly attacks ethnicity theorists, who, she argues, 'by freezing the
dynamics of race struggle in culture and ethnicity, subserve the interests of the state'.
Paul Gilroy (1987) claims that this 'evolution of racism from vulgar to cultural forms'
can be seen quite clearly in the way in which the categorisation of 'races' has moved away
from the all-encompassing category of 'black' referring to both Afro-Caribbean and Asians,
and instead made it applicable only to those of African descent; thus inhibiting the prospect of
Afro-Asian unity in the struggle to combat racism. He states that (1987:39):
This development has its origins in an understanding of 'race' that stresses the
obstacles to political accommodation erected between groups by culture and
ethnicity. Its conception of cultural differences as fixed, solid almost biological
properties of human relations is similar to the theory of 'racial' and national
differences propounded by the radical right. It has been amplified and reflected
politically in special state policy and provision for 'ethnic minorities' (invariably
defined so that they coincide with the old idea of biological 'races'). These policy
initiatives have played a part in the fracturing of the inclusive definition of black.
They have institutionalised the desire to meet minority needs that are perceived
to be distinct and separate though formally equal.
Thus, Gilroy argues, today's British racism is much more subtle and elusive than previous
forms. It is no longer defined in terms of notions of inferiority and superiority associated with
the period of British expansion overseas, but has become anchored to the decline of the
national economy. The process of national decline is presented as coinciding with the cultural
contamination of British society and its values by alien strains. Alien cultures come to be seen
as a threat to society's values and norms, and thus the decline of the national economy is
viewed as being precipitated by the arrival of blacks. Recognising this fundamental
development, Gilroy argues, enables one to understand how the gap between radical and
conservative, socialist and openly racist theories 'race' and explanations of racial
discrimination have been narrowed so considerably.
Martin Barker (1981) has labelled this apparent change in conception 'the new
racism', and he sees its major role as being to account for the present situation of national
decline. Its uniqueness, it is argued, stems from its ability to combine ideas of patriotism,
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nationalism, xenophobia, Britishness and gender difference into a complex system which
replaces notions of 'race' difference with those of culture and national identity. These
perceived cultural differences are reproduced in educational institutions and, above all, in
family life. However, whether or not such an emphasis on cultural difference or preference
can be considered to constitute a 'new racism' (and many would argue that it cannot) such an
emphasis can be used in explaining or justifying the segregation of migrants into the bottom
sections of society, concentrated in inner city areas and in low paid, unskilled work. Thus one
of the major problems of interpretation confronting ethnic studies researchers is the difficult
task of striking the correct balance, one which gives due weight to cultural variations without
at the same time exaggerating the gap which exists between the various ethnic minority
cultures and, between them and the rather under-researched 'host' culture (or, more
appropriately, host cultures).
Furthermore, accusations of ethnocentrism are frequently hurled at writers on
ethnicity; it is frequently alleged that sexist assumptions creep into the descriptions of Asian
females. Thus, a distorted stereotype of 'passive' Asian females is circulated, in which they
are portrayed as 'subjugated' and 'oppressed' by patriarchal Asian culture. Pratibha Parmar
(1982) argues that this patronising over-simplification ignores the brave and constructive role
played by Asian women in resisting racism, capitalism and patriarchy. These criticisms of
ethnic studies certainly deserve attention, but it is also important to note that mainstream
ethnicity writers do not always agree on these descriptions and evaluations. Moreover, not all
the researchers are white or male. And it would be curious if ethnic cultures contained no
'internal' problems, tensions or weaknesses, especially given the damaging history of racism
and the dislocating impact of migration.
According to such writers as Carby (1982) Trivedi (1984) and Westwood and Bhachu
(1988), Asian women (and black women in general) remain an invisible minority in Britain,
largely ignored by the majority population, or if considered at all, discussed in terms of
common stereotypical images. Thus, Asian families are seen to be 'unhealthily strong',
cohesive and controlling of their members. Asian women are portrayed as passive victims of
their religion and culture, exploited and oppressed by their menfolk and forced to stay in the
home. Focus has been placed on the arranged marriage system and the practice of purdah,
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which are considered to form the primary source of oppression for young Asian Women.
However, as Amos and Parmar (1982) point out, such views fail to understand the cultural
traditions of Asian people and the important part they play in the growth and development of
Asian women, and because they do not understand them they label them as 'backward' or
'inferior'. Thus cultural traditions such as purdah and arranged marriages are highlighted as
repressive features of Asian society which exploit women in a way that is unacceptable to the
'more liberated' West. These images of 'oppression', according to Amos and Parmar (1984),
serve to perpetuate racist stereotypes in Britain and further justify the institutionalisation of
racism. Parmar (1988) argues that such analyses have focused on one form of oppression at
the exclusion of another. In order to understand the position of Asian (and black) women in
Britain, she argues it is necessary to examine the factors of 'race', gender and class that
simultaneously shape their experiences and contribute to their lack of power in society.
The Importance of Race, Class and Gender
For ethnicity studies researchers, what is of importance is not 'racially defined groups' and
the effects of racism and discrimination, but 'ethnic groups' who are self-defined and whose
attitudes and values have to be assessed in terms of their distinct culture. Thus their cultural
distinctiveness becomes the primary object of inquiry. Such an analysis, while recognising
the fact that these cultures form an important part of the individuals' lives, fails to examine the
social, political and economic features involved. However, for many commentators (Miles
1982; Phizacklea 1984, Gilroy 1987), the underlying problems are structural ones of power
and conflict, and these issues cannot be tackled by abstract debates about 'culture'. Racial
disadvantage, it is argued, is not the 'natural' outcome of a multi-cultural society in which
some ethnic groups cling to cultural values: it is the structural outcome of an exploitative
oppressive society which can only be transformed through radical change. As Jenny Bourne
(1980:345) states:
Reactive ethnicity', or cultural resistance, can only be a resistance to racialism in
British society. Racialism is not about power but about cultural superiority.
Racism is. not about cultural superiority but about power; and the resistance to
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racism must in the final analysis be political resistance, expressed perhaps in
cultural forms.
What Bourne is arguing here, is that the relationship between different ethnic groups in
Britain is one of power. Ethnicity theorists, by focusing solely on culture, fail to account for
these power relationships. It is the racism in society, Bourne argues, which points to political
struggle along 'race' lines; and it is the denial of that struggle which produces ethnic
organisation that has no power. Likewise, Miles and Phizacklea (1979) argue, it is racial
discrimination that has forced black people to organise ethnically, and because the cultural
characteristics of Asians and African-Caribbeans are so different collective organisation is
impossible. Thus by focusing on ethnicity and the reinforcement of cultural values, the
common fight against racism has been divided, the various groups split into the component
parts and black people as a whole rendered powerless.
In this respect, several commentators have attempted to show how, by concentrating
solely on aspects of culture, ethnicity studies researchers have misinterpreted what are, in
fact, 'racial' situations. Annie Phizacklea (1990), in her study of the fashion industry, provides
a contrasting view of 'ethnic entrepreneurship' from the traditional cultural theories which
focus on the characteristics which certain ethnic groups possess that are favourable to
entrepreneurial success, such as hard work and risk-taking. Instead, she argues that for
many minority ethnic groups entrepreneurship has become a necessity. With the continuing
high levels of unemployment in Britain and the persistent presence of racial discrimination
many Asians and Afro-Caribbeans have found it necessary to adapt their own skills and
resources to create their own employment. In this way, Phizacklea argues, entrepreneurship
can be regarded as 'a form of disguised unemployment' (1990:80).
In addition, Phizacklea argues that the disparity that exists between different ethnic
groups in terms of their involvement in entrepreneurial activities can be explained in part by
differential rates of access to cheap and flexible female labour. She states that: 'My
contention is that those ethnic groups deemed to be more successful in the business world
than others are characterised by social structures that give easier access to female labour
subordinated to patriarchal control mechanisms'. This situation, Phizacklea argues needs to
be examined in the context of sexist immigration legislation that has reinforced and aided the
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reproduction of patriarchal expectations of women's dependency. With respect to Asian
migration, this was predominantly male-led; the men came over to Britain to work for a short
time in order to earn enough money to buy land and property at home. However, restrictive
immigration legislation for New Commonwealth citizens, introduced in 1962, encouraged
many men to bring over their wives and family to join them in Britain. Thus, according to
Phizacklea (1 990:95): 'the fact that many minority women had no choice but to enter as a
family woman on a voucher sponsored by a relative has had a major impact on the terms
upon which they entered British labour markets'.
Phizacklea is highly critical of cultural explanations that she believes provide a useful
justification for exploitation. Such explanations see 'ethnic' businesses as providing a
valuable source of employment for minority women who are prevented from finding
alternative work because of racial discrimination and the decline in manufacturing jobs. In
addition, it is argued, the jobs available to these women are limited by the women's own
'disadvantages', such as poor language skills, cultural preferences and a lack of relevant
skills and qualifications. Phizacklea refutes these claims, stating that 'it is imperative to
recognise that it is racism and discrimination that constrain choice and force many minority
men into the entrepreneurial option and thus minority women to work for them' (1990:93).
Ann Phoenix (1988), using data from a study of young Afro-Caribbean and white
women in the process of motherhood, argues against the use of narrow definitions of culture
for explanation. She states that such explanations are unsatisfactory because they serve to
reinforce the notion that black people are deviants from the norms of white British behaviour.
Phoenix (1 988:153) argues that:
Concentration on cultural differences between black people and white people
has frequently obscured the fact that cultural beliefs, identities, and practices
necessarily embody the structural forces that affect people's lives, and that
culture itself is dynamic rather than static. In particular, analyses of class, race
and gender are crucial to the understanding of British society and of individual
behaviours, since the intersection of these structural forces serves to locate
individuals in their social positions and also to produce social considerations of
beliefs and identities.
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Thus Phoenix highlights the importance of looking at racism, class relations, and gender as
factors in explaining and describing the processes whereby young black and white women
become mothers. In this way, she emphasises the fact that although there are experiences,
such as racism, that are specific to black women, the two groups do share common
experiences relating to their gender and class position. Phoenix thus rejects cultural
explanations of early motherhood among Afro-Caribbean women as resulting primarily from
the cultural traditions of specific regions of the Caribbean, and instead attributes it to the
class forces operating in British society, class forces that also impress upon the lives of
young white women.
Culture Re-defined
However, Phoenix does not believe that culture is irrelevant to the study of 'ethnic and racial
minorities' or that it is never legitimate to compare black people and white people. However,
complex (rather than simple) representations of culture need to be used which embody the
structural influences of class, gender, and race, which affect white people's as well as black
people's lives. This sort of approach takes account of the experiences that black and white
people share as the result of their gender and class positions, whilst recognising that racism
divides white people from black people and stops them from being aware of their similarities.
The narrow representations of cultural influence cannot portray these complexities, and are
therefore inadequate for the explanation of human behaviour.
According to Paul Gilroy, what is needed is the incorporation of a more sophisticated
theory of culture into the political analysis of 'race' and racism in Britain by claiming the term
back from ethnicity. Culture should not be seen as a 'fixed and impermeable feature of social
relations', but, instead, the active, dynamic aspects of cultural life should be emphasised.
Gilroy states that one need only to examine the changing nature of culture within the black
communities in Britain to see this active use of culture:
Black British cultures have been created from diverse and contradictory
elements apprehended through discontinuous histories. They have been formed
in a field of force between the poles of under- and overdevelopment, periphery
and centre. Their bi-lingual character expresses these origins and dislocates the
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languages of sometimes antagonistic political formations - black and white,
slave and slaveholder, class, people, nation and locality into new meanings.
(Gilroy 1987:21 8)
Gilroy uses culture in a far more constructive way than previous researchers, and links it very
much with race, gender and class. He talks about culture not in a narrow sense but as a
means of resistance, as a vehicle for social change. The syncretic cultures of black people in
Britain, he argues, have freed cultural practices from their origin or source and used them to
develop 'new patterns of meta-communication' which provide a solid basis for their collective
identity. In this way, he argues, 'The defensive walls around each sub-culture gradually
crumble and new forms with even more complex genealogies are created in the synthesis
and transcendence of previous styles' (1 987:21 7). For Gilroy, these new forms of expressive
black culture do not develop along ethnically absolute lines but in complex, dynamic patterns
of syncretism, which elicit new definitions of what it means to be black based on the
experiences of black people globally.
Part of the problem with previous theories of ethnicity, Nimmi Hutnik (1991) argues,
is that they tended to assume that there was a direct relationship between an individual's
'strategy of self-categorisation' and the 'style of cultural adaptation' they adopted for
themselves. In this way, someone defining him or herself as Indian would be expected to
display attitudes and behavioural patterns that were consistent with this categorisation. Thus,
for Hutnik, focus on the presence of one was used as an indication of the other. However,
evidence would seem to suggest that the relationship between self -categorisation and styles
of cultural adaptation is much more complex. Strategies of self-categorisation, she argues,
may be quite unconnected with styles of cultural adaptation, and may subsequently obtain
'functional autonomy'. Definitions of ethnicity that emphasise 'shared sense of peoplehood'
and 'common cultural tradition', are therefore inadequate. Such definitions, Hutnik argues,
are unable to account for the second and third generation who, despite displaying strong
styles of cultural adaptation, nevertheless maintain a strong commitment to their ethnic
heritage in terms of their strategy of self-categorisation. Thus Hutnik (1991:159) argues: 'not
all ethnic minority individuals have an "ethnic identity", in that they may eschew the cultural
traditions of their group. However, all have a method of ethnic identification that is manifest in
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a strategy of self-categorisation and a style of cultural adaptation'. To account for this
distinction, she argues, the concept of ethnic minority identity must be revised. For Hutnik,
the notion of functional autonomy seems to account for the recent rise of ethnicity. It
represents an increase of 'dissociative self-categorisation' despite greater levels of cultural
adaptation in terms of the country of residence.
Similarly, Ann Swidler (1986) also examines the relationship between culture and
action. The problem with previous theories, she argues, is that they envisage human action in
terms of individual acts. Thus they believe that particular actions are chosen individually, i.e.
one at a time, according to an individual's values and interests. Swidler, on the other hand,
argues that actions are not isolated phenomena, but are integrated into larger networks that
she refers to as 'strategies of action'. In this way, culture shapes action by providing the
resources from which strategies of action are constructed. Thus the relationship between
culture and action is built on the fact that individuals rely on culturally acquired skills, habits,
views, and attitudes in order to develop particular patterns of action.
Swidler's theory acknowledges the fact that culture is not a unified system, constant
and unchanging, 'that pushes action in a constant direction', but rather that all cultures
contain a multiplicity of varying and conflicting symbols, values and 'guides to action' (Swidler
1986:277). She thus sees culture as a 'tool kit' or 'repertoire' from which individuals can
select differing elements for constructing lines of action. For Swidler, individuals are not
'passive cultural dopes', but active and often skilled users of culture who possess the ability
to choose different lines of action in different circumstances, according to culturally-based
knowledge they have at their disposal. Thus although culture provides a variety of tools from
which people can construct different strategies of action to achieve different life goals, culture
nevertheless restricts action in that people are most likely to choose lines of action for which
their 'cultural equipment' is best suited.
To assess the influence of culture, Swidler distinguishes between the role of culture
in settled and unsettled lives. In the case of settled lives, Swidler argues, culture is more
closely integrated with action, indeed they seem to reinforce each other. It is therefore difficult
to see clearly the relationship between culture and action. In settled cultural periods culture
provides the resources from which individual and groups construct strategies of action.
27
However, such cultural resources are diverse and thus individuals will usually choose specific
resources to construct different strategies of action in different situations. Settled cultures
therefore support various lines of action, while at the same time, obscuring culture's
independent influence.
For Swidler, settled cultures also warrant a distinctive explanation. Firstly, although
culture provides the 'tool kit of resources' from which individuals can select different
strategies of action, the construction of such a strategy necessarily involves choosing
particular cultural elements and investing them with certain meanings in specific historical
circumstances. Thus in this instance, culture can not be said to cause action, as both the
cultural elements and the strategy of action are chosen simultaneously. Indeed, the
meanings given to particular cultural elements depend, in part, on the life strategy of which
they are a part. Nevertheless, the role of culture is significant in that it provides the resources
from which a strategy of action is created. Furthermore, as Swidler argues, as specific
cultural resources become more central to an individual's life, and they become more fully
invested with meaning, they give stability to the strategies of action individuals have
developed. Secondly, according to Swidler: 'the influence of culture in settled lives is
especially strong in structuring those institutionalised, but recurrent situations in which people
act in concert' (Swidler 1986:281).
It is during unsettled periods that culture is most subject to change. To assess how
cultural change occurs in these situations, Swidler distinguishes between ideologies.
traditions and common sense. She describes an ideology as 'a highly articulated, self-
conscious belief and ritual system, aspiring to offer a unified answer to problems of social
action' (Swidler 1986:278). For Swidler, ideologies mark the first phase in the development of
a 'system of cultural meaning'. Once an ideology becomes accepted by a specific group of
people, it can become a tradition. Traditions also represent 'articulated cultural beliefs and
practices', but ones which people take for granted so that they seem 'inevitable parts of life'.
Swidler argues that the same belief system, such as a religion, may be regarded as an
ideology by some people and as a tradition by others and it is possible under certain historical
circumstances for a belief system previously considered a tradition to become an ideology.
The final phase of this cultural transformation is common sense: 'a set of assumptions so
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unconscious as to seem a natural, transparent, undeniable part of the structure of the world'
(Swidler 1986:279).
Ideological battles occur when different and competing systems of organising action
are developing or fighting for supremacy. During such periods, new patterns of action are
developed and put into practice. It is here, Swidler argues, that culture can be seen to directly
shape action, as new ideologies instruct people how to act and begin to formulate the
workings of community life. It is in these unsettled lives, according to Swidler, that ritual
habits and practice often become highly charged with meaning. Ritual acquires such
significance because it represents an expression of the new ideology and a challenge to the
previous 'taken-for-granted' habits and models of the old cultural system. Individuals
developing new strategies of action rely on cultural models to learn styles of behaviour. Thus
allegiance to a new ideology involves a greater consciousness of thought and action, as it
represents a break away from the tradition and common sense of previous ways of life.
Swidler argues that these 'explicit' cultures can be thought of as systems, for
although they are not entirely consistent, they do provide a unified model of how individuals
should conduct their lives. These cultural systems are coherent in the sense that they must
fight with competing cultural models to dominate the attitudes and values of their members.
In this way, therefore, cultural models can be seen as exerting a powerful influence, although
in a restricted sense. They are restricted, firstly, in that such ideologies are not made up from
scratch, but rely, to a certain extent, on traditional ways of understanding the world. They
therefore include 'taken- for-granted' assumptions from other cultural systems. Secondly, in
any period of cultural transformation, ideology necessarily forms around established patterns
of behaviour. Thirdly, in order to assess the influence of culture on unsettled lives it is
necessary to explain why it is that a particular ideology is adopted in preference to another.
Such analysis necessitates an examination of the structural constraints and historical
circumstances within which particular ideologies fight for dominance.
Swidler's model of culture allows for a more thorough understanding of the way in
which individuals use the various cultural resources at their disposal to maintain and
transform their identity. By focusing on the role of culture in unsettled lives, it is possible to
see how competing ideologies battle for dominance in instructing people how to act.
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Conceiving of the various cultural systems as ideologies in this context enables an
examination of the way in which individuals draw on specific aspects of these systems to
construct their strategies of action. What it is important to emphasise here, is that this
process of cultural redefinition is not purely a case of individuals choosing one ideology over
another, or indeed, selecting elements from several ideologies. In order to understand why
one cultural model triumphs over another it is necessary to analyse the structural constraints
and historical circumstances within which such cultural models compete for supremacy.
Factors such as 'race', class and gender inevitably effect the choices that individuals make.
New Ethnicities
Many theorists have attempted to assess the influence of these different and competing
cultural and structural elements in terms of their effects on both individual and collective
identities. This has involved for many, a rediscovery of the importance of ethnicity as an
explanatory concept. Stuart Hall (1988) argues for a return of the concept of ethnicity, but
attempts to define it in a more radical way, by using it to explore the question of positioning.
The revival of ethncity comes, he argues from a shift in black cultural politics in Britain. He
states that the coining of the term 'black' in the 1970s and 1980s represented a means to
reference the common experience of racism and marginalisation in Britain. It provided a
means by which different groups and communities could come together and produce a
potential challenge to resist the 'dominant regimes of representation', in both the media and
academic discourses, that stereotyped, pathologised or simply ignored the position of black
people in Britain. This 'moment', which he describes as the 'relations of representation',
sought to challenge their marginalised position and increase their access to the rights of
representation. Hall states (1991:55) 'In that moment, the enemy was ethnicity. The enemy
had to be what we called "multi-culturalism". Because multi-culturalism was precisely what I
called previously "the exotic".
However, he argues we are now witnessing a new phase in black cultural politics.
This shift, he argues, is not definitive; it is not simply a case of one replacing the other, for as
long as black people continue to be marginalised by the dominant society, the struggle
remains. However, the collective black identity had the unintended consequence of
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sought to challenge their marginalised position and increase their access to the rights of
representation. Hall states (1 991 :55) 'In that moment, the enemy was ethnicity. The enemy
had to be what we called "multi-culturalism". Because multi-culturalism was precisely what I
called previously "the exotic".
However, he argues we are now witnessing a new phase in black cultural politics.
This shift, he argues, is not definitive; it is not simply a case of one replacing the other, for as
long as black people continue to be marginalised by the dominant society, the struggle
remains. However, the collective black identity had the unintended consequence of
suppressing the different experiences of black people in Britain, of homogenising culture,
ethnicity, class and gender within the concept of an 'essential black subject'. Thus by the end
of the 1980s, the hegemony of the all-encompassing black identity came under pressure
from a variety of sources 1 . The controversy surrounding the Rushdie Affair further
challenged the usefulness of collective Black identity as debates centred on the emergence
of, and opposition to, religious absolutism within minority communities, suggesting that new
political alignments were taking shape.
As a result of these developments, Hall (1 988:27) argues that we are now entering a
new phase in black cultural politics, which represents a change from a struggle over the
'relations of representation' to a 'politics of representation' itself. For Hall, this shift marks the
end of the innocent notion of the essential black subject, and the beginning of a new cultural
politics that recognises the vast diversity in terms of 'subjective positions, social experiences
and cultural identities' of black people (Hall 1988:28). The acknowledgement of this diversity
and differentiation, he argues, requires a different kind of cultural politics, one that 'engages
rather than suppresses difference and which depends, in part, on the cultural construction of
new ethnic identities' (1988:29). Thus the category 'black' can not merely be seen as a
racialised category, but one which is historically, politically, and culturally constructed. For
Hall, it is the term 'ethnicity' that takes account of these influences on the construction of
1 See for example, Modood (1988) and Anthias and Yuval-Davies (1992) for a critique of
'black' identity. Au (1991) cites both the simultaneous success and failure of anti-racism and
the emergence of cleavages within communities differentially affected by class, gender and
other pressures, as the two main forces that acted to weaken the basis of black solidarity in
Britain.
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identity, as well as acknowledging that all discourse is positioned and contextual. Thus he
argues for a reworking of the concept of ethnicity, separating it from the rhetoric of 'race' and
'nation' and its discourses within the dominant regimes of society; and focusing instead on its
conception at the margins. Thus, for Hall (1 988:30), 'the new politics of representation has to
do with an awareness of the black experience as diaspora experience, and the
consequences which this carries for the process of unsettling, recombination, hybridisation
and "cut-and-mix" - in short, the process of cultural diaspora-isation which it implies'. In this
way, new ethnicities challenge not only the nature of black or minority identity but also the
dominant coding of what it means to be British. This opens a range of issues that are related
to the way notions of authenticity and belonging are defined within racist and absolutist
conceptions of culture. Thus as Gilroy (1987:) states:
Black expressive cultures affirm while they protest. The assimilation of blacks is
not a process of acculturation but of cultural syncretism. The effects of these
ties and the penetration of black forms into the dominant culture mean that it is
impossible to theorise black culture in Britain without developing a new
perspective on British culture as a whole. This must be able to see behind
contemporary manifestations into the cultural struggles that characterised the
imperial and colonial period. An intricate web of cultural and political connections
binds blacks here to blacks elsewhere. At the same time, they are linked into the
social relations of this country. Both directions have to be examined and the
contradictions and continuities that exist between them must be brought out.
Central to this process of cultural syncretism, Hall (1991) argues, is the rediscovery of
ethnicity. It is important to acknowledge that this process of black cultUral production does not
occur in a void, but must be seen as placed and positioned within historical, political, and
social discourses. In this way, he argues, the rediscovery of ethnicity and 'roots' is a
prerequisite for the politics of representation: 'I do not think the margins could speak up
without first grounding themselves somewhere' (1991:36). Thus the revival of ethnicity and
'roots' can not merely represent a return to the past, but must be re-experienced through the
categories of the present in order to produce a politics of criticism, of challenge and
resistance. In similar vein, Cornel West (1993) states:
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The most desirable option for people of colour who promote the new cultural
politics of difference is to be a Critical Organic Catalyst. By this I mean a person
who stays attuned to the best of what mainstream has to offer - its paradigms,
viewpoints, and methods - yet maintains a grounding in affirming and enabling
subcultures of criticism. (1 993:21 6)
The new politics of representation, therefore, is based on the concept of 'identity through
difference', in which ethncity plays as important part. In his later works, Hall uses ethnicity to
demonstrate the importance of placing black cultural politics in the context of globalisation.
Hall (1992) argues that the expansion of the world market into a global system has had the
effect of fragmenting the old identities of race, class, gender, ethnicity and nation, which
stabilised the social world, and enabled individuals to locate themselves in society.
Traditional sources of authority and identity have become fragmented, and collective sources
of membership and belonging displaced (Mercer 1990). Consequently, Hall argues there has
been a subsequent shift in personal identities, which can no longer be seen as stable and
unified. As Hall (1992:277) states 'This produces the post-modern subject, conceptualised as
having no fixed, essential or permanent identity. Identity becomes a "moveable feast":
formed and transformed continously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed
in the cultural systems which surround us'. In this way, individuals can be seen to take on
different identities at different times, and within different contexts, producing a multiplicity of
identities that can be both complementory and contraditory.
This situation is further compounded by the spread of global consumerism, in which
the cultural differences that previously defined identity become detached from their origin and
become assimilated into the global consumer market; that is, they become consumed by the
process of 'cultural homogenisation'. According to Kevin Robbins (1991), this 'global
standardisation in the cultural industries' is indicative of the quest for achieving greater
economies of both scale and scope. This is achieved, he argues (1991:29), 'by targeting the
shared habits and tastes of particular market segments at the global level, rather than by
marketing on the basis of geographical proximity to different national audiences'. However,
Robbins points out, within this process of cultural homogenisation it is not possible to
eradicate or transcend difference completely. Rather, the resourceful global conglomerate
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exploits local difference and particularity: 'the local and the "exotic" are torn out of place and
times to be repacked for the world bazaar' (1991:31). Thus cultural artef acts and images are
commodified, detached from their sources of origin and thrown onto the world market where
their meanings become infinitely translatable. Thus, as Rutherford (1990:11) points out:
'Difference ceases to threaten, or to signify power relations. Otherness is sought after for its
exchange value, its exoticism and the pleasures, thrills and adventures it can offer'. For
Robbins, time and distance can no longer be seen to mediate the encounter with the
otherness and difference.
Globalisation is about the compression of time and space horizons and the
creation of a world of instantaneity and depth!essness. Global space is a space
of flows, an electronic space, a decentred space, a space in which frontiers and
boundaries have become permeable. Within this global arena, economies and
cultures are thrown into intense and immediate contact with each other - with
each 'Other' (an other that is no longer 'out there', but also within). (1991:33)
However, whilst he sees the prevailing force of globalisation reflected in the processes
of de-localisation, locality, like difference can never be completely transcended. Rather, the
restructuring of capitalist economies can be seen to have increased the significance of
localities, developing new and intricate relations between global space and local space,
producing what he describes as a new global-local nexus. Thus globalisation, he argues,
necessarily requires an interaction with, and understanding of, the 'local'. The local in this
sense however does not refer to a specific area or territory, but instead must be seen as a
'fluid and relational space', significant only in relation to the global. This is not to undermine
the value of local cultures and identities, but these are always over-shadowed by the process
of cultural homogenisation. Thus, Robbins argues (1991: 41):
The global-local nexus is associated with new relations between space and
place, fixity and mobility, centre and periphery, 'real' and 'virtual' space, 'inside'
and 'outside', frontier and territory. This, inevitably, has implications for both
individual and collective identities and for the meaning and coherence of
community.
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As Hall (1992) argues, what is being debated in part is the tension between the 'global'
and the 'local' in the transformation of identities. The established boundaries of national
identities have been disrupted and dissolved by the spread of global culture, challenging the
stability and unity of identity. Thus in Britain, Hall argues (1992:307) 'the first effect of
globalisation has been to contest the settled contours of national identity, and to expose its
closures to the pressures of difference, 'otherness' and cultural diversity'. One consequence
of this, Hall (1991) points out, is the emergence of the local, of the marginal, as a powerful
space that has the potential to challenge the discourses of the dominant regimes. As these
discourses weaken under the process of globalisation, so the local and marginal pull away.
However, the impact of globalisation is nevertheless contradictory, the reaction of the local
and the marginal can be both expansive and defensive. Thus some identities may 'gravitate'
towards what Robbins refers to as 'Tradition', attempting to reconstruct purified identities
which restore unity and certainty in reaction to the ever-increasing diversity. Threatened by
the forces of globalisation, the margins 'can themselves retreat into their own exclusivist and
defensive enclaves' (Hall 1991:36). Hall (1992) cites two examples of this tendency in the
resurgence of nationalism in Eastern Europe and the rise of religious fundamentalism.
However, Hall argues, this is not the only possible consequence of globalisation, another,
involves what Bhabha (1994) and Robbins (1991) refer to as 'Translation'.
This describes those identity formations which cut across and intersect natural
frontiers, and which are composed of people who have been dispersed forever
from their homelands. Such people retain strong links with their places of origin
and their traditions, but they are without the illusion of a return to the past. They
are obliged to come to terms with the new cultures they inhabit, without simply
assimilating to them and losing their identities completely. They bear upon them
the traces of their particular cultures, traditions, languages and histories by
which they were shaped. The difference is that they are not and will never be
unified in the old sense, because they are irrevocably the product of several
interlocking histories and cultures, belonging at one and the same time to
several 'homes' (and to no one particular 'home'). People belonging to such
cultures of hybridity have had to renounce the dream or ambition of
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rediscovering any kind of 'lost' cultural purity, or ethnic absolutism. They are
irrevocably translated. (Hall 1992:310)
In this way, Hall presents a radical re-framing of the concept of ethnicity that moves away
from more primordial definitions of ethnic identity, and acknowledges the influences of both
local and global in the construction of individual and collective identities. Thus Hall uses the
concept of ethnicity to explore the question of positioning and placing in relation to the local
and the global. The local represents a space for the development of counter-movements of
resistance that challenge the dominant regimes of society, but he is not referring here to a
specific locality. Rather, the local should be seen to represent resistances that are separate
from one another. 'So I use the local and the global as prisms for looking at the same thing.
But they have pertinent appearances, points of appearance, scenarios in the different
locations' (Hall 1991:61). Thus as West (1993) points out, what is significant about these new
ethnicities in the way in which difference is defined. It is about 'how and what' constitutes
difference and what elements are prioritised in the terms of representation. The new cultural
politics of representation/difference therefore involves not only a reworking of ethnicity but
also a re-theorising of difference (Hall 1991).
For Brah (1996) this involves studying the articulation between different forms of
social differentiation, both empirically and historically, and to see them as contingent
relationships with multiple determinations. Like Hall, Brah considers the 'de-coupling' of
ethnicity from the essentialist notions of race, nation and culture to be vital. She subsequently
views ethnicity as 'a mode of narrativising the everyday life world in and through processes of
boundary formation' (1996:240). Thus ethnicity is seen as the way in which notions of
'difference' and 'commonality' are created, transformed and resisted; as well as how these
are subsequently influenced by the specific political, cultural and historical forces in
operation. She therefore views ethnicity as no less 'real' than other forms of social
differentiation, such as race, class and gender. For Brah, the significance lies in the particular
power relations that operate to articulate these differences. She therefore considers it vital
that different forms of oppression are not 'compartmentalised'. Rather, she suggests, what is
needed is a strategy for challenging all forms of oppression through an understanding of how
they interconnect and articulate. She thus advocates a 'multi-axial performative' concept of
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power, which problematises the notion of minority and majority positions, by highlighting the
way in which a group considered a 'minority' in terms of one form of differentiation may be
viewed as a majority in another. Minorities are thus positioned in complex and diverse ways,
in relation both to majorities as well as to other minorities.
Brah advocates the concept of diaspora, which focuses on these complex relations
of power that differentiate diasporas internally as well as position them in relation to one
another. She sees diasporas as 'historical contingent genealogies', which are experienced
through specific relations of race, gender, class and generation. 'As such, all diasporas are
differentiated, heterogeneous, contested spaces, even as they are implicated in the
construction of a common "we" (1 996:184). They encompass both the local and the global,
with members of a single diaspora often scattered throughout the world. The concept of
diaspora therefore demonstrates the flexible and changing nature of 'origins', whilst at the
same time acknowledging the importance of 'home' as an imagined place as opposed to a
specific territory. Thus the concept of diaspora 'refers to multi-locationality within and across
territorial, cultural and psychic boundaries' (1996: 197).
Brah proposes the concept of 'diaspora space', where experiences and imaginings of
diaspora, boundary and location come together and are articulated in relation to economic,
political and cultural processes.
It is where multiple subject positions are juxtaposed, contested, proclaimed or
disavowed; where the permitted and the prohibited perpetually interrogate; and
where the accepted and the transgressive imperceptibly mingle even while
these syncretic forms may be disclaimed in the name of purity and tradition.
Here, tradition is itself continually invented even as it may be hailed as
originating from the mists of time. (1 996:208)
It is in this diaspora space, she argues, that cultural process that both unite and divide are
experienced, negotiated, transformed and resisted. Thus for Brah, diaspora space is about
the contestation of boundaries of both inclusion and exclusion. As such it is inhabited by both
the 'indigenous' and the 'non-indigenous', the 'migrant' and the 'native'. 'In other words, the
concept of diaspora space includes the entanglement of genealogies of dispersion with those
of "staying put"(1996:209). It is here that various forms of social differentiation - race, class,
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gender, ethnicity, sexuality, etc. - converge and interweave to produce multiple political and
cultural practices through which power is exerted. In this way, the new cultural politics of
difference, what Brah refers to as 're-figuring the multi', must be seen as part of the
continuous struggle to find new ways of understanding the relationship between and across
specific fields of power, as they are exercised in the transformation of social relations,
subjectivity and identity. In this way, 'difference' and 'commonality' must be seen as relational
concepts. It is not possible, she argues, to prioritise a specific axis of differentiation, for such
a priority is contingent; it can not be envisaged as an autonomous category, despite having
independent effects. It is only by viewing difference and power relations in this way, Brah
argues, that it is possible to effect a politics that fosters solidarity without eradicating
difference.
Ethnicity, therefore, must be seen as a relevant concept but, as Floya Anthias and
Nira Yuval-Davis (1992) point out, it can not simply be viewed as synonymous with culture
and identity. Ethnicity is an important concept for understanding the dynamics of culture and
structure, but it is not the most important, factors such as 'race', class and gender are equally
significant to our understanding.
Ethnicity is more than merely a question of ethnic identity, either in the personal
sense vis-à-vis the individual's identification with a group or in terms of a
collective sentiment. Ethnicity involves partaking of the social conditions of a
group, which is positioned in a particular way in terms of the social allocation of
resources, within a context of difference to other groups, as well as
commonalities and differences within (in relation to the divisions of class and
gender, for example, within the group). Ethnicity cross-cuts gender and class
division, but at the same time involves the position of a similarity (on the inside)
and a difference (from the outside) that seeks to transcend these divisions.
(Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992:9)
Ethnicity, class and gender all involve differential allocation of resources and process of
inclusion and exclusion, through patterns of subordination and domination. They also contain
systems of representation involving 'capacities' and 'needs' contained within both general
and official discourses, and state practices and policies. However, Anthias and Yuval-Davis
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argue, each division relates to a distinct location, 'that is, to different ontological spheres'
(1992:17). Their approach, therefore, requires an analysis of the intersection between
ethnicity, 'race', class and gender divisions and processes within the state. Only by
conceiving social divisions in this way, they argue, is it possible to challenge the practices of
exclusion and subordination operating within specific historical context. Political struggles do
not have to be uniform. Rather, they argue, what is needed is a recognition of differences of
interest in terms of 'race', class and gender divisions, 'otherwise any notion of solidarity would
be inherently racist, sexist and classist' (1 992:197)2.
Summary
From the evidence produced by 'ethnic studies' research it is clear that there exists in Britain
a variety of different 'ethnic' cultures, which can often be used not only to foster group
solidarity but also to distinguish them from other individuals and groups. However, the overall
question is whether tension and conflicts between ethnic groups derive from perceptions of
cultural (and physical) differences that one group sees in another, or whether they are the
result of political and economic factors that generate conflicts of interest expressed in an
ethnic or racial form. Thus one would expect that in the absence of these political and
economic factors cultural differences would exist and be observed but would not necessarily
give rise to conflict. Two points should be considered here. Firstly, although ethnicity is
potentially an important source of in-group solidarity and intra-group division, that potential
only has reality within the social context from which it is derived. Thus it is important to
consider conflicts that are non-ethnic (and non-racial), particularly those which derive from
political and economic inequalities. Secondly, group solidarity and divisions between different
groups are always more acute when centred on the bonds of ethnicity and race.
Thus in any examination of 'race and ethnic studies' what is important is to examine
the interplay between 'cultural' and 'structural' forces. In addition, it must be acknowledged
that different 'ethnic groups' possess differential degrees of power. It is this fact that ethnicity
studies, on the whole, have failed to account for. Ethnicity tends to be conceived as a benign
2 These arguments are developed further in a recent article by Anthias (1999), which is
discussed in the concluding chapter.
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phenomenon not necessarily involving any sort of oppression, coercion or exploitation. Hence
the strategy for resolving ethnic conflict is seen to be the fostering of 'mutual understanding'
and cultural compromise. By focusing on cultural differences, however, attention has been
diverted from the problems of oppression, exploitation and conflict that are the very problems
that need to be tackled. Thus in the final analysis, any concept of ethnicity, whilst
acknowledging that specific groups wish to maintain a sense of common identity and cultural
exclusion, must take account of the structural forces that impinge upon all members of
society, black and white, male and female, and from whatever class position, within a specific
historical context.
However, although we might want to question the usefulness or accuracy of the
'ethnic studies' framework, this does not mean that the notion of culture is irrelevant to the
study of 'ethnic and racial minorities' in Britain. The existence of culture and of a sense of
common identity amongst groups of people who wish to reinforce and maintain their cultural
characteristics in relation to others must be recognised; for this process has real political,
economic and social effects for the groups concerned. Yet, equally, it must be acknowledged
that these individuals are members of the society as a whole and subsequently dominated by
the processes of 'race', class and gender which operate in that society. Thus, as Gilroy
(1987) and Phoenix (1988) argue, what is needed is a more sophisticated theory of culture,
one that embodies the structural influences of class, gender and 'race'. Culture should not be
seen as a 'fixed and impermeable feature of social relations', but, instead, the active,
dynamic aspects of cultural life should be emphasised.
This call for a redefinition of culture needs to reach beyond the description of relevant
belief systems towards a search for the social factors that shape and condition those beliefs.
Cultural beliefs cannot be seen as 'given' or simply 'there'. Instead we must acknowledge that
a society's 'culture' (its network of attitudes, values, meanings and ideologies) is connected in
complex and intricate ways with its 'structure' (its productive arrangements, power
relationships and social institutions). In this way, culture can be seen to refer to the
processes, categories and knowledges through which communities are defined, that is, the
way in which they,
 are rendered specific and differentiated. An emphasis on the social
construction of 'race', as well as that of gender and class, acknowledges the fact that
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individuals play an active role in the creation and maintenance of meaning. Nevertheless, this
activity takes place within particular historical and structural contexts that tend to limit
people's choices and make certain behaviour and cultural responses more likely than others.
It is the interaction of these different variables that recent theories of ethnicity seek to
understand. What is needed therefore is an approach that examines the significance of
social consciousness, of inter-group behaviour and of social structure.
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Chapter Two
Asian Muslims in Britain: Differentiation and Ethnic Diversity
According to the 1991 Census there are 475,800 Pakistanis in Britain and 160,300
Bangladeshis, representing 0.91 and 0.3 per cent of the population respectively (Anwar
1998), most of whom can be assumed to be Muslims. The majority of Pakistanis in this
country are from two particular areas of Pakistan: the Punjab and Mirpur and are from
predominantly rural backgrounds. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are the most disadvantaged
groups in Britain, according to Anwar (1998). Pakistanis are comparatively less concentrated
in the South East compared to other groups and found in greater numbers in the West
Midlands, Yorkshire, the North West and Scotland. These settlement patterns are inherently
bound up with the nature of the migration process itself. However, as a result of such
settlement patterns they have been disproportionately affected by the loss of manufacturing
jobs in these areas, and have therefore experienced high rates of unemployment. According
to Anwar, the very high unemployment rates and the proportions of unskilled and manual
jobs mean that many Pakistanis and Bangladeshis with large families have low incomes and
are in poverty. This has implications for housing, health and the education of children (Anwar
1998:183).
The political character of the Muslim population has changed dramatically over the
last decade, with Muslims across the country taking a more active role in the politics of their
communities. However, it is important to emphasise that although collective Muslim action
has been apparent at specific times, for example, during the Rushdie affair, a common
Muslim stance does not exist in Britain. Throughout the country there is widespread
divergence between Muslims along regional/linguistic, national and British regional lines.
Contrary to the popular view, Britain's Pakistani population is extremely
heterogeneous. The migrants come from different socio-economic
backgrounds, and lifestyles of Pakistanis from the same region of origin differ
from city to city in Britain. Local housing and employment markets, the history of
immigration and the composition of other minority populations have produced
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varying opportunities for, and reactions to, the local Pakistani population.
(Saifullah Khan 1977:57)
Their political strength as Muslims is therefore considerably weakened by these differences,
and the establishment of specific Muslim parties and groups seems to have had the effect of
splitting the population further. Yet debates concerning the notion of Muslim unity continue to
dominate much of the discussion on Muslims in Britain.
The question of religious unity is not solely confined to Muslims in Britain. For
example, Roger Ballard (1994), considering the commitment to unity and solidarity among
Sikhs, argues that divisions based on sect, caste, occupation, power and wealth and most
notably 'personal rivalry', are inherent characteristics of Sikh (and Punjabi) society and have
subsequently led to disunity.
They have also long been matched by countervailing forces: Sikhs have always
been strongly committed to unity, no less for its pragmatic benefits than for
ideological reasons. And it is when they have faced the most severe external
threats (successively from the Mughals, the British, the Arya Samaj, the Muslims
in the civil war following Partition, and now the rising forces of Hindu
chauvinism) that internal contradictions have been most comprehensively
glossed over, so allowing the Sikhs to move closer to their ideal condition of
unity' (1 994:115).
Thus while there is significant evidence of periods of unity throughout Sikh history, this
position has not been easily reached. Once the perceived external threats have diminished,
Ballard argues, the internal divisions have re-emerged, and any sense of unity has
evaporated. Nevertheless, he points out, paradoxically it is these divisions that have held
Sikhs together, and led to the 'collective success'. He believes that it is because of their
vigorous pursuit of internal rivalries that Sikhs across the globe have made such significant
advances
A review of the literature demonstrates that a similar situation can be found among
Pakistanis in Britain. The factors that have served to promote cultural cohesion among the
first generation are also those that produce and maintain internal differentiation. The aim of
this chapter, therefore, is to highlight the significance of ethnicity and religion among Asian
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Muslims in Britain in relation to their experiences of racial, ethnic, class and gender
discrimination; and how these often competing and conflicting forms of social differentiation
influence the creation, maintenance and transformation of individual and collective identity.
To what extent is religion becoming a more attractive basis for individual and collective
identification among Asian Muslims in Britain, and to what extent do experiences and
perceptions of different forms of social differentiation influence this identification?
The chapter begins by examining these factors and outlines the nature of the
diversity among first-generation Pakistanis in Britain. It will then go on to look at the position
of the second and third generations, and show how their experiences bring further diversity to
the Pakistani population. The literature on Muslim women further highlights the importance of
gender as another source of differentiation. Yet despite the significance of these factors,
there are still those who view the unity of Muslims in Britain as a real possibility. These
arguments will be outlined later in the chapter, together with those studies that have
highlighted the importance of a Muslim identity to the second generation. This position,
however, is not without its critics and several commentators have warned against the
religious grip that is taking hold of many Muslim communities in Britain, restricting the
choices that Muslim women can make. Thus while these factors may continue to divide
Pakistanis and Muslims in general still further, they do demonstrate the complex and shifting
nature of religious and cultural variables, and the social identities that are constructed out of
these variables, as well as the influence of structural factors such as 'race', class and gender.
The First Generation
The 'phenomenon' of the existence of specific regional communities among the Asian
population in Britain, according to Vaughan Robinson (1986), can partly be explained by the
pattern of chain migration, where newly arrived migrants sought accommodation with earlier
arrivals, and also by a conscious desire on the part of Asian migrants to maintain close links
with fellow villagers in order to safeguard cultural values. Anwar (1979) claims that the aim
behind such residential clustering was to recreate Indian or Pakistani village life in Britain.
Such a system provides not only security and support for Asian migrants but also ensures
that traditional norms and values are maintained within the community. in this way, according
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to Robinson (1986:79): 'the interaction of Indian and Pakistani migrants is controlled by
norms, sanctions, and values which are derived directly from those currently prevailing within
the village of origin. Migrants seek to create an environment that will strengthen, rather than
challenge, these values'. The economic spur to migration is not so much to earn a living but
to supplement and build on the resources the kin groups already possess. Migration is seen
as an economic investment intended to raise their social and economic status in Pakistan,
rather than a serious bid for a gratifying 'new life' in Britain. Consequently, the Pakistani who
travelled to Britain (at least in the earlier years of post-war migration) was typically a transient
rather than a permanent settler. The intention was to return eventually to Pakistan, and this
signified a particular scale of values.
The orientation to Pakistan is perhaps most vividly represented in the reproduction of
features of that way of life within Britain. Thus, it is possible to see the migrant community
attempting to carve out a life style which approximates to an extension of village life, with
some necessary modifications to adjust to the new context. Of course, in the early years of
migration it was not possible simply to recreate village life in Britain. Early settlers, often
discharged seamen, were drawn from different villages and kin groups, yet had to share
accommodation with others. So Badr Dahya (1974) describes a 'fusion' taking place between
different Pakistani groupings. Nevertheless, with the pick up in numbers generally - and more
particularly with the phenomenon of sponsored migration (where the village-kin group
sponsors someone to join another member in Britain) there has been a gradual process of
'fission' or internal division, first along regional then along village-kin lines. There had always
been certain divisions within the Pakistani population in Britain, but over time village-kin
divisions became more distinct, as larger family units were established in Britain.
This progression from fusion to fission was also highlighted by Verity Saifullah Khan
(1976). She states that the earliest migrants from India and Pakistan either became
integrated into the indigenous British population or sought the company of other Asians, with
whom they had much more in common than with the local population. However, as the
number of Asian migrants increased, and with it the growth in ethnic services and facilities,
the need for contact with the indigenous population decreases. In addition, with the arrival of
friends and family, internal differentiation along ethnic and class lines began to emerge.
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'Informal gossip networks' among family and kin in Britain, together with the close
communication with Pakistan, combined to reinforce religious and ethnic norms and
practices and to safeguard the migrants from the 'corrupting influence' of British society.
Thus differentiation or cleavages occurred along village-kin lines and between the more
'Western-orientated' elite and the migrants from the poorer rural origins.
However, Dahya argues that alongside this internal differentiation there is movement
towards on over-arching solidarity among Pakistani groups. The considerable separation
between these communities and the rest of the 'host' population, and the sheer scale of racial
hostility helps unite the Pakistani groups. Thus, the structured exclusion from 'white' society
helps generate the internal solidarity of these groups. He describes Pakistani communities as
an 'army on the march' who choose to live together to defend their ethnic identity, rather than
being forced into it by outside pressures.
Saifullah Khan (1976) takes issue with Dahya on the degree of deliberation and
common perspective among all Pakistanis that he implies, but which she feels is clearly
contradicted by his and other evidence. For her, there is no such thing as 'Pakistani ethnicity'.
'If ethnicity refers to common identification and behaviour based on a common history and
culture, the fact that Pakistan is only 27 years old and its population spans five main ethnic
groups will explain why the factor of common national origin has not been more significant in
the organisation of Pakistanis in Britain' (1976:228). In addition, the strength of village-kin
networks, both in Britain and Pakistan, has contributed to the lack of any manifestations of
ethnicity at the level of nationality. Thus according to Saifullah Khan, one cannot speak about
'Pakistani ethnicity' in any meaningful sense because migrants from Pakistan rarely consider
themselves as sharing common characteristics. Rather, their sense of difference with the
majority population in Britain is perceived in relation to their family and fellow villagers from
the same region.
The dangers of generalisation are also highlighted by Roger Ballard (1994). He
argues:
If one regards a community as a body of people whose feelings of mutual
identification, are strong enough to precipitate an active and ongoing sense of
solidarity, the great majority of Britain's ethnic colonies rest on much more
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parochial foundations than is commonly supposed. The networks of reciprocity
which provide the framework for most settlers' everyday lives are largely
grounded in much narrower loyalties of caste, sect and descent-group. (1 994:4)
Alison Shaw (1988, 1994), also stresses the importance of family and kin to Pakistani
migrants. She points out that although the initial migration from Pakistan largely involved
single men, these individuals were sponsored by their entire extended family, and thus their
loyalties and expectations where linked directly to those of the wider kinship group or
biradari1 as well as to those of the family. Such links not only had a major impact on patterns
of migration, since newcomers tended to head for specific areas in Britain were they were
assisted in finding work and accommodation by their family and fellow villagers. The
presence of kinsfolk also exerted strong control on the lives of these men, ensuring that most
continued to conform and uphold the expectations of their extended family and biradari in
Pakistan. For Shaw, the key to the arrival of women and children in the late 1 960s and early
1 970s lay in the expectations of the biradari back in Pakistan, rather than simply a response
to new immigration legislation. The arrival of women and children ensured the further
continuation and strengthening of biradari loyalties in response to the new environment, and
re-imposing the biradari control over male sexuality. Thus family reunion can be seen to have
had a strongly 'conservative' influence on lifestyles within the community. 'This served both to
sustain community distinctiveness and to shelter its members from Western influence' (Shaw
1994:48).
These studies of Pakistani communities point to certain continuities between life in
Pakistan and life in Britain. The 'village institutions' are reproduced within Britain, and mutual
aid, pooling of resources, and religious practices are successfully perpetuated. Thus it is
argued that Asians in Britain make conscious efforts to avoid interaction with the rest of
British society. Furthermore, as Desai (1963) argues, Indian and Pakistani migrants also
minimise the need for contact with other Asian groups. Thus there is a tendency for Gujeratis
to mix predominantly with other Gujeratis, Punjabis with fellow Punjabis, and so on.
Deliberate strategies are employed for this purpose, Robinson argues, which lead to spatial
separation and social exclusivity. In this way, cultural values can be maintained in preparation
1 Literally meaning brotherhood, it represents a localised intermarrying 'caste' group (Lewis
1994).
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for return to the village of origin. Furthermore, Shaw (1988) argues, the desire for cultural
purity is further compounded by the negative evaluations which Pakistani migrants hold of
British society. She claims that while in Pakistan Britain is held in great esteem, Pakistanis in
Britain are far more critical of British society. Likewise, Jeffery (1976) argues that Pakistani
migrants were highly critical of British morality, sexuality and family life.
However, as Saifullah Khan (1976) argues, it is also important to acknowledge that
Pakistani migration to Britain occurred somewhat later than the migration of other ethnic
groups, and consequently coincided with the increase of hostility against the immigrant
population on the part of the indigenous British people, the tightening of immigration controls
and the decline in the British economy.
Such factors as numerical size of the population, the nature of the migration
process and the legal, economic and social characteristics are all significant
variables in the apparent manifestation of the distinctiveness attributed to
Pakistanis. Maintenance, even development, of the minorities' own system of
resources and distinct identity is particularly important for the minority that meets
structural exclusion and feels insecure or threatened. External definition and
reception of the majority society (be it hostile, neutral or misinformed) may
support existing tendencies towards encapsulation. (Saifullah Khan 1976:223)
Thus according to both Saifullah Khan (1976) and Anwar (1985), the encapsulation' of
Pakistanis needs to be understood in the framework of external constraints within Britain and
pressures on them to conform to the cultural norms and values of their family and kin in
Pakistan. However, Saifullah Khan points out that such encapsulation limits inter ethnic
relations across the ethnic boundaries and consequently reinforces their ethnicity.
It is clear that internal differentiation and diversity were significant characteristics of
the first generation of Pakistanis in Britain. It is not nationality, religion or language that
provided a focusing point for the first generation, but the much more narrowly defined
principles of family, kin and biradari. These allegiances, whilst serving an invaluable role in
the maintenance of traditional norms and behaviour among Pakistanis in Britain have also
divided the population as a whole. However, with the emergence of a British-born and raised
generation the focus of the Pakistani population has begun to change. According to Shaw
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(1994), the protection of the community from Western influence and the preservation and
assertion of its distinctive identity has now become the main concern for many Pakistanis in
Britain.
The Second Generation
The family is at the heart of Islamic society, and Muslims regard a stable family life as
essential for the stability of that society. There are many rules and regulations in the Quran
concerning the safeguarding of the family, such things as the relationships between men and
women, prohibitions against sex outside marriage, and covering the body. In addition,
respect for parents, and elders in general, is strongly upheld. Writers such as McDermott and
Manazir Ahsan (1980) and Joly (1987) believe that the preservation of family loyalty and
family networks within Muslim communities has assisted considerably in the preservation of
Islamic values in the second generation in Britain.
However, it has been suggested that the family can also be a site of conflict between
the first and second generation (Anwar 1985). The parents are considered to be largely
uneducated, from rural backgrounds, and have an outlook on society that is very different
from that of western society. Their children, on the other hand, have been brought up in
Britain and have experienced western culture and western ideas and values. They have
mixed with people who have different values and attitudes from their own family, and, it is
argued, this can cause conflict between themselves and their parents. The second
generation holds ideas and values from western culture that their parents do not understand
and cannot understand. Thus many writers (Taylor 1976; Watson 1977; Anwar 1982) believe
that there is a vast generation gap emerging between Pakistanis of different generations. As
a result of this, it is argued, many second-generation Pakistanis find themselves 'caught
between two cultures', experiencing both the Pakistani Muslim culture of their parents at
home and western culture from their peer group at school and work.
In her study of Pakistanis in Bradford, Verity Saifullah Khan (1977) argues that 'the
difference between Mirpuri parents and children is a generation gap, resulting from time of
birth, background and subsequent experience of different cultures and social change. There
is also a difference of orientation' (1 977:86). Whereas for the first generation life in Britain is
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perceived as an extension of life back home, the second generation have experience of life in
two different worlds which inevitably affects their attitudes, and in turn their behaviour.
Saifullah Khan argues that although the 'two cultures' may appear contradictory, Mirpuri
children are flexible enough to avoid identity conflicts and maintain a consistent view of
themselves. In addition, most Mirpur children in Bradford have limited contact with local
English children and, together with the strong emotional support of their family and kin, this
ensures a relatively coherent and unconfused view of the world. Nevertheless, she argues,
intergenerational differences and conflicts are apparent. 'The divergent culture and
orientation of British Asians and their parents, particularly those of rural origin, produce
tensions that arise from a mutual inability to appreciate the priorities and preoccupations of
the other' (1 977:86).
Within the Muslim population, according to such writers as Anwar (1982) and Joly
(1987), the major concern and focus of attention is to ensure the maintenance and security of
Islam among the second generation, as it will be they who determine the future of Islam in
Britain. The first generation, therefore, make strenuous efforts to preserve the principles of
Islam within their children. However, according to Ellis (1991) and Raza (1991), many Muslim
parents feel that the second generation is a 'lost generation', who are being enticed away
from Islam by the perceived attractions of British society.
There are several factors, Raza (1991) argues that contribute to the westernisation
of Muslims in Britain. Firstly, westernisation can occur as result of what he calls the 'income
factor', whereby individuals join the mainstream employment market and through this
become integrated into the class structure of British society, and hence the culture of British
society. Through their involvement in mainstream employment, Raza argues, individuals
begin identifying along class lines based on the buying power of their income, and thus adopt
the corresponding class ideologies of status symbols and social mixing. Secondly, Raza
argues, westernisation can occur through an individual's membership of the British education
system. Through this system young Muslims are educated in the history of British culture
and society, and as a result may come to identify more strongly with British culture than
Islam. Thirdly, it is at school where individuals come under the most influence from peer
group pressure, and the strong incentive to imitate the practices of their peers in terms of
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dress, culture and identity. Fourthly, Raza argues, language is another factor that can lead to
increased westernisation among young Muslims. Speaking English gives individuals access
to literature written in that language, and consequently becomes a vehicle of communication
for the transmission of ideas, values and knowledge of the dominant society and culture.
Finally, Raza believes that the society itself can become an influencing factor, disseminating
ideas through the media of its 'superior' culture, undermining and devaluing other cultures
and lifestyles.
However, Raza argues, the process of westernisation is not merely a one-sided
process. As well as the pressure by family and community to conform to traditional culture,
there is also the factor of racism. Thus as several writers point out (James, 1974; Anwar
1979; Ballard 1979; Robinson 1986; Hiro 1991), even though the second generation may
have been born and/or brought up in Britain, and possess a thorough knowledge of British
society and culture, the presence of racism and discrimination in British society makes them
aware that they are 'different' and may never be accepted as British by the indigenous white
population. On the one hand, writers such as Henly (1982) and Raza (1991) argue, an
awareness of racial discrimination can lead the individual to reject their culture and religion,
considering it to be inferior to that of western society. This situation can leave individual
isolated: rejecting their own community and culture and being rejected by the dominant
society and culture. On the other hand, however, writers such as Watson (1977) and Raza
(1991) state that the experience of racism and discrimination can precipitate a reactive pride
in their separate 'ethnic' and cultural identity. Feelings of rejection from mainstream society,
therefore, can cause the second generation to revert back to the culture and religion of the
family and community.
However, comparative studies of Asian young people have highlighted considerable
contrasts between Muslims and other South Asian groups, such as Sikhs and Hindus. Hiro
(1991) states that religious identification is stronger among young Muslims than young
Hindus; whilst other commentators have mentioned the Muslims' greater conservatism
(Taylor 1976). Likewise Evans (1971) notes that his Pakistani respondents were 'the most
culturally introverted group'. There are several reasons why Muslims may be the most
'conservative' group. Firstly, Islam is regarded as an ethical code which covers most day-to-
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day aspects of individual, family and community life, including, for example, dress and
etiquette, food and personal hygiene. Secondly, many Muslims are recent arrivals to Britain
compared with Sikhs and Hindus, and are therefore less willing to change. Thirdly, they
mainly come from rural backgrounds and are mainly working class, in occupational terms.
In a study of young Asians in Britain and Canada, Singh Ghuman (1994) found his
Muslims informants to be more 'religious-minded', they attended mosques regularly and had
a greater knowledge of their religion in contrast to their Sikh and Hindu peers, who tended to
be 'woefully ignorant' of their respective religions. The main reason for this, he argues, is the
lack of properly organised religious instruction among the Sikh and Hindu communities
compared to the various Muslim communities. In addition, Muslim parents tended to be more
concerned about the religious education of children and young people. Furthermore, Muslim
parents were particularly concerned with the education of their girls, and preferred single-sex
schools. Hindu and Sikh parents, on the other hand, felt that the way to achieve inter-cultural
understanding was to follow the norms of the host society.
In comparison, Anwar (1998) found that the importance of religion for all Asians
marks them out as distinct from other ethnic groups. For the overwhelming majority of Asians
he studied, religion was the main basis for their ethnic identity. However, there were
differences between Asian groups. Three quarters of the Muslims thought that religion was
very important for the way they lived their lives compared with less than half of Hindus and
Sikhs. There were also differences in attitudes towards such issues as single-sex schooling
and the establishing of schools of one's own religion, with Muslims much more in favour of
such provisions. Differences between Muslims and Sikhs and Hindus also emerged on the
question of freedom for girls. With Muslims, both parents and young people were more in
favour of restrictions on teenage girls. There was also a greater tendency for Muslim young
women always to wear Asian clothes compared to Sikh and Hindu women. In general, Anwar
argues, the young Muslims seemed to have a more 'conservative' outlook and a higher
conformity to religio-cultural norms than Sikh or Hindu young people. These differences, he
believes are partly religious and partly linked to social class, educational backgrounds, and
areas of origin and time of migration to Britain.
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These studies point to the continuation of Islamic and Pakistani norms and traditions,
albeit in a modified form, among the second generation, especially when compared with
other Asian groups. However, they also demonstrate the potential for divisions between the
generations. Born and brought up in Britain, the second generation has a much wider basis
from which to construct their identities and sense of belonging, than is open to the first
generation. In addition, they have little or no personal experience of life in Pakistan, which is
of such importance to the first generation. Differences in opinions and attitudes are therefore
to some extent inevitable, although this need not necessarily lead to conflict as some
commentators have suggested. Nevertheless, it does indicate the possibility of increased
diversity within the Pakistani population. The issue of gender also adds a further layer of
differentiation, as the following section illustrates.
The Position of Muslim Women
The common assumption expressed by the media and other sections of British society is that
Muslim women are suppressed and isolated, subordinate to 'their' men and confined to their
homes. Early studies, whilst rejecting some of these myths, still seemed to confirm the view
that Muslim women in Britain were in general more isolated and subject to more restrictions
than their non-Muslim counterparts. According to Anwar (1982), Muslim women can face
special difficulties arising from certain rules of social behaviour laid down by their cultures
and/or religion. To preserve traditional customs like purdah can be very difficult. There are
several elements to the concept of purdah, but in general it refers to the creation of separate
spheres of existence for men and women. Thus, according to Jeffery (1976), who writes
about Muslim women in Pakistan, 'on the one hand, purdah refers to the division of the home
into separate areas (zenana for women and merdana for men), often by use of a curtain,
though sometimes with a wall. Further, purdah refers to the subtle ways in which a woman
creates and maintains social distance between herself and men through the use of her
dupatta, chaddar or burqa' (1976:28).
Far from weakening the influence of their traditional culture as many earlier
commentators predicted, Pakistanis in Britain have become stricter in their observance of
purdah, according to Saifullah Khan (1976). The improvement in the financial position of
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Pakistanis in Britain and their urban lifestyle has directly led to increased restriction in the
movement of women outside the home. As a result of these restrictions, together with the
fact that Pakistani women are discouraged from seeking employment outside, Muslim
women are considered to have a more isolated existence and a substantially reduced role in
Britain. This is confirmed by Joly's (1987) study of Muslims in Birmingham, which looks at
some of the issues facing second-generation Muslim women. She claims that Muslim
parents show particular concern for the education of girls, whom they see as more vulnerable
in British society. Beliefs about women's roles and responsibilities influence Muslim parents
decisions about the upbringing and education of their daughters in Britain. It is almost
impossible, she argues, for a girl to participate in the life of her British peers and remain a
good Muslim, so restrictions are considered necessary. What most concerns the parents is
the free mixing of sexes in all areas of British society including school.
According to Joly, 'Muslim leaders describe the girls as the mothers of tomorrow:
they will be the ones who transmit a proper Muslim way of life and values to children to come,
as their prime responsibility is to the upbringing of the family' (1987:17). Thus the Muslim
community sees the role of women as of crucial importance. They could jeopardise the whole
family and community structures if they do not conform. Many parents therefore, because of
the fear of westernisation through peer-group pressure and the free mixing of the sexes, are
unwilling to allow their daughters to continue in education or go out to work. The reputation of
their girls must be preserved at all costs. This, as Joly maintains, can lead to frustration for
women who want to pursue a career. Furthermore, Shaw (1988) argues that Muslim women
in Britain are likely to experience a greater degree of conflict with traditional culture due to the
fact that their role confines them predominantly to the arena of the family and home, that they
are denied the freedom afforded to Muslim men and further that they are considered
subordinate to men.
Further confirmation comes from Haleh Afshar's (1994) claim that amongst Muslims,
women are traditionally the appointed site of familial honour and shame and represent the
public face of the society's apparent commitment to Islam.
Muslim women are both the guardians and the guarded. The custodians of
religious beliefs, even though for centuries men have been the interpreters of
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the norms, values and practices according to that belief. Women, whether they
wished to or not, have been required to reflect the religious commitment of the
group in their attire and behaviour as well as in most aspects of their lives. This
has not been a painless or static process. At different times and places Muslim
women have come to different arrangements and have struck different bargains
with patriarchal structures within which they find themselves. (Afshar 1994:129)
However, Avtar Brah (1993, 1996) warns against focusing exclusively on 'culturalist'
explanations for understanding the position of Muslim women in Britain. By highlighting
employment trends among these women she demonstrates the importance of examining
structural factors as well as purely cultural elements. She points out that the reason most
commonly put forward for the lower economic activity rates for Muslim women is that Muslim
families do not permit female members to work outside the home. Such exclusively culturalist
explanations, however, fail to take account of factors such as: 'the later migration of Muslim
women from Pakistan and Bangladesh compared with Hindu and Sikh women from India; the
differences in the economic activity levels of Muslim women for Africa as compared with
Muslim women from the subcontinent; the regional variation between the levels of Muslim
women engaged in wage labour in the south-east and south-west of England compared with
Yorkshire and the West Midlands; the socio-economic position of the women prior to
migration and the different time period in which these women entered the 'modern' job
market in the countries of origin; and the structure of the local labour markets in the areas of
Muslim settlement in Britain' (1996:70). In addition, she argues studies that include young
Asian women from different ethnic groups do not allude to any significant variation in the
employment aspirations of young Muslim women compared with non-Muslims. When one
considers all the evidence, Brah argues religion and the family no longer exercise the
'overarching determinacy' that they are often given in discussions on young Asian women.
Women's personal narratives show them to be positioned differently within and
across a variety of discourses. For Brah, Muslim women's position in British society, and
specifically in the labour market, demonstrates the multiplicity of their experiences.
Overall we found that the young women's relationship to the labour market was
structured by a multiplicity of ideological, cultural and structural factors, such as
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the impact of the global and national economy on the local labour market,
ideologies about women's positions in relation to caring responsibilities and paid
work; the women's own social and political perspectives on such issues, that is
how they might 'feel' as well as 'think' about them; the role of education in the
social construction of gendered job aspirations, and racism. In other words,
structure, culture and agency; the social and the psychic are all implicated and
are all integral to the framework outlined. (1993:456)
Thus while gender discrimination both within the various Muslim communities and wider
British society remains a significant factor in the lives of young Muslim women, and
consequently adds a further layer of differentiation within the Pakistani population, it is not the
only factor that influences their lives. 'Race' and class are also crucial determinants in this
process. However, it is important to point out that these competing, and often contrasting,
elements are not experienced in a void. Muslim women are not merely passive victims of the
structural and cultural circumstances in which they find themselves, but, as Brah points out,
their own views and aspirations are crucial to an understanding of their position in society.
Some of their responses to this position are outlined in the following sections.
The Role of Islam
According to Anwar (1985), Islam is the 'binding force' which holds Pakistanis in Britain
together, and differentiates them from other ethnic groups. 'Religion was the basis used for
the creation of a separate Muslim state of Pakistan and it played an important role in creating
the feelings of minority status among Muslims in British India. It is also crucial for Pakistanis
who have settled in Britain and, once again, it is the distinguishing characteristic that
identifies them as a minority group' (1985:12). As Islam represents a whole way of life, he
argues, so it affects individual social relationships across ethnic boundaries thereby leading
to Pakistani 'encapsulation'. In addition, Shaw (1994) states that as the force of the myth of
return has declined, there has been a corresponding increase among Pakistanis of the
perception of themselves as a religious minority, and thus a growing concern with the issue
of Muslim identity. Despite the different emphasis, the current concern with religious identity
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can be seen as serving a very similar purpose to that once served by the myth of return, in
that it provides an effective way for migrants to maintain and control their distinctive culture.
According to Dilip Hiro (1991), the Rushdie affair had a profound effect on Muslims
throughout Britain, bringing them together for the first time. He states (1991:188) 'the
incomprehension of the media and the insensitivity of the government, revealed by the
'Satanic Verses' issue, added insult to injury. In a sense, the Rushdie affair crystallised a host
of Muslim grievances'. The Rushdie affair thus provided a focus point for the mobilisation of
Muslims in Britain committed to maintaining Islamic values in a country where they
represented a religious minority. In addition, Hiro argues, the affair halted the process of
secularisation which had been increasing gradually in Britain over the past few decades,
particularly within the second generation who had begun to question the religious and cultural
values of their parents. With the tenets of their faith under attack, secular, liberal and
traditional British Muslims were encouraged to join forces in defence of Islam.
Thus despite the evident diversity among Pakistanis in Britain, as outlined earlier in
the chapter, the notion of one Islamic community in Britain is receiving increased attention.
According to Nielsen (1 987:392):
There is quite enough evidence to justify talking of a Muslim community in
Britain. Traditional factors of division continue to exist in some strength, factors
of theology, policy, ethnicity and socio-economic background. But the ideal
desire for unity is increasingly finding ways of expressing itself also in practice,
both through common organisation and common responses to particular issues
of concern. At the same time, however, a new agenda is in the process of being
written as young Muslims begin to make their presence felt. This implies
changes in the ways in which the Muslim identity is expressed as well as in
areas of social life in which Muslims expect to be active as Muslims.
In examining the notion of Muslim unity, contained in the Islamic ideal of one umma
(the community of all believers), Elizabeth Scantlebury (1995) poses the question: 'is it
possible to talk of the Muslim community of Manchester?' Whilst previous studies have
tended to outline the diversity evident within the Muslim population in Britain, and particularly
within the Pakistani population, Scantlebury argues that increasingly Muslims, most notably
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the second and third generations, are demanding to be recognised as a religious rather than
a racial group. She states (1995:425): 'that while racial, linguistic, ethnic and theological
diversity remains, the notion of one religious community cannot merely be dismissed as an
unattainable ideal. There is evidence of an emergent British Muslim identity that is effectively
crossing racial and ethnic barriers in some circumstances within a localised setting'.
Scantlebury uses Dahya's (1974) model of fusion and fission, outlined earlier in the
chapter, and applies it to Muslims in Manchester. She argues that the pattern of fusion
followed by fission has been very evident amongst Muslims in the city, but that there has
been a subsequent stage characterised by another period of fusion. This latter phenomenon,
she point out, is not solely due to the issue of numerical size but has been brought about by
the external pressures that all Muslims have experienced. The Rushdie Affair and the Gulf
War had a profound impact on Muslims in Britain. They responded by organising themselves
together to give a united front. In Manchester, as in most major cities with a large Muslim
population, this took the form of setting up a Council of Mosques. Such collective
organisation among Muslims in Manchester, Scantlebury argues, shows the potential for
unity despite the diversity that evidently exists. However, as she points out, once these
external pressures began to diminish, past divisions and differences once more began to
emerge. Nevertheless, whilst such events reflect the inherent fragility of Muslim unity and the
force of long-standing divisions within the population, Scantlebury believes that they do
demonstrate that Muslim unity is a real possibility, even if it is limited to particular issues and
time periods.
While the continuing move from fusion to fission may be apparent among first
generation Muslims in Britain, Scantlebury argues, the second generation adds a new
dimension to the situation. Increasingly British-born Muslims are looking less towards their
parents' countries of origin as the basis of their identities in Britain, and instead stressing a
more specifically Islamic identity. This process, according to Scantlebury, involves a
questioning of their parents' traditional values and norms of behaviour with the aim of
separating the 'merely cultural' from the 'genuinely Islamic'. This can lead to many young
Muslims rejecting much of the older generations' traditional lifestyles, which they see as not
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only inappropriate to their lives in Britain but also essentially 'unlslamic'. Thus Scantlebury
argues (1 995:431):
There is therefore a process of redefining what it means to be a Muslim in
Britain, taking the form of trying to strip away the varying cultural traditions that
first-generation migrants have, rightly or wrongly assuming it to be Islamic, from
the 'essential core' of the religion. The basic tenet of this 'central core' is that
Muslims should be united in one umma.
However, Scantlebury describes the position of the second generation as paradoxical. On the
one hand, the aim of many is to unite the Muslim population, and defend their position in
British society. On the other, their attempts to create a united Muslim identity have resulted in
yet another division between Muslims. Thus, she argues, while the primary divisions within
the Muslim population have been vertical, along the lines of national, ethnic, linguistic and
cultural differences; young Muslims are producing a horizontal division based on generational
variations. Whilst this ever-growing diversity would seem to impede any form of unity among
Muslims in Britain, Scantlebury argues that as British-born Muslims move into positions of
leadership within the various Muslim communities, it is likely that greater emphasis will be
placed on the ideal of umma; and the process of fusion could well be achieved.
The importance of generational change is central to Haleh Afshar's (1993) three-
generation study of Muslim women in West Yorkshire, which highlights some of the
contradictions between the lived experiences of schoolgirls and their mothers' and
grandmothers' concept of education as a process of improving their life. She argues that the
increased interest in Islam and manifestation of an Islamic identity among the young stems
from this contradiction. Like Saitullah Khan (1982), Afshar believes that for many young
women they either operate a 'double standard', conforming to the West during school hours
and to the East at home or employ a self imposed separatism. In addition, Afshar argues, the
combination of racial discrimination at school and at work, their duty to maintain and
safeguard the honour of the family and their obligations as future mothers within the
community all play a part in restricting the ambitions and aspirations of the third generation.
Furthermore, she points out, 'the rampant racism' that was evident throughout the country
threatened the delicate balance of conflicting values and identities that these young women
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had maintained over the years. Events such as the Rushdie affair and the Gulf war
compounded the situation further, and greatly increased the gulf between young Muslims and
wider British society.
With the racial lines drawn and the Muslims as a community threatened, many
of the youngest generation found that they had no choice other than returning to
the fold and suspending all criticism of the biradari. They have chosen to return
to Islam, the religion that offers them a sense of identity, of belonging not only to
a small immigrant minority, but to a vast, vibrant and vocal community, an umma
that is prepared to defend the cause against all odds. There is a real sense of
pride in belonging to the righteous group and defending the cause, the morality
and the honour of Islam. (Afshar 1993:66)
The growing significance of Islam to the second generation is also highlighted by
Katy Gardner and Abdus Shukur (1994) in their examination of British Bengalis. They argue
that while Bangladesh remains a central focus point in the lives of those born and raised
there, their British-born children display more complex attitudes and priorities. On the one
hand, Bangladesh represents a largely alien world to them; on the other, they are aware that
no matter how British they may feel, they are not accepted as British by the majority
population. In this respect, they argue, Bangladesh represents 'an ideal land where they are
accepted', and consequently their 'Bengali-ness' is still crucially important to them. For
Gardner and Shukur, therefore, the experience of racism provides a central component of
self-definition for many young Bengalis, encouraging them to look for new ways of expressing
their cultural identity and distinctiveness in Britain. One of the ways they have sought to do
this is through their support of Islam.
Although this renewed commitment for Islam would seem essentially traditional in
nature, in the way it separates its followers from mainstream British culture and returns them
to their Bengali Muslim roots, Gardner and Shukur argue that such an interpretation is
misleading. The increasing support for Islam among the second generation is not a return to
old traditions, but is a product of their experiences of racial and ethnic exclusion in Britain,
brought to a head by the Rushdie affair and the subsequent negative portrayal of Muslims in
the media. Thus according to Gardner and Shukur, this new allegiance to Islam can be seen
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as both a reaction to, and a defence against, the racism endemic in British society, which the
second generation are no longer prepared to tolerate. They argue (1 994:163) 'Islam provides
both a positive identity, in which solidarity can be found, together with an escape from the
oppressive tedium of being constantly identified in negative terms. Even more important,
Islamic rhetoric not only condones fighting for one's rights and acting in collective defence of
a Muslim brotherhood, but explicitly encourages it'. Furthermore, support for Islam not only
provides young Bengalis with an instrument with which to fight against their exclusion within
British society; it also links them to the global umma, and to other Muslim countries. Thus
while their commitment to Islam does not necessarily impede their allegiance to Bangladesh,
Gardner and Shukur argue that for many young Bengalis, their parents' culture is often seen
as a 'distraction' from their true path. Increasingly the second generation is coming to identify
themselves principally as Muslims as distinct from Bengali or Bangladeshi. In this way, they
are constructing new and varied lifestyles of their own.
In her study of young Pakistani women in Britain, Jessica Jacobson (1997, 1998)
also considers the interrelationship between religious and ethnic identities, and examines
why religion is increasingly becoming a more significant source of social identity for them
than ethnicity. She argues that the greater significance of religion contains two key elements.
Firstly, there is a fundamental distinction made by many between religion and ethnicity as
sources of identity. The distinction rests on the assumption that whereas Pakistani ethnicity
relates to a particular place and its people, Islam has universal relevance. Secondly, she
argues a distinction is also made between the essential characteristics of the social
boundaries that represent the two forms of social identity. 'Social boundaries which
encompass expressions of religious identity among young British Pakistanis are pervasive
and clear-cut in comparison to the increasingly permeable ethnic boundaries' (1997:238).
Jacobson suggests that part of the attraction of Islam for young Muslim women is its
universalism. By providing these women with a universal set of prescriptions that covers all
areas of daily life, Islam enables them to deal with the ambiguities and contradictions they
experience in their lives. For many, she argues (1 997:254) 'Islam's teachings are a source of
precise and coherent guidance that enables them to rise above the uncertainties of existence
in a world that they perceive as comprising of two cultures'. However, Jacobson stresses that
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this does not imply that these women are able to make a straightforward choice between
their ethnic and religious identities, between being Muslim or Pakistani or Asian. In practice
religious and ethnic boundaries are not clear-cut, but are very closely interrelated.
Nevertheless, she believes religion and ethnicity are increasingly coming to be regarded as
separate or even alternative bases of self-definition.
In discussing young Muslims in Bradford, however, Philip Lewis (1994) draws a
distinction between Muslim and Islamic identity. During the Gulf war, for example, when
many young people were actively promoting their Muslim communal identity in support of
Iraq, in the local schools where he carried out some his research, very few of these young
people prayed in the area set aside for them. Young people's perception of themselves as
Muslims, he argues, does not, for the most part, 'translate into prayer 1 . Furthermore, Lewis
points out, the younger generation's allegiance to Islam and/or to Pakistani nationalism if
often dependent on context: 'during the Rushdie affair youngsters rallied around Islam as a
vehicle of ethnic identity; after Pakistan won the cricket world cup in March 1992 many
youngster celebrated by driving through parts of the city in high spirits, waving flags, some a
little to enthusiastically' (1 994:75). The hope for many religious leaders, Lewis argues, is that
the explicitly 'Islamic' component in identity will assume greater importance.
The increase in Islamic activity among Muslims in Britain, however, is not viewed as
a positive development by all. In particular, groups such as 'Women Against
Fundamentalism' have warned against the increase in religious commitment and its effects
on the position of women. Those involved in 'Women Against Fundamentalism' and others
seek to address 'the efforts of fundamentalists to restrict women's life choices and
sexualities' (Connolly 1991).
Pragna Patel (1991), herself a member of WAF, also highlights the oppressive,
dictatorial nature of Muslim fundamentalism. She argues that religion should be regarded as
a personal matter and left to the individual to interpret. Instead, she believes Muslim
fundamentalists seek to impose one version of Islam and thereby restrict any form of
individual interpretation. In this way, they present their male-dominated view of Islam which
aims to return women to the realms of the home and limit their position by confining them to
the traditional role ascribed to them in the Qur'an. Patel argues that the rise of Muslim
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fundamentalism is linked to the notion that 'what occurs within a minority community must be
left to those who have the power within it, that is, male heads of the family and religious and
community leaders, to resolve. To do otherwise, many argue, is to play into the hands of
racists' (1991:100). Not only does Muslim fundamentalism prioritise racial oppression over
that of gender, and thus deny the experiences of women; it also 'plays straight into the hands
of the state', which she argues 'is only too ready to adopt social policies on schools and the
family that serve to leave minority communities at the mercy of religious leaders' (1991:101).
As a result women become subjected to the male-dominated traditions and customs within
the community. Fighting racism, from this perspective, becomes a fight to preserve ethnic
cultures and traditions as if they are 'ahistorical' and 'apolitical'. For Patel, the danger for
women like herself, who have fought to find a space for themselves, lies not so much in the
rise of religious fundamentalism, as in the 'orthodoxy, conservatism and traditionalism' that is
increasing, along with the power of religious leaders, within certain communities.
The rise of religious fundamentalism in Britain, Gita Sahgal and Nira Yuval-Davis
(1992) argue, is partly due to the rise of religious fundamentalist movements globally, and in
particular in the countries of origin of minority groups in Britain. However, also of central
importance to its manifestation are the multiculturalist policies apparent throughout the
English education system and 'the Race Relations Industry'. Multiculturalist discourse, they
argue, defines minority communities on the basis of stereotypical notions of their 'culture',
which are increasingly being interpreted as expressions of religious identity. In this way,
minority communities that were previously defined in terms of their national or regional origin,
for example: Pakistani, Mirpuri, Bengali, Punjabi, are now presented as unified religious
communities. This is especially apparent in the case of Muslims, partly as a result of the
Rushdie affair. The construction of minority communities into religious groups, according to
Sahgal and Yuval-Davis, can be seen as a result of both external and internal definitions.
However, the main beneficiaries of this process, they point out, and of the adoption of
multiculturalist norms, are the fundamentalist leaders of minority communities. By presenting
themselves as the most 'authentic' representatives of their communities, they have been able
to silence criticism.from both within and outside these communities, on the grounds that such
criticisms are racist.
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According to Sahgal and Yuval-Davis, fundamentalists seek to impose strict
limitations on the behaviour of women in order to ensure the maintenance of religious
solidarity.
The "proper" behaviour of women is used to signify the difference between
those who belong and those who do not; women are also seen as "cultural
carriers" of the grouping, who transmit group culture to the future generation;
and proper control in terms of marriage and divorce ensures that children who
are born to those women are within the boundaries of the collectivity, not only
biologically but also symbolically' (1 992:8).
Yet despite these restrictions, Sahgal and Yuval-Davis acknowledge the fact that some
women gain a sense of security and even empowerment 'within the spaces allocated to them
by fundamentalist movements'. Their active involvement in religious movements gives them
a legitimate, public position that they would otherwise not possess. It can also provide a 'less
threatening', but nevertheless attractive, social role and identity for unskilled working-class
women and 'frustrated' middle-class women. Furthermore, they point out, it provides some
women from minority groups with a means of challenging racist stereotypes and prejudices.
However, Sahgal and Yuval-Davis argue, 'the overall effect of fundamentalist movements
has been very detrimental to women, limiting and defining their roles and activities and
actively oppressing them when they step out of the preordained limits of their designated
roles' (1 992:9). Women like themselves, they point out, who are actively involved in the fight
against fundamentalism, often feel they are caught 'between the devil and the deep blue sea'.
Not only are they having to confront the emergence of fundamentalism within their own
communities and/or countries of origin but they must also confront the racial prejudice and
discrimination evident within British society in general, as well as within the Left and the
feminist movements.
Hannana Siddiqui (1991) is also highly critical of those who seek to impose one view
of Islam to the exclusion of all others. In her review of Rana Kabbani's (1989) book Letter to
Christendom, she challenges Kabbani's support of Islamic fundamentalism. Siddiqui argues
that Kabbani's criticism of Rushdie's 'Satanic Verses' for being depoliticised and
unaccountable to its non-western readership is unjust. Instead, she believes it represents the
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exploration and questioning of religious values that many Muslim women like her have been
involved in. She adds 'to dismiss and classify my views as a "Westernised, Muslim
intellectual" response is to deny my experiences, which have included fighting both racism
and the orthodoxies of my religious and cultural background. It also denies the experiences
of many ordinary Asians living in Britain, especially women, who have been castigated and
censored for expressing doubt and dissent within their families and communities' (1 991 :80).
Like Patel and Sahgal and Yuval-Davis, Siddiqui believes that the rise of religious
fundamentalism brings with it a demand for greater conformity to traditional orthodoxies,
which makes it more difficult to practise a more liberal version of religion. Whereas Kabanni
argues that it is impossible to be both Western and non-western, Siddiqui believes that it is
possible to reach a point of balance between two cultures, and to forge an identity that is not
based on the restriction of freedom of others. She states, 'I have learnt that it is not a simple
either/or situation. In fact, my struggles have created a stronger bond between myself and my
family, who have grown to respect my right to choose for myself. I realise that enemies exist
on both sides of the cultural and racial divide, as do friends. Winning freedoms means the
right to choose who my enemies and friends are. In this the hope for the future lies'
(1991:83).
Diverse Responses to Changing Environments
In many ways, as Kim Knott and Sajda Khokher (1993) point out, these different
perspectives represent the changing experiences of young Muslims during the last few
decades, both in relation to the history of settlement of the various Muslim communities and
their position in British society. The changing experiences of young Muslims is highlighted by
Haleh Afshar (1994) drawing on her study of three generations of Muslim women in West
Yorkshire, outlined earlier. She looks at the ways in which different social and economic
circumstances offer these women different choices in terms of their identity. For many young
Muslim women, Afshar argues, the revitalisation of the 1980s was of crucial importance, for it
provided an ideal worth supporting. It offered them a new form of identity that conferred
dignity on those who adopted some form of the veil, providing women with a separate space.
It also made them part of 'the great anti-imperialist Islamic movement'.
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In her interviews with second and third-generation women in 1992, however, she
found a slightly different situation. There were still those with a strong commitment to Islam,
who gained strength from their vision of a united Islam, but these were predominantly the
youngest group, still at school. Amongst the second generation, however, many now working
in the social services, education, the local councils and the 'Race Relations' industry, 'the
mood was less euphoric'. Despite their hopes, they found that in practice, when it came to
support in the workplace and to economic and professional allegiances, the gender divide
between Muslim women and men was 'unbridgeable'. To conform to the norms of morality
and modesty and to represent 'the immaculate face of Islam', Afshar argues, means keeping
a respectful silence on issues to do with women. Feminism is presented as the 'ultimate
weapon' of the British State. Thus like Patel and other members of WAF, Afshar highlights
the difficulties that many Muslim women can face as a result of the male-dominated nature of
Islamic revitalisation and its stifling effects on the lives of Muslim women. She concludes by
saying: 'It is true that the Muslim community as a whole and its men as a group begin to
reconsider the demands made by their women to move towards a position that allows these
women to choose a combination of identities that suits them, rather than to be forced to
adopt ascribed identities that do not add up to a coherent whole' (1 994:145).
As Knott and Khokher (1993) point out, in one sense research has now gone full
circle. With Muslim women like Siddiqui demonstrating the problems of rejecting one religlo-
cultural model in favour of another and instead pointing to the need to embrace the idea of
being 'between two cultures' with the hope of finding a new and positive way forward, a point
of balance. However, what is of particular significance and importance about these recent
discourses on Muslim youth, and particularly Muslim women, is that they represent a
development from the 'externally observed and defined models' to the 'internally generated'
ones which highlight the self-determination of individuals. Knott and Khokher state that their
contribution to this approach, and to the discussion about the interrelationship of religious
and ethnic issues in the experience of Muslim women, stems from two factors: the particular
questions they asked when interviewing and the way in which they chose to analyse the
answers. However, they claim, it was the thoughts of the young women themselves which
gave substance to their ideas. Thus rather than beginning their work with a hypothesis: for
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example, that a religious identity offered the most effective way forward for young Muslim
women in Bradford, they decided instead to work with the premise that 'different women offer
different interpretations and pursue different strategies' (1993:598). They considered it
'unhelpful' to work with the notion that Muslim women would share a common orientation.
However, they adopted a 'perceptual map', which they admit can also be a potentially limiting
tool, for assessing the interrelationship of religious and ethnic issues in the experience of
young women. This map contains four religio-ethnic orientations: religiously orientated, not
religiously orientated, ethnically orientated and not ethnically orientated, the aim being to
place each of the women they interviewed on one area of the map. In conclusion, they state:
It has been our attempt, however, not to force young women into rigid categories
or ideal types, but rather to see them - at a specific point in time - as negotiating
religious and ethnic factors in a particular way, perhaps giving preference to one
domain over the other. We do not see this process as static: a different map
would be produced if we were to interview the young women now, several years
on' (1 993:607).
The evidence produced by their research thus highlights the 'complex, shifting and
multi-faceted' nature of the experiences of young Muslim women, who at certain times can
be 'selective, critical and assertive'. While they admit that these experiences are indicative of
the different and often conflicting environments in which they find themselves at home and in
school, Knott and Khokher do not believe that these need necessarily be experienced as an
opposition. In addition, evidence of cultural synthesis among the young women points to the
variations and diversity that such an approach can take. Not only do they feel that existing
descriptive models are inadequate to deal with such diversity, but they also consider the
more commonly used identity descriptions like 'Muslim' and 'Pakistani' to be problematic.
Such terms, they argue (1993:608) 'while of some limited general use, inevitably fail to inform
us of the complexity of their self-understanding'.
In a further elaboration of this theme, John Eade (1994) seeks to analyse the diversity
apparent in the social identities of young British Bangladeshis. He argues that the
construction of these identities is influenced not only by their social situation within Britain
where racism plays a significant role, but also by the political and religious developments
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within Bangladesh and other nation-states within the Indian sub-continent. He states
(1994:377 'like other descendants of migrant workers in Western Europe, they are caught up
in the public debate about national belonging where their supra-national links provide them
with special insights into the construction of hybrid identities and new ethnicities and the
maintenance of individual identities in the globalising world'.
The result, according to Eade, is the manifestation of a variety of different opinions
and perspectives associated with the different claims of national and Muslim belonging.
Whilst the majority of individuals acknowledge that their social identity is made up of a wide
range of different elements, they also recognise that many of these elements may be
contradictory. Such contradictory and often conflicting 'definitions of belonging', Eade argues,
make it very difficult for individuals to choose appropriate social identities. However, 'through
highly versatile individual deliberations' Eade believes young Bangladeshis are able to
provide some meaningful understandings of themselves and their social identities. He states
(1994:392):
An important element in that ordering was the ability to distinguish between
social identities, which were constructed through political and cultural
discourses, and the personal significance of these identities. Yet at the same
time the consistency of their deliberations must not be overemphasised. There
were anxious moments of self-doubt and ambiguity where 'home' - an
emotional as well as political and cultural phenomenon - may not be locatable'.
Summary
These studies of Muslims in Britain highlight the complexity of the issues surrounding the
second generation, and the differing responses that individuals make at different times in
their lives. While some may look to the universal appeal of Islam to help them solve the
contradictions in their lives, others may choose to adopt a more secular response in their
efforts to balance the varying and often competing cultural systems within which they find
themselves. Second-generation Pakistanis, therefore, like their parents, can not be seen as a
homogenous group displaying a common perspective and a similar strategy in the
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construction of their identities. Instead, differentiation and diversity would seem to be a more
accurate interpretation of their lifestyles and aspirations.
In addition, the review of the literature also highlights the importance of examining
structural factors, such as racial prejudice and gender discrimination, which have a significant
impact on the lives of the second generation. Thus the existence of racial prejudice and
discrimination within British society, it is argued, has the direct effect of 'pushing' young
Muslims towards their own communities. In the case of Muslim women, it would seem that
their gender status produces a double discrimination, both within their own community and
within British society as a whole. Second generation Muslim women, it is argued, experience
considerable pressure from their parents and older members of their community to conform
to traditional religious and cultural values in order to preserve the nature of their community.
In addition to these internal 'pressures', it is inevitable that these women will also experience
the sexual discrimination in British society generally, which, together with racial prejudice,
acts to restrict and limit the opportunities open to them.
However, as commentators such as Afshar (1994), Eade (1994) and Knott and
Khokher (1993) point out, although such competing and conflicting elements may make it all
the more difficult for individuals to construct appropriate social identities, their evidence would
seem to demonstrate that the majority do manage effectively to provide a stable sense of
self, even if this may vary over time according to their individual experiences. This highlights
the complex and changing nature of social identities, but it also points to the ability of the
second generation actively to select and interpret competing cultural systems, and to adopt,
incorporate or abandon specific elements in their search for an appropriate individual
strategy. Young Muslims are therefore actively defining and redefining themselves as a result
of the multifarious cultural and structural factors that they experience both on an individual
and group level. There are a great number of possibilities open to them, despite the
restrictions they experience. Thus for the time being at least, differentiation and diversity
among Pakistani Muslims in Britain is likely to remain.
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Chapter Three
Ethnicity and Identity amongst Cypriots in Britain
Although the focus of this study is on Pakistani and Turkish Cypriots, this chapter will
examine the literature on both Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Britain. This is because firstly,
they share many similarities in terms of migration and settlement patterns and their position
in British society; secondly, their sense of ethnicity has, in many ways, been defined in
relation to each other; and thirdly, my Turkish Cypriots informants identified very closely with
Greek Cypriots, far more so than with Turks or members of other ethnic groups in Britain.
Therefore, in common with many of the authors mentioned in this chapter, I have used the
term 'Cypriot' where the discussion is considered relevant to both populations, arid 'Turkish
Cypriot' or 'Greek Cypriot' where the emphasis in more pertinent to one. According to Floya
Anthias (1992), the main similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots are that they both
possess relatively low language and technical skills and have tended to draw on the
traditional skills and roles of women to enable them to establish entrepreneurial activity in the
retail and clothing industries. They both display a strong sense of ethnic identity which has
developed through their political and economic experiences in Cyprus, their strong ties of
kinship, the importance they place on the family and the religious and cultural prescriptions
placed on the control of female sexuality.
This chapter will therefore examine these and other factors and their influence on the
creation, maintenance and transformation of ethnicity and identity among Cypriots in Britain.
In doing so it demonstrates the importance of kinship and ethnic ties for sustaining and
enhancing collective solidarity for Turkish Cypriots in Britain. Furthermore, it points to the
significance of their perception of ethnic distinctiveness in relation to other ethnic groups, and
especially in relation to Turks and Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot ethnicity, therefore,
involves ascription of both 'self' and 'other' fostered in, and through, boundaries of inclusion
and exclusion. However, crucial to an understanding of ethnicity among Turkish Cypriots is
also an analysis of 'race', class and gender. Such social divisions interact with those of
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culture and ethnicity to produce multiple and contradictory effects for both individuals and
groups.
The chapter will begin by examining the experiences of Cypriots in relation to other
New Commonwealth migrants in Britain, the extent to which they experience similar 'ethnic'
disadvantages and what particular cultural resources they have utilised in an effort to
overcome some of these disadvantages, It will then go on to examine the maintenance of
ethnic identity amongst Cypriots in Britain and the factors that have influenced this. The
relationship between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, and the former's relationship with migrants
from Turkey will also be discussed, demonstrating the way in which ethnic identity is both
created and sustained by these relations, as well as transformed in the British environment.
The chapter will then go on to examine the maintenance of ethnicity among the second
generation and the factors that influence this. Finally, the position of Cypriot women in Britain
will be discussed along with the main concerns and issues facing the second generation.
Managing Ethnic Disadvantage
As a white minority group, displaying few distinctive physical features, Cypriots, according to
Oakley (1987), have not experienced racial exclusion to any significant extent. Consequently
they provide a useful marker by which to evaluate the influence of racial exclusion on the
experiences and socio-economic positioning of migrants in Britain. In addition, he argues
they enable an examination of the significance of cultural factors in determining the 'choices'
that migrants make in relation to the economic and social opportunities available to them. As
Floya Anthias (1992) points out, studies on minority groups in Britain have tended to
concentrate on their degree of cultural and structural integration or assimilation with British
society, or the effects of racial discrimination on their socio-economic position. Discussions of
the latter, she argues, tend to ignore the position of Cypriot migrants in Britain, as they are
not considered to constitute a racialised group. Nevertheless, as the institutionalisation of
racism in Britain is considered to be rooted in the historical development of capitalism and
colonial relations, as colonial migrants Cypriots must be seen as relevant to this discussion.
Unlike black migrants from the New Commonwealth they do not suffer
racialisation as such. Historically, racism is constructed through the medium of
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slave society and not only colonialism. But racism is dynamically constituted and
can be attached to any difference that has an 'ethnic' character; that is, it is
possibly an essential character of locus or 'origin'. What was foreign - white -
exotic yesteryear may become racial and undesirable this year. (Anthias
1983:37)
In addition, Cypriots can be seen as displaying many similarities with other colonial
migrant groups. Cypriots in Britain possess a distinctive language and traditional culture.
They also share a predominantly rural agricultural background. The island, which is now
divided into two states: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot State
of South Cyprus, is based on a predominantly mixed agricultural economy, traditionally
organised on an individual, peasant land-holding basis, often highly fragmented. According to
Oakley (1979:16) 'The Cypriot village may be described typically as a fairly compact
community of small autonomous family groups, closely interconnected by numerous ties of
marriage and descent'. The economic and social background of Cypriot migrants is therefore
closely resembles that of Pakistanis and other Commonwealth migrants in Britain. Their
reasons for migration are also very similar; Cypriots migrated to Britain for economic
reasons, to obtain stable jobs and better wages (Oakley 1970). Most Cypriots came to Britain
from depopulated rural areas, some having already migrated to the town to find work. Like
other Commonwealth migrants, the early Cypriots did not intend to settle permanently in
Britain but to improve their economic situation with the intention of returning to Cyprus. Thus
there was a desire to maintain cultural values and social relationships in preparation for their
return, which was further enhanced by the process of chain migration. Thus, Kucukcan
(1999) argues, Cypriot migrants followed the pattern of many other minority groups, and
preferred to be near friends and relatives already settled in London.
However, despite these similarities Cypriots differ from other migrant groups in
several respects. As Oakley (1970) points out, their settlement is highly concentrated in
London. Over three-quarters of Cypriots in Britain live in the Greater London area. London
therefore contains the largest number of Cypriots living outside Cyprus, although
proportionally more Turkish Cypriots have settled in London than Greek Cypriots. This
degree of concentration in a single urban area is the highest for any ethnic minority in Britain.
72
This settlement pattern, he argues, is indicative of the social and economic development of
the Cypriot community generally in Britain. It can be seen as a response 'firstly to a desire for
cheap rented housing near workplaces in the West End, secondly, the desire to be near the
centre of community life in Camden Town, and most recently, the preference for the move
away from poorer 'reception areas' to better quality owner-occupied housing further out'
(Oakley 1970:100). However, he points out that although Cypriots have tended to move
gradually further away from the central area of settlement, the degree of residential
concentration has remained high, as ethnic services and employment have moved
accordingly. Thus, Oakley argues, Cypriots have displayed a 'moving concentration' rather
than a dispersal process. The settlement patterns of migrants are highly significant in
accounting for the concentration of ethnic business in any one area. 'Proximity of residence
creates the demand for ethnic services and provides labour for the business set up to meet
this demand' (Ladbury 1984:107). According to Kucukcan (1999), the establishment of a
neighbourhood through 'clustering' around a particular area constitutes one of the first stages
of the institutionalisation and reproduction of values for migrants.
Perhaps the most significant point of difference between Cypriots in London and
other Commonwealth migrants, Ladbury (1977) argues, is that Turks and Greeks in Cyprus
are not financially dependent on migrant remittances for their material existence. In fact, she
points out, 'migration was not an economic necessity for the majority but a matter of personal
choice for the individual' (1 977:303). Among Cypriot migrants, it is the nuclear family and not
the wider group of kin that constitutes the normal residential unit. In marked contrast to Indian
and Pakistani migrants, the decision to migrate is therefore seen purely in terms of the
benefits it accrues to the immediate family alone. Thus, as Oakley (1970) points out,
although it is common for both jobs and housing to be provided or arranged by close
relatives, and for there to be a strong preference for the 'company of kin', the immediate
family remains very close-knit and essentially autonomous. In this way, he argues, Cypriots
can be seen as far more 'family-centred' than any other large ethnic minority in Britain, and
certainly more so than the population at large.
In addition, Anthias (1983) states, unlike other New Commonwealth migrants, Cypriot
men have tended to take up employment in areas vacated by earlier migrants, such as Jews
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in retail and Italians in the catering industry. Cypriot women, on the other hand, like other
migrants, have acted as replacement labour in jobs that indigenous women had left in favour
of more stable and desirable white-collar service positions. Furthermore, Oakley states,
Cypriots in Britain have been more economically successful than other Commonwealth
groups in achieving steady employment and the higher standard of living that they sought
from migration. As a result, the Cypriot community is to a large extent self-sufficient in
providing for its needs. The first Cypriot migrants to Britain found work mainly within the
catering industry. This economic pattern continued, despite the growth in settlement during
the 1950s and early 1960s, together with a move into the clothing industry and into other
service occupations. According to Oakley, the success of Cypriots in the clothing and
catering industries is a reflection of the widespread desire among them to own their own
businesses. A fifth of all Cypriot men in Britain are self-employed, more than twice the
national average. These businesses are predominantly 'one-man' or small family enterprises.
The ability of Cypriots in Britain to maintain a high degree of concentration together
with geographical and social mobility, Oakley (1987) argues, suggests a considerable
amount of 'choice' in terms of where they choose to live and an absence of 'constraint'.
However, he considers this to be a superficial analysis. For Cypriots, the element of choice
has been greater because of the absence of racial discrimination, and their increased wealth
that has been accrued as a result of their involvement within the ethnic economy, and their
ability to utilise an 'exploitable niche' for Cypriot employment and entrepreneurship in the
retail and service industries. Nevertheless, despite these advantages Cypriots are just as
much influenced by the social and economic constraints operating in society as any other
group. 'It is not possible to isolate or oppose the elements of "choice" and "constraint" in this
situation, for it is essentially the interaction between Cypriots and their environment that
produces the form of the relationship at any one time' (Oakley 1987:25).
Thus in order to explain why Cypriots have entered the clothing industry and service
sector, Ladbury (1984) argues, it is necessary to examine both structural and cultural factors.
Like other migrants, Cypriots have, on the one hand, been constrained economically,
politically and socially by the discrimination of the indigenous population and the British State
in general. On the other, the experiences and aspirations of the migrants themselves present
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a range of opportunities, some of which may be more appropriate and desirable than others.
Both these factors, Ladbury argues, are influential in determining the employment patterns of
Cypriots in Britain, that is, there are elements of both choice and constraint. Nevertheless,
she points out, structural constraints must be considered primary as these define the
boundaries within which cultural choices can operate. As Sasha Josephides (1988:43) states:
'for many of them, going into business was seen as the only way to make money and fulfil
their dream of going back to Cyprus with sufficient capital to buy property and live
comfortably'. However, she points out, in reality, the majority of small business owners have
not made money but merely enough to live on, and what they have earnt has been achieved
by working long hours and dealing with the uncertainties of being in business. Such
entrepreneurial activity therefore is very much situated on the margins of the economy. In
addition, as Salahi Sonyel (1988) demonstrates, while a small number of Cypriots have
managed a degree of success and have moved away from decaying inner city areas to the
suburbs, the majority of the community still live as owner-occupiers in the 'partly depressed'
and 'under-privileged' areas of the inner city. As a result they experience the same socio-
economic conditions and difficulties as the indigenous working class people, such as low
income or unemployment, bad housing, poor schooling, lack of proper community facilities,
etc. In addition, as a minority group they have 'tended to suffer severely constrained life
chances over and above those of the native working class' (Sonyel 1988:38).
Despite their position as a white minority in Britain, Anthias argues, Cypriots are
subject to same forms of social and economic disadvantage as other Commonwealth
groups. Such disadvantage therefore questions the distinction between racial and ethnic
categories that is often made.
As colonial migrants from an underdeveloped region, Cypriots brought with them
cultural visibility, low language skills, low occupational and educational
qualifications, and non-initiation into the structural 'openings' and cultural capital
of British social relations. They are also a physically visible minority group
particularly in certain areas of high concentration in London. But more
importantly, ethnic disadvantage is implicated in the structures of employment,
housing, and access to the state in the interplay with ethnic and class resources
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of the group. Ethnic disadvantage is linked to the exclusion processes structured
by sectarianism and the dominant ethnicity of British society both at an
institutional level and that of employer and the working class. (Anthias 1992:2)
Thus while Cypriots in Britain have in many ways been able to use their ethnicity in the
development of an ethnic economy, providing both employment and services for many
Cypriots, and have managed to avoid economic and social assimilation into British society,
this can not simply be seen as evidence of their ability to exercise cultural choice in the
absence of racial exclusion. As Anthias argues, cultural choices and identities need to be
examined within the context of migrant or ethnic exclusion and disadvantage. Cypriots, like
other New Commonwealth migrants, have been subject to political, economic and social
exclusion in Britain, and have therefore had to use their ethnicity to 'manage' the ethnic
disadvantage they face. The following section will therefore outline the factors which have
helped to sustain and reproduce Greek and Turk ish Cypriot ethnicity in the British context.
Maintaining Ethnic identity
Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots brought with them to Britain a strong sense of their
separate ethnic identities, which had evolved in relation to the political, social and economic
conditions in Cyprus. Greek Cypriot ethnicity was defined, as Anthias (1992) highlights, in
opposition to both British colonialism and to Turkish ethnicity, and structured through the
growth of the Enosis movement (Union with Greece). On the one hand, Enosis represented
the ideological expression of the polarity between 'Greekness' and 'Turkishness', formed in
Greece in opposition to Ottoman Rule. Articulated in Cyprus initially through the Church and
the bourgeoisie, it affirmed the ethnic distinctiveness of Greeks and Turks and the desire for
union with Greece. On the other hand, Enosis became increasingly articulated as a 'national
liberationist' movement in opposition to British rule and the economic exploitation of Cyprus
by the British, and incorporating the Greek Cypriot peasant and working class. By
comparison, Turkish Cypriot ethnicity, as Sonyel (1988) states, developed from a strong
Turkish Cypriot community opposition to the Enosis movement and a desire to maintain their
own religion as Muslims, their Turkish language and their Turkish way of life. While initially
the Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie favoured British rule in order to safeguard their rights as a
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Turkish minority, Turkish Cypriot nationalism and ethnic expression developed into the
concept of Taksim (Partition). Thus as Anthias (1992:43) states: 'Enosis and Taksim stood in
opposition as the representation of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ethnicity'.
The development of their distinct ethnic heritages in Cyprus, in relation to each other
and to British colonialism, helps to explain why Greek and Turkish Cypriot migrants in Britain
have maintained a strong pride in their respective heritages and did not regard themselves as
culturally inferior. They therefore preferred accommodation to assimilation. For Anthias
(1992) this strong sense of ethnicity may partly explain why certain cultural values and
traditions have not progressed naturally as in Cyprus but have remained in a 'time warp'.
Such traditions include the maintenance of the Cypriot dialect and traditional norms and
practices in relation to female sexuality, both of which have been considerably modified in
Cyprus. Nevertheless, as Anthias points out, the development of Turkish and Greek Cypriot
ethnicity in Britain cannot merely be seen in terms of their orientation to Cyprus, but is
structured by the migration process itself and the social and economic conditions of their
local environment.
Cypriot migrants, as Monica Taylor (1988) argues, have subsequently made
conscious attempts to develop their own community, to maintain their loyalties to Cyprus and
to resist 'Anglicisation'. This process, she argues, was further aided by the self-sufficient
nature of the Cypriot community, which sheltered them from the 'forces of assimilation'. The
development of ethnic shops and services, Kucukcan (1999: 93) argues 'could be interpreted
as an expression of ethnic identity in the context of north-east London'. They not only provide
goods and services for the local Turkish (and Greek) community, but also offer employment
and help develop wider social networks through friends and acquaintances.
According to Pamela Constantinides (1977), two main factors can be seen as central
to the maintenance of Cypriot identity in Britain. Firstly, the large proportion of married
couples and nuclear families that emigrated as a group; and secondly, the fact that the bulk
of immigrants arrived over a limited period between 1955 and 1962. The presence of whole
families, she argues, served to keep men under a certain degree of 'moral control'. Kucukcan
(1999) argues that the desire to maintain or recreate social relationships and the capacity of
Cypriots to achieve this has been considerably enhanced by the process of chain migration,
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in which individuals and families moved along lines of kinship and patronage, thus
reconstituting groups and relationships in the British sethng. In addition, Anthias (1992) points
out, Cypriot migration was seen as only temporary; thus there was a greater incentive to
maintain cultural values and traditions in preparation for their return. This 'ideology of return',
she argues, also affects the British-born Cypriots' participation within Britain and reinforces
traditional social values and networks. Thus Cypriot migrants have retained their basic
commitment to traditional Cypriot social values, both as regards life-styles and patterns of
social relationships. Thus, according to Sonyel (1988:21) 'they have become accustomed,
rather than integrated, to British society'. As Cypriots arrived in large numbers, Anthias
states, the ethnic service industry developed simultaneously. Single women were absorbed
into the ethnic economy and made the ethnic marriage market more feasible. Moreover, she
points out, the ethnic economy has been strong enough to absorb the second generation.
Thus the migration patterns of Greek and Turkish Cypriot migrants can be seen to
have had an important influence on their specific ethnic identity, which had been created and
sustained by the particular economic and political conditions in Cyprus. However, although
Cypriots in Britain have tended to preserve their ethnic identity and maintain strong links with
other Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot families and neighbours, their ethnicity is nevertheless
distinct from that of Cyprus. As Sonyel points out:
As it was impossible for them to maintain their Turkish Cypriot identity in a
foreign country owing to cultural differences in language, morals and religion,
they developed a dynamism of their own, and gradually ceased to be an exact
replica of the home society. As a result, they have adapted and developed a
new version of their Turkish culture and Turkish Cypriot sub-culture in the
UK.. .The culture they now identify with is a re-cycled one; it resembles the
homeland culture or sub-culture in many ways, but is not quite the same thing
(1988:21).
A similar observation is made by Anthias (1992) in relation to Greek Cypriots in
Britain. She states that their ethnicity is not the same as that of Greek Cypriots in Cyprus
because it is structured by the migration process itself and must therefore be seen in relation
to the exclusions and subordinations they experience as a minority ethnic group.
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Nevertheless, the economic and political conditions of post-war Cyprus have provided the
foundations for the changes and adaptations made. 'The strong sense of ethnic
distinctiveness and the importance of the Greek language and family were constructions that
predate the migration experience but the ways in which they are expressed and their role has
changed in the new setting of British society' (Anthias 1992:137).
The maintenance of religion can also be seen in a similar light. According to Anthias
(1992) although the Greek Orthodox Religion can be seen to represent an important part of
Greek Cypriot ethnicity, and much of the early nationalism in Cyprus was articulated through
religion, she describes their allegiance to it as one of 'passive religiosity'. In Britain, while the
majority of Greek Cypriots maintain traditional religious festivals and many women in
particular attend Church, religion does not play as important a role, neither ethnically nor
politically, as it did in Cyprus. For Turkish Cypriots, Anthias points out, the influence of
Kemalist nationalism has led them to develop a more secular and 'Statist' ethnic identity.
According to Ladbury, only a small minority of Turkish Cypriots in London make any
concession to formal religion such as attending a mosque or reading prayers in their homes.
In contrast, however, Kucukcan (1999:255) who generalises about migrants from Turkey and
Cyprus argues: 'Islam is one of the indispensible components of Turkish/Cypriot identity'.
Amongst his informants, even those who defined themselves as 'not religious' or 'normal'
Muslims believed that religion has had public and private influence on the formation of
Turkish identity1 . Thus, as Taylor states: 'It may be that religious beliefs and practices are
more important in maintaining ethnic and cultural identity rather than on their own account'
(1988:28).
In addition, Ladbury (1977) states that compared with Greek Cypriots, working class
Turkish Cypriots have lacked group organisation socially and culturally as associations have
largely been run and patronised by the middle class. Since this time the numbers of Turkish
Cypriot (and Turkish speaking) organisations has greatly increased, as Kucukcan (1999)
reports. Nevertheless, the majority of Turkish Cypriots do not actively participate in these
organisations; their only contract with them may be through seeking Turkish language
teaching for their children (Sonyel 1988). Among Greek Cypriots, however, ethnic
1 My own research, however, highlights significant contrasts between the religiosity of Turks
and Turkish Cypriots, as reported in chapter eight.
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organisation tends to be more 'popularly based', which Anthias suggests may be linked to the
historical importance of socialism in Greek Cypriot social and political life.
Thus neither organised religion nor other forms of organisational activity provide a
centralising focus for Turkish Cypriots in London. 'If one is to find such a focus one must turn
to the ties of kinship and affinity and to the interdependence of neighbours, all of which link
individuals and provide the means whereby Turks in London retain, as far as possible, their
self-sufficiency as an ethnic group' (Ladbury 1977:307). Likewise, Constantinides states that
the majority of Greek Cypriots do not involve themselves in the political or other activities of
the community. Instead, their lives are centred round the boundaries of family and work ties.
'Many are little interested in building a "British Cypriot community". They see themselves as
transplanted members of their Cypriot village, and as individual family units struggling to
achieve an acceptable standard of material comfort' (1 977:290).
According to Kucukcan (1999), the influence of kinship networks on the behaviour of
migrants from Turkey and Cyprus can be seen throughout the processes of migration,
settlement and post-settlement in Britain. Akraba (kinship) networks among Turks and
Cypriots in London, he argues, therefore play a similar role to the Biradari system among
Pakistanis (outlined in the previous chapter). In the early stages of migration kinship and
social networks help fellow members to find employment and accommodation, and provide
mutual support for coping with the challenges of the new environment. Nevertheless, as
Ladbury points out, these relationships are also influenced by the new environment. Thus,
marriages are not arranged between members of families who originated from the same
village in Cyprus, nor are relations maintained with non-kin after leaving Cyprus. 'Rather,
certain kin relationships have been strengthened and completely new relationships formed
between individuals who now relate, not on the basis of where they once lived in Cyprus, but
on the basis of their present status' (Ladbury, 1977:307). Turkish Cypriots in Britain,
therefore, tend to focus their relationships on other Turkish Cypriot families in their local
neighbourhood, and the strongest kin-based ties are among those they see most often.
However, Kucukcan points out, unlike Turkish Cypriots, migrants from Turkey still attach
considerable importance to being from the same village or city.
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The social interaction of Cypriots, as Taylor (1988) states, was primarily within their
own group, rather than with the British or other local minority groups, thus reinforcing
traditional social and cultural values. Furthermore, she argues, within the Cypriot community
there are strong religious, 'inguistic and kinship differences between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots which, together with the importance placed on family life, have served to perpetuate
ethnic distinctiveness despite a certain amount of economic interdependence. However, as
Ladbury (1977) points out, different influences may affect both the migrants and the home
society so that considerable differences develop between them. On the one hand Greek and
Turkish Cypriot ethnicity is maintained by distinguishing themselves from each other and
from other ethnic groups, in the same way as Pakistani ethnicity has been maintained and
reproduced in Britain. On the other, the attitudes Turkish and Greek Cypriots have towards
other groups with whom they come into contact are also a product of the environment in
which they live. Thus the attitudes of Turkish Cypriots to a particular group in London are not
necessarily the same as those held towards the same group in Cyprus.
In Cyprus, Ladbury points out, cultural differences between Turkish Cypriots and
Turks are often exaggerated and emphasised and discriminatory attitudes or derogatory
stereotypes displayed as a result of the perceived economic advantage given to Turks since
the Turkish invasion of 1974. She suggests that since this time Turkish mainlanders have
come to fulfil the important social role of the scapegoat, normally reserved for the Greek
Cypriots, to maintain ethnic distinctiveness. In London the majority of Turkish Cypriots have
relatively little contact with mainland Turks, even those living in the same areas or similarly
employed in catering, although some visiting occurs and occasionally marriages are
arranged. In Britain, Ladbury argues, although derogatory stereotypes of mainland Turks can
emerge in individual situations of conflict or disagreements from time to time, they do not
exist at the group level. The reason for this, she suggests, it that Turkish Cypriots do not see
the existence of mainland Turks in Britain as a threat to their own interests as individuals.
Thus they are not regarded as competitors either economically or ideologically, as they
possess very similar religious and cultural traditions and values. Although mainland Turks are
usually considered more traditional and religious than Turkish Cypriots, Ladbury argues, this
is not reinterpreted to mean 'backward' or 'uncivilised as it is in Cyprus. In addition, Turkish
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Cypriots in London often rely on the greater religiosity of the Turks to provide religious
ceremonies, for example when someone dies. According to Kucukcan (1999) the 'subtle
differentiations' between mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots represent two poles of Turkish
identity, and are based on 'self-ascription' rather than 'external attribution'. Nevertheless, he
argues: 'these self-ascribed boundaries between Turks from the mainland and Cyprus have
become diluted during confrontations between "Us" and "Them". The relations between
Turkish Cypriots and Turks in Britain, therefore, demonstrate the significance of local
environmental conditions in determining the nature of ethnic relations.
Relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Britain can also be seen as
indicative of the local context. According to Anthias (1992), the Greek-Turkish distinction that
developed in Cyprus in the 1950s as a result of 'chauvinist nationalism' is much less relevant
in Britain. Although their distinct identities are still important they are maintained and
emphasised for different purposes. Despite differences of kinship, language and religion that
served as the boundary markers in Cyprus, relationships at an individual level between Greek
arid Turkish Cypriots in London are very good. Both Constantinides and Ladbury argue that
despite intercommunal hostilities of 1963 and the subsequent fluctuating nature of Greek and
Turkish relations on Cyprus, this did not have profound consequences for inter-ethnic
relations in Britain. The migrants, many of whom came from ethnically mixed villages, had
already established working relations together in London. Common origin and working
conditions in Britain gave Greek and Turkish Cypriots greater unity of outlook than prevailed
in Cyprus after 1963. Indeed, as Taylor points out, relations between British Cypriots were
often held up as an example to be emulated in Cyprus. Although the Turkish invasion of
Cyprus and its aftermath imposed a real strain on relations, individual and working relations
have remained good. However, Ladbury argues, although ethnic differences have been
played down in the context of work and the neighbourhood, relations between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots have mostly remained public. Family visiting and intermarriage between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots is rare and any relations overstepping conventional behaviour
lead to the ethnic boundaries being redrawn with renewed vigour. Nevertheless, the local
environment has.clearly influenced these relations.
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These opinions and attitudes towards other groups demonstrate the ways in which
Cypriot ethnicity is influenced by the environmental conditions within which it is based. Thus
while Cypriots in Britain can be seen to maintain a strong commitment to their ethnic
heritage, cultivated by the political and economic conditions in Cyprus and subsequently
reinforced by the circumstances of migration, Cypriot ethnicity, Greek or Turkish, cannot be
seen as an exact replica of that found in Cyprus itself.
The Second Generation
Whilst first generation Cypriots in Britain display a well-defined ethnic identity, the situation for
the second generation is much more complex. Their sense of ethnicity is not only formed in
relation to their allegiance or orientation towards Cyprus, or to Greek or Turkish Cypriots, but
the fact that they have been born and/or brought up in Britain subsequently affects their
sense of who they are. This involves not only their experiences of aspects of British social
and cultural life through their participation in school and work, but also the way others
perceive them. Consequently their orientation towards Britain and their sense of 'Britishness'
is also a major factor in their ethnic identity. Furthermore, as Taylor (1988) points out, the fact
that they are less distinguishable by physical appearance than other ethnic minorities means
they may 'pass' as indigenous British.
The main factors that influence the ethnic identity of second generation Cypriots,
according to both Anthias (1992) and Taylor, are firstly, their degree of orientation towards
Cyprus, particularly in relation to the 'Cypriot problem'; secondly, the level of social, political,
economic and cultural organisatiori and dissemination among Cypriots in Britain and the
degree of allegiance an individual has to his or her local Cypriot community; and thirdly, their
awareness of cultural differences between themselves and other groups, together with their
perceptions of the attitudes of the indigenous population to these differences.
In relation to the second generation's orientation towards Cyprus, commentators are
somewhat divided in their views. Constantinides (1977) argues that as a result of the Turkish
invasion of Cyprus in 1974, second generation Greek Cypriots became acutely aware of their
Cypriot origins and their allegiance to family and kin, which still tied them to Cyprus. Ladbury,
on the other hand, writing about Turkish Cypriots in the same publication, stated: 'Meanwhile
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a generation is growing up which knows the beaches of Cyprus better than its politics and, in
many cases, does not care very much about either' (1977:329). Similarly, Sonyel (1988)
argues that having grown up in Britain many second generation Turkish Cypriots feel a
greater sense of allegiance to Britain than to Cyprus, which represents a 'distant land' or
merely somewhere to go for a holiday and a place where relatives might live. Thus despite
the strong emotional ties of the first generation to Cyprus and their efforts to instil a sense of
'roots' and 'origin' in their children, most of the second generation, she argues, find it very
difficult to display such allegiance to Cyprus. Rather, the majority has become 'accustomed'
to life in Britain and regard it as their home.
The orientation of both Turkish and Greek Cypriot young people towards Cyprus,
Taylor (1988) points out, varies from individual to individual. However, she does not feel that
being born and/or brought up in Britain necessarily prevents the second generation from
identifying with their parents' country of origin. 'Regardless of the length of time in the UK,
emotional ties persist and romanticised images derived from family stories, together with the
increased consciousness of cultural and ethnic roots at times of war and from visits back,
may serve to revive identity' (Taylor 1988:183). Nevertheless, she points out, research seems
to indicate that although many Greek Cypriots seem to be identifying themselves as London
Cypriots, thus emphasising their allegiance to both Cyprus and Britain, Turkish Cypriots tend
to be split between either dismissing their Cypriot identity altogether or reaffirming it more
determinedly. Part of the reasons for this, she states, were considered to be the fact that
Turkish Cypriots represent only a small group in Britain and had a less extensive support
structure than the Greek Cypriots. In relation to Greek Cypriots, Anthias (1992:120) states:
'Most young people, however, express a certain degree of ambivalence about their ethnic
identity, although they often "know" they are Greek/Cypriot "deep down"'.
Despite these differences, it is clear that the second generation have been influenced
as much by their experiences of British society as they have by those of Cyprus. According to
Oakley (1970), many Cypriots were encouraged to migrate not just to improve their financial
position, but also for the educational advancement of their children, which they believed
Britain offered. Nevertheless, it was assumed that their children would remain essentially
Greek or Turkish. Thus he argues, 'a new and largely unanticipated problem is that the
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influences of school and neighbourhood deflect children far from parental ideals of Cypriot
youth, forcing unwanted changes in family life' (1 970:1 02). Thus, as Sonyel (1988) points out,
on the one hand parents fear the integration of their children into mainstream British culture,
but on the other continue to hold high educational aspirations for their children. Such
aspirations necessarily require a significant amount of participation in British schools and
society, yet instead Cypriot parents tend to encourage cultural isolation in order to safeguard
Cypriot values, and strong measures are often taken to maintain this isolation.
Furthermore, Constantinides argues many children have severe difficulties in
reconciling their own values and aspirations with those of their parents, causing many to
resent their parents' traditional Cypriot values and lifestyles. According to Oakley: 'Few
parents, however, seem really to confront the different situation, preferring to avoid decisions
that might enable them to resolve conflicts in a constructive way. Often changes come by
default, so relations between parents and children may become bitter and hostile, in some
cases communication ceasing altogether' (1970:102). Similarly, Sonyel states that Turkish
parents can experience severe communication problems with their children, which can lead
to tensions and conflict and 'to the breakdown of the harmony of family life at home'
(1988:55). Turkish young people, as Kucukcan (1999) highlights, are adopting different
attitudes and values to the first generation. These generational differences can lead to
disagreements and tensions between parents and children, which are rooted in the traditional
cultural values of the first generation. Consequently, he argues, many young people are
distancing themselves from some of the values of the first generation by 'internalising' social
attitudes of the wider British society. According to Kucukcan (1 999:122): 'these observations
suggest that a process of change and deeper integration in the surrounding society are
becoming influential forces shaping the identity of the Turkish young generation in Britain'.
Thus like Pakistani young people, second generation Cypriots are considered by many
commentators to be 'caught between two cultures', confronted with two often contrasting and
conflicting models of social behaviour.
Turkish Muslim children are growing up in an alien culture, under the constant
risk of losing their ethnic identity, and of being completely assimilated by the
indigenous Anglo-conformist culture, which neglects, omits and even degrades
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Turkish Muslim culture, and causes some Turkish children to denounce their
own culture through self-fulfilling prophecies and low self-concepts. Many of
them are ignorant of their own culture: language, religion and traditions; and
many more are becoming strangers to their own ethnicity. Under the influence of
British culture, a number of them question, and even reject, their own values
and traditions. (Sonyel 1988:45)
The result of this confusion, created by their experience of two conflicting cultures, Sonyel
argues, is that they become 'victims' of the 'dual-role dilemma'. This involves having to
practise different values and adapting to different cultural patterns of behaviour, while
retaining a 'mutual existence' between them. For Oakley, the situation of the second
generation 'is doubly acute, seeking as they do an identity astride two cultures, and lacking
the communication to traditional and comforting institutions upon which their parents can
always fall back' (1 970:102). In addition, Anthias (1992) points out, the contrasting patterns of
behaviour that they experience at home and at school, together with the failure of parents to
allow them to develop an identity relevant to their experiences in Britain, and the inability of
the schools to acknowledge or understand their cultural and structural position, lead many
young Cypriots to feel that they are doubly misunderstood. Furthermore, these conflicts are
experienced differently by young women and young men, due to the greater restrictions that
parents place on daughters in order to protect their sexual purity (Kucukcan 1999). According
to Anthias, young women face specific difficulties in reconciling the aspirations of their peers
and school with the strict sexual mores of their parents. As a result, Sonyel argues, many
parents attempt to restrict the socialisation of their daughters at school by not encouraging
them to participate in after-school activities, and many parents seek to send their daughters
to single-sex schools to limit their contact with males and thus safeguard their reputation.
This situation is further compounded for Turkish Cypriot young people in particular by
the difficulties and disadvantages they experience in school. Thus as Sonyel notes, Turkish
children were considered to represent 'the worst underachievers' in British schools, according
to the 1985 Swann Report. Many of these difficulties result from a lack of recognition of their
culture, language and religion. In addition, she points out, the socio-economic conditions of
the majority of Turkish people in Britain have been a major contributory factor in the
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underachievement of the second generation. Such conditions include unemployment or long
and unsociable working hours among parents, poor and run-down localities, overcrowding,
malnutrition, unhygienic conditions and so on. Such conditions, she argues, have a
considerable effect on the physical and mental well-being of Turkish children, as well as
preventing their parents from spending time with them or taking an interest in their education.
While many of these conditions apply equally to Greek Cypriots, they do not seem to
have experienced the same levels of underachievement. Anthias (1992) states that although
there is evidence that Greek Cypriot children experience specific disadvantages in relation to
their class and ethnic/racial status, there is a greater tendency for them to continue on to
further education and consequently become more 'upwardly mobile'. According to Sonyel,
these differences in Turkish and Greek educational achievement can largely be explained by
the greater levels of prejudice, discrimination and stereotyping that they experience.
Increased levels of prejudice towards Turkish Cypriots in relation to Greek Cypriots were
seen by the Swann Report to be based on the fact that Turkish Cypriots, being darker-
skinned, may well be viewed as black, whereas Greek Cypriots could more easily 'pass' as
white. Furthermore, stereotypes attributed to the two groups were based on historical
interpretations which regarded the Greeks as 'the great civilisers of the world', while Turks
were largely viewed as 'uncivilised and cruel barbarians' (Sonyel 1988:46). These
stereotypes, Sonyel points out, are evident in the assumptions of the majority population,
articulated in the curriculum and consequently influencing teachers' expectations.
These difficulties and conflicts affect the second generation in a variety of different
ways, leading them to adapt a number of different possible strategies. Some may come to
reject their parents' values, others to identify with them more strongly. In addition, as Anthias
(1992) states, those who have achieved a greater level of educational success and acquired
professional status may 'move away' from their ethnic identity and social life. However, as
both Constantinides (1977) and Anthias point out, whilst many of the second generation may
reject their Cypriot identity in adolescence, once leaving school many will return and reassert
their ethnic identity as they become aware of the problems they face as 'foreigners' and the
restrictions this imposes on their economic and social integration in British society.
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For many, a type of identity crisis seems to occur in the period after they have
left school and sought employment. Those who have received education in
overcrowded and poorly staffed schools in the inner city find themselves poor
candidates for the more glamorous jobs they dreamt about. In the case of girls,
parental concern for their moral welfare may place restrictions on how far away
from home they are allowed to work. However, the ethnic economy is ready and
willing to absorb them, particularly when there are family businesses to be
maintained. For quite a few rebellious adolescents, this period marks their 're-
entry' into their ethnic group (Constantinides 1977:286).
The experiences of Turkish young people, Kucukcan (1999) highlights, demonstrate
'continuity and change': they may still respect their parents' traditional Turkish values, but
there is a tendency for them to 'change' restrictive customs and practices. In this way, he
argues, the formation of Turkish identity among the younger generation can be seen as a
dynamic and on-going process, involving constant negotiation and redefinition.
Thus the existence of a strong and extensive system of economic, political and social
organisation among Cypriots in Britain provides opportunities for employment, helps preserve
language and cultural values and upholds the sanctity of female sexual morality, which may
exert a considerable influence on the second generation. Nevertheless, as Taylor states:
'The very fact of growing up in wider society and the educational environment means that in
different places or phases in the lives individuals may choose to adopt values more attuned
to their Greek, Turkish or Cypriot backgrounds at one time and those of British society at
another (1988:178). Consequently, individual aspirations and self-perceptions of identity may
vary considerably, possessing few clear or shared meanings. As a result, Taylor argues, it
may be more relevant and appropriate to examine individual perceptions of identity and social
positioning in order to understand the complex nature of identity formation among Cypriot
young people in Britain
The Role of Women
Traditional Cypriot norms and gender divisions can be seen as central to the creation and
maintenance of Cypriot ethnicity in Britain. Women, Anthias (1992) argues, are crucial to this
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process as they represent both the transmitters of the 'cultural stuff', as well as the definers
of the ethnic boundary. Their defining of the boundary works both legally in relation to
citizenship and in terms of the system of sexual relations, which ensures the maintenance of
ethnic reproduction through patriarchal control over the activities of women. This system,
which is far stricter for women than it is for men, places restrictions on the choice of suitable
marriage partners thus ensuring that children remain in the ethnic group. 'For women this
entails behaving in ethnically appropriate ways by conforming to the principle of sexual purity
and for men it entails maintaining control over women' (1 992:93). Similarly, Kucukcan (1999)
highlights the hierarchical authority of the traditional Turkish family, which assumes different
roles and responsibilities for family members: 'this gives the father the dominant role as
"breadwinner" and considers the mother a "care taker", responsible for the internal affairs of
the family such as looking after children and carrying out household duties' (1 999:74).
Furthermore, as Anthias points out, the patriarchal nature of the Cypriot family can
be seen as a major factor in the 'management' of ethnic disadvantage and for achieving the
economic aims of migration. Cypriot women, therefore, provided a cheap and readily
available source of labour for small-scale businesses in catering and clothing, that were
themselves facilitated by drawing on Cypriot women's traditional skills of cooking and sewing.
In this way, Anthias argues, Cypriot female labour can be seen as the 'cornerstone' of the
ethnic economy.
The norms and values governing family practices and women's actions, Sasha
Josephides (1988) points out, are based on the concepts of honour and shame, which
permeate every aspect of social and economic life in Cyprus, as in other Mediterranean
countries. Such values are easier to maintain she argues if women do not work outside the
home. To do so is a blatant indication that the husband is unable to support his family
himself, as well as exposing women to outsiders. However, the economic impetus for
migration to acquire sufficient money to return home and live comfortably, made it necessary
for women to work as well. Nevertheless, as Anthias states: 'It was however unthinkable for
women brought up in the enclosed world of traditional Cypriot rural life to enter into unskilled
manual work in a foreign and "dangerous" male-regulated territory' (1 983:79). In addition, as
the Cypriot economy was predominantly based on agriculture, women lacked confidence of
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working in an urban setting, which was exacerbated by their lack of language skills. Thus
most Cypriot women in Britain work as either machinists, finishers or homeworkers in the
clothing industry, or with family in restaurants, cafes and shops situated in the main areas of
Cypriot settlement in London.
Despite the large proportion of Cypriot women working and the subsequent growth in
their economic independence women remain under the control of male authority. This is
because, Anthias states, their employment as machinists, while reasonably well paid,
involves long working hours and poor conditions, in which the women have little security or
control over their work. In addition, Cypriot women have very minimal opportunity to resist
patriarchal control. To stand up to their husbands could lead to estrangement, as they are
unlikely to receive support within the Cypriot community, which for most women, and for older
women in particular, constitutes the whole basis of their social lives. Whilst there seems to be
a greater 'willingness' to seek separation or divorce from their husbands than is evident in
Cyprus, Anthias points out, Cypriot women in London feel more isolated, living away from
their family and kin in Cyprus. Childcare is also more difficult, as older relatives who would
usually help out are not present in London.
Cypriot women in Britain, therefore, continue to be controlled by the patriarchal
norms and values which affect the second generation as much as the first; and parents
continue to bring up their children, and more particularly their daughters, according to
traditional norms of appropriate sexual behaviour. However, this can cause tension between
parents and daughters, as such values contrast quite significantly with those of British
society. Nevertheless, Anthias suggests, Cypriot women in general have more opportunities
in Britain to confront these forms of patriarchal control. In London women are supervised less
closely than they would be in Cyprus, and an increasing number of young women are finding
employment outside the Cypriot communities. Similarly, Kucukcan argues that the process of
migration and settlement in Britain has lifted some of the social familial expectations of
women. They are no longer under the close control of parents-in-laws, and their contribution
to family income through employment has changed their status 'from that of partners to an
economic resource', although they are still expected to carry out household duties (1 999:76).
In addition, Anthias points out, although parents are still concerned about the 'public'
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reputation of their daughters, in the more 'anonymous' environment of London they tend to
be less traditional in their approach. Furthermore, the second generation have a much
greater knowledge of British society and subsequently are more aware of alternative models
of behaviour, including those of feminism, which promote equality and women's rights.
Second generation Cypriot women may therefore be more 'prepared' to resist the norms and
values of their parents.
However, Anthias points out, most young women seem quite capable of 'managing'
the potential tensions and conflicts they experience. Most do not publicly go against their
parents' expectations, although many do display alternative values and patterns of behaviour
in private; many have boyfriends and some are involved in sexual relations with them.
'Parents may suspect but as long as a public display has not taken place and as long as they
are assured in their own minds that the girl is still a virgin they make concessions' (Anthias
1983:90). Although there is considerable variation in the attitudes of Cypriot parents, Anthias
states, most are beginning to allow their daughters more freedom in Britain and giving them
more autonomy over their lives.
Education is also becoming a much higher priority both in Cyprus and in Britain.
Many parents, as Josephides points out, are now more willing to allow their daughters to
continue their education and obtain employment; many even expect this. Yet, she argues that
among the better-off families this may be considered merely an 'interim period' until the
young women are married. In addition, Josephides argues, most of the second generation,
are determined not to follow their mothers into the clothing and catering industries. On the
other hand, as Ladbury (1984) points out, many young Cypriots are forced to seek work in
the ethnic economy as a last resort, when they are unable to acquire employment in the open
market. Second generation Cypriots experience the same kind of disadvantages in education
as those from other ethnic minorities, and display comparable levels of unemployment. Yet
within these constraints, Josephides argues, young Cypriots are making certain choices.
Young women tend to aspire to what they perceive as 'glamour' jobs, such as beauty therapy,
hairdressing and fashion. These represent a major contrast to the work that their mothers
have been confined to. In addition, many young Cypriot women are taking up clerical
positions, particularly in travel, banking and insurance. In addition, Kucukcan points out,
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some Turkish women are also entering public life and there are a number of Turkish
professionals in areas such as teaching, social work, interpretation, law and journalism. The
number of women in these areas, he argues, demonstrates the changing status of Turkish
women in London.
Most young women prefer not to work for other Cypriots, despite opportunities for
work in Cypriot banks, tourist agencies and other Cypriot offices, which require Greek or
Turkish language skills. However, Josephides argues, most young people felt that it was
better to work for non-Cypriots if possible as there was more prestige attached to finding
work in the open market. 'So not only do Cypriot women choose not to work within the
traditional spheres of the ethnic economy, but they also choose not to work for Cypriots if
they can help it' (1988:52).
The preference of most young women to work outside the Cypriot communities,
however, does not mean that they have abandoned their Cypriot values, and the majority will
still live at home until they are married. In addition, as Anthias indicates, most young Cypriot
women will adopt a more Cypriot based social life after leaving school, usually maintaining
only their Cypriot friendships and confining their leisure activities to those within the
community. Although many young women are critical of some of their parents' values, the
majority will submit to their parents' dictates, but as independent adults they do so out of
obligation. As Anthias argues: 'It appears to be in their economic interests to maintain these,
since Greek Cypriot parents have an ideology of "sacrifice" towards their children that not
only imbues guilt but also self-interest' (1 983:91). Most young women are better-off financially
living at home, where they are often provided with cars and not obliged to contribute to the
household expenditure, consequently their money is their own. In addition, Josephides
argues, the second generation enjoy the safety and security that being part of a Cypriot
community gives them, and many are therefore unwilling to rebel or behave inappropriately,
at least in public. Furthermore, as Anthias highlights:
A further factor is that often geographical, social, economic and political links of
the Greek Cypriot community act as an effective 'policing' mechanism. Greek
Cypriots congregate in particular areas, many of them working there and having
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a close network of family and relations. Under such conditions, traditional sexual
relations and roles are preserved. (1 983:91)
Similarly, Kucukcan (1999) points out that the involvement of some members of the Turkish
community in the circulation of gossip and the damage that this can cause to the parents'
reputation produces social pressures which force young women to behave in 'culturally'
appropriate ways.
Thus while the second generation retain, on the whole, a sense of ethnic identity, and
most Cypriot norms and values are still strongly maintained in Britain, there have been
certain modifications relating to marriages and dowries. Most Cypriot women, Constantinides
notes, prefer to marry other Cypriots because they feel they will have 'more in common' with
them, and thus, in theory at least, uphold the concept on 'family honour' (Anthias 1983).
However, most are not in favour of arranged marriages and the practice is generally
becoming less common in Britain than it is in Cyprus, although it is still the norm. Also in
contrast to Cyprus, the dowry system has mostly disappeared in Britain, although many
parents still provide financial assistance in setting up a home. Constantinides argues that the
decline in the practice of formal dowries can partly be explained by changes in marriage
customs, but more significantly she believes, it is linked to the socio-economic background of
the migrants themselves. As the majority of Cypriots who migrated to Britain are from the
poorer sections of Cypriot society it is unlikely that they would have obtained much in the way
of a dowry when they were married. Furthermore, Constantinides points out, in Britain it is the
economic success of women that is becoming more important. Ladbury (1977) also notes
that many of the urban educated Cypriot migrants are attempting to introduce new forms of
behaviour in an effort to become more 'western'.
Yet despite these modifications, concepts of reputation and sexual modesty in
relation to women are still given a high priority. Indeed, as Josephides claims, many of the
first generation are maintaining the attitudes and values they brought with them in the 1950s,
in contrast to Cyprus where many of these values have become less important. For young
Cypriot women, she states, most of these issues focus on the question of 'being allowed out'.
Most are allowed to go out with family members or other Cypriot women known to the family.
However, conflict can arise over the issue of going out with school friends and young men.
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According to Josephides, there is much variation in the extent to which parents will allow their
daughters freedom, and although some are given more freedom than others are, most young
women do not feel that they are given enough. Therefore, she argues, the concept of honour
can be seen to have been separated from the issue of women's role in employment and has
become 'exclusively attached' to the issue of 'being allowed out'.
For Josephides, the possibility of change rests on the 'coupling' of women's
increasing role in the labour market with their access to wider society, allowing them to 'exit'
from the Cypriot community if they choose to. This does not mean, she argues, that the
second generation will choose to adopt British cultural values and patterns of behaviour in
favour of Cypriot ones, but their access to these alternative values weakens the power of the
constraints and restrictions which they may experience. The increased choices and
opportunities they experience, therefore, give second generation Cypriot women greater
bargaining power within their own communities.
Summary
What is clear from studies of Cypriots in Britain is the extent to which they experience the
same kind of economic and social disadvantage as other ethnic minorities. Although they
may have been able to utilise ethnic ties in the development of an ethnic economy providing
goods and services both internally and externally, this in itself is a reaction to their
disadvantaged position in society. Thus Cypriot ethnicity has been used to manage the ethnic
disadvantage they face. Although the foundations of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot
ethnicity developed as a result of the environmental conditions in Cyprus, the British
environment has also had a significant effect on it. Their ethnicity therefore is both a product
of and a reaction to their experiences of migration and settlement. Gender is also a major
factor in the formation and transformation of Cypriot ethnicity in Britain. Patriarchal models of
sexuality have been used to reinforce Cypriot values and patterns of behaviour among
Cypriots in Britain and have helped create and maintain the ethnic economy.
Class distinctions, as Anthias highlights, can also be seen as significant in the
appropriation and use of ethnicity by Cypriots in Britain. For those working class migrants
who lack educational and economic resources their reliance on ethnicity, in terms of
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providing both employment and services, is paramount. Among more middle class migrants,
on the other hand, their greater and more 'universal' resources enable them to utilise their
Cypriot ethnicity when and if they consider it appropriate, according to the specific context
within which they are operating. Although they may rely on ethnic ties in terms of providing
workers for their businesses or customers for their goods and services, they are nevertheless
able to vary their 'ethnic' allegiance in accordance with their economic interests. In this way,
Anthias argues: 'ethnic allegiance may facilitate extensive exploitation of their own ethnic
workforce whilst they avow a commonality of ethnic interests with it' (1992:140).
The self-sufficient nature of the Cypriot communities has helped shelter them from
the forces of assimilation. The second generation has become re-socialised into their ethnic
identity by the community structure and in particular through ethnic employment. Yet with
more women in particular choosing to work outside the ethnic economy, this has implications
for their ethnic solidarity. Indications are that the majority of the second generation is still
maintaining their Cypriot identity and stiU upholding many traditional Cypriot values and
norms. However, their involvement in wider society, both socially and economically, gives
them a greater bargaining power within the community. Thus second generation Cypriots,
like their Pakistani counterparts, are in a process of continuity and change: using their own
experiences to challenge patriarchal norms that limit their socialisation, while at the same
time, maintaining their commitment to their Cypriot identity.
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Chapter Four
The Research Process: Feminist Approaches to Methodology
The increased focus of research on ethnic minorities in Britain has also led to a questioning
of the role of the sociologist in effecting social change. The principal concerns of these
debates has been the intended and unintended consequences of research on ethnicity and
"race", and the ethical and political concerns and obligations of the professional sociologist.
For some, a major concern is who carries out the research, and there are as many issues to
do with the position of white researchers in "race' relations' research as there are about men
in gender studies (Harding 1986). Black and feminist researchers have been critical of
conventional (Western) research methodology, which they see as dominated by white, male
sociologists (Roberts 1981). Another area of concern relates to issues of eurocentricism in
research, compounded by the 'distortions' of white feminists (Carby 1982, Bourne 1983).
Concern with eurocentricism is linked to issues of stereotyping, in which sociologists are
seen as unwilling to take on board the racist and sexist characterisations of the ethnic
minority communities. These issues are discussed in chapter one in relation to research on
ethnicity. Thus as Lawrence (1982) argues, much of the literature within ethnicity studies is
permeated with examples of pathologisation and a tendency to 'blame the victim'. Such
studies, it is argued, perpetuate racist stereotypes and further justify the institutionalisation of
racism in Britain (Amos and Parmar 1984). Furthermore, a focus on cultural differences
ignores the influence of "race", class and gender and prevents the formation of collective
struggle to combat these forms of inequality within British society.
One of the most comprehensive challenges to research principles and practice in the
social sciences has come from feminist researchers. Through their debates on objectivity,
accountability and positioning, many feminists have sought to challenge conventional
methods of social research in relation to issues of "race", class and gender that
simultaneously shape individual experiences and contribute to a lack of power in society.
Their concerns are therefore very closely connected with both the theory and methodology
used in my thesis. I shall therefore begin this chapter by examining the influence of feminist
research on methodological debates, and in particular on their focus on feminist objectivity. I
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shall then go on to describe the practice and principles involved in my own research, and
seek to analyse my own experiences of being a white researcher and a woman in the light of
the discussions outlined.
A Feminist Critique
Feminist researchers have raised fundamental questions about the value of conventional
methods of social research in the analysis of gender issues. These questions are linked with
the more widespread concern that the social sciences have in general either ignored or
distorted the position of women in society. The central issue for feminists, therefore, is 'how
best to correct partial and distorted accounts in traditional analysis' (Harding 1988:1).
Oakley (1981) argues that suggestions contained in the research method books
have objective ideas that go against her experiences of research on women. She found it
impossible to maintain the distance that traditional methods advocate. For example, Moser
and Kalton (1971), in discussing interview techniques, argue that the response you gain from
a question is a function of 'individual true response', the interview effect and some
interactional error. Thus accordingly, one moves towards the scientific process by getting rid
of the element of humanity. The general idea is that you impose uniformity on the research
process. But how do you deal with the need to probe? It is here that such traditional methods
face difficulties. The distant approach that the researcher is encouraged to adopt for the sake
of objectivity, and thus reliability, can make it particularly difficult for interviewees to 'open up'.
According to Oakley, 'the woman to woman interview is of a very different nature'. She states
that the women she interviewed were keen to ask her questions and to 'chat' more informally.
The traditional, formal interview, she argues, is therefore unsuited to research on women.
Instead she recommends less-structured research procedures which avoid creating
hierarchical relationships between the researcher and those 'she' is studying.
Janet Finch (1984) had similar experiences in her own research. She claims that she
had expected to have to work hard at establishing some kind of 'rapport' with the women she
interviewed. However, she found that such efforts were unnecessary, as her female
respondents were keen and enthusiastic to talk to her, even though some may have had
initial anxieties about the purpose of the research or of their own 'performance' in the
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interview. Thus, although Finch claims no 'special personal qualities', she states that her
interviewees found the interview a 'welcome experience', in contrast to the lack of
opportunities to talk about themselves in other circumstances. Finch argues that this is not
just a simple reflection of the effectiveness of in-depth interviewing, but rather, it suggests
that the woman to woman interview has special characteristics which give rise to the 'easy
flow' of information, and subsequently more detailed and comprehensive data.
The specific nature of all-female research gives rise to two important questions for
feminists: Is there a distinct feminist method? And how should feminists deal with the ethical
dilemmas that arise from their research? I shall deal with the former question first. According
to Sandra Harding (1988), by focussing on the method question, social scientists have
'mystified' the most interesting aspects of feminist research, that is, what makes feminist-
inspired research so 'powerful'? Furthermore, Harding (1988:2) points out, feminist
researchers use just as many methods as traditional researchers:
For example, they listen carefully to how women informants think about their
lives and men's lives, and critically to how women traditional social scientists
conceptualise women's and men's lives. They observe behaviours of women
and men that traditional social scientists have not thought significant. They seek
examples of newly recognised patterns in historical data.
It is not method that makes feminist research so distinctive, she argues, or adding women to
traditional analysis, but it is 'women's experiences' which provide the new resources for
research. Central to this notion of 'women's experiences' is the emphasis on plurality.
Harding argues that in accepting the fact that there is no universal man, feminist analyses
also recognise that there is no universal woman; but the experiences of women vary as a
result of class, racial and cultural differences between them. However, whilst acknowledging
the existence of these differences, Harding believes that they do not negate the importance
of gender relations as an area of study. For just as elements such as "race", class and
gender affect the experiences of women, they also affect the 'experiences, desires and
interests' of men. According to Liz Stanley and Sue Wise (1993) what is essential to 'being
feminist' is the possession of 'female consciousness'. 'And we see feminist consciousness as
rooted in the concrete, practical and everyday experiences of being, and being treated as, a
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woman. Feminist consciousness.. .is a particular kind of interpretation of the experience of
being a woman as this is presently constructed in sexist society' (1993:32). Thus the
importance of feminist research, they argue, is not so much that it should be conducted by
women only, but that it should be conducted for women. The product of feminist research,
therefore, should be used by women to formulate policies and provisions necessary for
feminist activities.
According to Finch (1 984:76), there is always an additional dimension when women
interview other women, because 'both parties share a subordinate structural position by virtue
of their gender'. Through this, not only is a particular kind of identification likely to develop,
but this relationship between interviewee and interviewer denotes a high level of trust. Such a
degree of trust, she argues, has 'real exploitable potential', which makes women especially
vulnerable as subjects of research. This leads to the second key question that feminists
involved in research must address, that is, how should they deal with the ethical dilemmas
that arise from their research? Finch suggests that central to feminists doing research on
women must be the acknowledgement that collective, and not merely individual, interests are
at stake. Feminist research should actively promote both the interests of the people being
researched and those of feminism in general. 'I would endorse Oakley's (1981) position that,
as a feminist and a sociologist, one should be creating a sociology for women - that is a
sociology which articulates women's experiences on their lives - rather than merely creating
data for oneself as researcher' (Finch 1984:86).
This notion of 'female consciousness' locates feminist research projects firmly in
women's experiences in political struggles, struggles not just against gender oppression, but
also against the oppressive nature of other factors such as class, "race", culture, disability,
sexuality and so on. Indeed as Harding (1 988:8) suggests, 'It may be that it is only through
such struggles that one can come to understand oneself and the social world'. Taking
account of factors such as "race", class, and culture etc. means not only accepting that
women's experiences may vary as a result of the influences of such factors, but also looking
at their influence on the research process itself. Thus, it is argued, feminist researchers must
pay careful attention to the relationship between the researcher and the researched, and to
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breaking down the power differences that exist between them. As Stanley and Wise
(1 993:157) point out:
Whether we like it or not, researchers remain human beings complete with all
the usual assembly of feelings, failings and moods. And all of these things
influence how we feel and understand what is going on. Our consciousness is
always the medium through which the research occurs; there is no method or
technique of doing research other than through the medium of the researcher.
For Harding (1988), the feminist researcher must be placed on the 'same critical
plane' as the subject she studies, thus opening up the entire research process for critical
scrutiny. 'That is, the class, "race", culture, and gender assumptions, beliefs, and behaviours
of the researcher her/himself must be placed within the frame of the picture that she/he
attempts to paint' (1988:9). The researcher should make his or her gender; "race", class and
culture clear and, where appropriate, suggest how this may have shaped the research
project. In this way, Harding, along with other feminist writers (Oakley 1981; McRobbie 1982;
Finch 1984; Ramazanoglu 1989; Stanley and Wise 1993; Gelsthorpe 1992; to name but a
few) argues against an 'objectivist' stance, which attempts to make the researcher invisible,
in favour of a more open approach. Only by acknowledging the influence of the researcher in
this way can feminism hope to produce research that is less biased by such influence.
However, as Caroline Ramazanoglu (1989) points out, the influence of the
researcher is not merely confined to the research process itself, for all research involves
selection and interpretation of people's accounts. She describes this need to select and
interpret as 'the Achilles' heal of all science and social science' (1989:53), and a problem
which feminism has still not resolved. If we accept the unavoidable nature of this subjective
element, does this mean that feminist knowledge is invalid? Ramazanoglu argues that in
order to account for this, feminist researchers must look critically at how their knowledge is
produced and the consequences of that knowledge. Harding (1988:9) supports this view and
adds 'Introducing this "subjective" element into the analysis in fact increases the objectivity of
the research and decreases the "objectivism" which hides this kind of evidence from the
public'.
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In an attempt to re-evaluate these issues, Donna Haraway (1988) suggests three
elements that are central to any discussion of feminist objectivity: positioning, partiality and
accountability. Firstly, she argues, the production of theoretical concepts from research must
be seen as a historical process, dependent on who is being studied, why, how and where; as
well as who produces and interprets the study. Feminist research, therefore, should not be
viewed as the production of complete knowledge, but rather as ideas and theories that are
historically situated and situation specific. She states (1 988:581): 'Feminist objectivity means
quite simply situated knowledges'. Such an approach acknowledges that there is no such
thing as the 'universal woman', and that women may have contradictory and contrasting
interests, It is thus quite possible for different standpoints to develop which may be in direct
opposition to each other. Accepting this notion of positioning as crucial to feminist research
'allows us to become answerable for what we see' (1 988:583). That is, to focus specifically
on the subject we seek to study. This leads on to Haraway's second element of feminist
objectivity, partiality. She suggests (1988:590): 'we seek those ruled by partial sight and
limited voice - not partiality for its own sake, but, rather, for the sake of connections and
unexpected openings situated knowledges make possible. Situated knowledges are about
communities, not about individuals'. Such partiality, she believes, could lead to greater insight
for feminist analysis. Thirdly, Haraway points to the importance of accountability for feminist
objectivity. Like Harding and others, she believes that the researcher's own beliefs and
behaviours must be rendered open to scrutiny, as an inherent part of the research process.
Drawing on Haraway's observations about feminist objectivity, Kum-Kum Bhavnani
(1994) suggests three questions which help outline criteria and principles by which feminist
research may be seen as implementing the goal of feminist objectivity. Firstly, she argues,
any research claiming to be feminist, and whose main subject of inquiry is women, should not
reproduce the subjects he or she has researched in ways which reinscribe inequalities
present in the dominant society. Thus the first question feminist researchers must ask
themselves and deal with in their analysis is: 'does this work/analysis define the researched
as either passive victims or as deviant - does it reinscribe the researched into prevailing
representations?' (1994:30). Secondly, Bhavnani argues, feminist research must make
explicit the micropolitical processes which are in play during the research process. She
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suggests that feminists should ask the question: 'how and to what extent does the
researcher's conduct, write-up and dissemination deal with the micropolitics of the research
encounter - what are the relationships of domination and subordination which the researcher
has negotiated and what are the means through which they are discussed in the research
report?' (1994:30). Thirdly, with specific reference to Haraway's element of partiality,
Bhavnani argues that feminist researchers must ask themselves: 'In what ways are questions
of difference dealt with in the research study - in its design, conduct, write-up and
dissemination?' (1 994:30). According to Bhavnani, these three questions generate the criteria
and principles necessary to providing a framework for evaluating research as feminist.
In this way, feminists seek to describe and account for 'women's experiences',
acknowledging the differences that may separate them as women. However, Mary Maynard
(1994) questions the usefulness of the notion of 'difference' for feminist analysis, especially
when dealing with the issues of "race" and ethnicity. She acknowledges that discussions of
difference have highlighted major problems that existed in the 'narrowly defined and
overgeneralised nature' of previous Western feminist discourses, where a concern for "race'-
related' issues was almost non-existent. However, she believes that a focus on 'difference'
alone prevents feminist researchers from exploring not only the ways in which women may
be distinguished from each other, but also the processes and mechanisms through which
distinct and specific forms of subordination are brought about. Part of the problem lies in
defining what the concept of 'difference' actually means and how it can be used
constructively in theoretical and research analysis. With reference to the issue of "race", she
argues, it can lead to an 'us' and 'them' connotation where only non-white women are seen to
be 'different'. Consequently, "race" is only seen to be a problem for black women. Such an
approach has the effect of separating "race" and gender not only from each other, but also
from racism and patriarchal oppression. In addition, an overemphasis on difference creates
endless possibilities for diversity. As Maynard (1994:19) states 'All forms of diversity are
linked together as examples of difference, implying that they are similar phenomenon, with
similar explanations. So many forms of difference are created it becomes impossible to
analyse them in terms of inequality or power'. In this way, she argues, simply to emphasise
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difference may in itself mask the conditions that give some forms of difference power over
others.
Rather than focusing on difference per Se, Maynard suggests several things that
should be taken into account. Firstly, she believes it is vital to examine the material, as well
as the cultural, aspects of social life and the relationships that are created from and interact
with these. Here she is referring to access to and the quality of resources such as food,
shelter, money and education; and the restrictions that come about through lack of them, as
well as from violence, harassment and abuse. She states (1994:21) ' The interaction
between these things, how they are represented and their relationship to more specifically
cultural phenomena may be complex and contradictory. They are, nonetheless, mediating
factors in any social circumstances and cannot be ignored in analysing situations of black
and white women'. Secondly, Maynard concurs with Ware (1992) who argues that in
considering the issue of "race" and gender, we need to problematise the label 'white'.
Whiteness is not seen as a racial identity, and thus issues of "race" tend to focus on black
people. However, in so doing, black people are presented as 'the problem'. Maynard argues
that the processes of racism and gender may be better understood by focusing on the
practice and means of white privilege and power. In addition, this approach also accepts that
the meanings of the categories 'black' and 'white' are not constant or homogenous concepts,
and that it is not only black people who experience racism, for example Jewish and Irish
people have also been subjects of racism. Finally, Maynard (1994:21) argues that we need
'to end the continual splitting of racial and gender identities and positions, as if they can be
dichotomised. It is necessary, instead, to focus on the ways in which each is implied in and
experienced through the other, and not separately'. Here Maynard cites much of hooks' work,
which examines how both "race" and class influence the extent to which male domination
and privilege can be asserted, and how racism and sexism are interconnected systems of
power, which support and sustain each other. According to Maynard (1994:21) 'Such an
approach is likely to involve concentrating on culturally and historically specific
circumstances, reversing the flow of theory away from the grand abstract theorising of the
metanarrative type dismissed (yet still used) by postmodernists'.
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In summary, feminist concern with research practices and objectivity has provided
valuable insights for the whole of the social sciences. By focusing on 'women's experiences',
feminists have acknowledged the differing ways in which factors such as "race" and class
impinge upon women's lives. By acknowledging and engaging with this notion, feminists have
used difference as a 'springboard' from which to transform feminist arguments about
objectivity. Feminist research thus aims to dismantle power differentials between women by
eliminating hierarchy in all research, and by subjecting the research process itself to more
rigorous analysis. Feminist research is about more than merely studying women, but it is
fundamentally involved with, and derived from, the nature of 'feminist consciousness'. As
Stanley and Wise (1993:44) argue:
While we see 'feminism' as a particular way of seeing reality, we also feel that
'feminist research' can be identified as something more than this. This
'something more' is to be found in the nature of the relationship between the
researcher and the researched, as well as in the researcher's own 'feminist
consciousness' and her experience of being a woman.
From my own point of view, understanding the structural and cultural aspects of women from
different ethnic, racial and class backgrounds is an essential part of being a feminist, If we
are to address the sexual oppression that we all experience as women we must also address
other forms of exploitation and oppression that cut across gender lines. It is therefore
necessary to understand the ways in which racial, ethnic and class based oppressions
interact with and further sustain gender inequality. We must also come to terms with the
ways in which we as women may maintain and further the oppression and subjugation of
other women. In other words, fighting our rights may limit the rights of others. Only by
acknowledging the differing elements that shape the identities and life-chances of other
women can we come to terms with our own identities as women - black or white, working
class or middle class. Yet at the same time, we must not lose sight of the commonalities that
we possess as women as these are vital for effective collective struggle.
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The Study
The aim of the thesis is to examine the influence of ethnicity and religion among Pakistani
and Turkish Cypriot women for both individual identity and collective representation. It further
seeks to highlight the ways in which notions of difference and commonality are influenced by
the evaluations and experiences of "race", class and gender, which position individuals and
groups in a variety of different and contrasting ways. Hence my field research focused on a
number of Pakistani, Turkish Cypriot and Muslim organisations and associations, and
interviews were carried out with a number of women working either directly within these
organisations, or who were otherwise active within their communities. The aim was to explore
differences in the experiences of these women and how these experiences are appropriated
to form both individual and collective identities.
For the purposes of this research I particularly wanted to study two Muslim
populations in Britain. Firstly, in order to examine the level of diversity that exists among
various Muslim groups (in much of the existing theory the concept of 'Muslim' is almost taken
to be synonymous with that of 'Pakistani'). And secondly, to analyse the elements which
these two groups may share, not merely as a resuft of their religion, but also due to their
position and status within British society. I chose to study Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot
people as one represents an Asian population and the other a European one. This again has
implications for their position in the dominant society, and therefore inevitably influences their
lives in Britain.
I chose North London as the location for my research not only because most
Turkish-speaking people in Britain live in London, and predominantly in the north and east of
the city, but also because of the level of diversity that exists there. I felt it to be important that
both populations that I wished to study lived in the same geographical area, as this can have
a considerable impact on people's lives. For example, I found there to be significant
variations between the Pakistani populations in London and those in Bradford, with whom I
had carried out research some years earlier. I shall explain these variations in more detail in
the succeeding chapters.
As highlighted in chapter one, the main focus of this research is the interaction of
"race", class and gender and their relationship with the continued reproduction of patriarchal,
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sexist and class-based oppressions. My exclusive focus on women is part of this concern. It
is also very closely linked to my own research methodology. The feminist accounts of
research practices outlined earlier in this chapter testify to the extraordinary ways in which
female researchers can achieve incredibly rich and detailed information, purely on the basis
of their gender. It would be almost impossible, it is argued, for a male researcher studying
women to achieve the same results. The same can be said, I believe, for women interviewing
men. There are, therefore, very practical as well as theoretical reasons for choosing to study
women only.
Data for the research was collected by using a combination of participant observation
and a series of in-depth, semi-structured interviews. The participant observation was carried
out over a two-year period within a number of organisations specifically catering for Pakistani
or Turkish Cypriot women. Access to the associations and organisations that I worked with
during my research was gained through contacts I had at Warwick University and elsewhere,
who provided me with names of individuals and organisations; I also consulted phone
directories and lists of voluntary and charitable organisations in the London area to acquire
further names and addresses. In addition, living in North London during the period of my
fieldwork I often visited organisations that I spotted when I was out and about generally. The
aim was to contact and visit as many different organisations as possible that catered
specifically for Turkish Cypriot (or Turkish speaking), Pakistani or Muslim women. Within the
Boroughs where the research was focused (Haringey, Hackney, and Islington) I contacted all
of the organisations that I could find, as well as a number from outside these areas. The
majority of my fieldwork was undertaken in four organisations, two Turkish Cypriot and two
Pakistani, two of which catered specifically for women, and two catered for both men and
women, although with female workers and female-only sessions. These groups I considered
broadly representative in terms of their clientele, membership, organisational arrangements,
policies and activities, of other social and welfare bases organisations.
The women I interviewed (fifteen Turkish Cypriots and fifteen Pakistanis) were
chosen because they all worked either directly or indirectly within the Pakistani or Turkish-
speaking communities. I was interested in their views and observations about the two
populations, as well as their own experiences of being a second-generation Pakistani or
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Turkish Cypriot woman in London and more widely in British society. The theoretical
implications of their professional positions will be discussed in the following chapters.
However, it is important to point out that my choice of informants was not designed to be
representative of Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women as a whole, or indeed the second
generation. Rather the aim was to examine their experiences of working (either paid or
voluntary) within the Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot communities, and its influence in terms of
their evaluation of both individual and collective identity (ethnic or religious). The aim was
therefore to examine the intersectionality of ethnicity, "race", class, gender and generation on
both a collective and individual level.
Most of my informants were contacted through the organisations I visited, either
directly through working there, or indirectly through being recommended by others. I also
gained contacts through other groups and activities that I was involved in as part of the
research. Although the women were not representative in terms of class or educational
background, a larger proportion having studied to a higher level than is common among
Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women, as well as nearly half coming from middle class
backgrounds, they were more representative of the second generation in terms of age and
country of birth. My respondents ranged in age from twenty to fifty, and just over a half had
been born in Britain (seven of the informants were born in Cyprus, four in Pakistan and two in
Kenya). At the time of the interview, ten of the Pakistani women were married, including one
who had divorced and remarried. All were married to Pakistanis except one who was married
to a white British man. Nine of the Turkish Cypriot women were married, all had married
fellow Turkish Cypriots except one who had a white British partner, and two were divorced.
Six of the Pakistani informants can be seen to come from broadly middle class
backgrounds. Five had fathers who owned or had owned small businesses (two had grocery
shops, one was in building, one owned a take-away, and another was involved in the family
business importing carpets from Pakistan). One of the informants had come over to Britain in
her late teens to study; her father was a doctor in Pakistan, now retired. Four of the women's
fathers were unemployed at the time of the interview, some for health reasons, one worked
for London Transport, two were factory workers, and two had died when the informants were
children. Among the Turkish Cypriot women, seven can be seen as coming from broadly
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middle class backgrounds. Four had fathers who owned their own businesses (one owned a
café, one a take-away, one had previously had their own retail clothing business, and another
a building enterprise). Among those who had come to Britain as teenagers to escape the war
in Cyprus, either on their own or with other family members, three of the women's fathers
were, or had been, a teacher, a policeman, and a civil servant in Cyprus. Two of the
informant's fathers were unemployed, two were factory workers, and four had died when the
informants were children.
Among the Pakistani informants, only one of their mothers worked, she was a
community worker, although several did sewing in their own home. Among the Turkish
Cypriot informants, all of the widowed mothers worked, three were machinists and one was a
nurse in Cyprus. In addition, one of the informant's mothers was a nurse in Cyprus, another
was a teacher in Cyprus, and one was a machinist in Britain. Many of the other mothers had
worked as machinists or helping their husbands in shops and takeaways in the past. For
those Pakistani informants who were married, two of their husbands owned or worked in the
family business, two were unemployed, one for health reasons, and two were factory
workers. Other occupations included a solicitor, an engineer, a service sector worker and a
mechanic. Among the married Turkish Cypriot informants, three of their husbands owned or
worked for the family business, two worked in the service sector, one was unemployed, one a
journalist, one a mechanic and another a solicitor.
In terms of their qualifications, five of the Pakistani and five of the Turkish Cypriot
informants had degrees, including two from each group who had studied, or were studying,
for their masters, and one who had done a PGCE. Two of the Pakistani and one of the
Turkish Cypriot women held Tec or Higher National Diplomas. One Pakistani woman was
studying for her degree at the time of the interview, and a Turkish Cypriot woman was
studying for her HND. Among the remainder, one Pakistani and three Turkish Cypriot women
had A'Levels only, seven Pakistani and five Turkish Cypriot women had O'levels or GCSEs
only, and one of the Turkish Cypriot women had no formal qualifications at all.
The posts that the women held included co-ordinators, advice workers, educational
development workers, youth workers, refugee workers, counsellors, health advocacy
workers, administrators and voluntary workers. A few of my informants were also active in
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their communities in other ways, for example campaigning over particular issues, such as
educational or health provision.
My interaction with the organisations and associations involved not merely passive
observation, but essentially acting as a volunteer. Subsequently, my activities within these
groups included helping out with basic paperwork and administration, looking after children,
helping out at functions, attending meetings and classes - sewing, cooking, first aid, health
awareness, English, Urdu and Turkish language courses, among others - and with the
Pakistani women's group in particular, driving their mini-bus and organising two of their
holiday play schemes for children in the local area. My involvement was therefore quite
extensive, and gave me a good insight into the workings of the organisations, the women
who attended, and the issues of significance and relevance to many. It also allowed me to
give something back to the organisations that were so instrumental to my research, and
increased levels of trust between my informants and myself.
The interviews were obtained in the latter half of my fieldwork and many of the
women interviewed worked in the organisations where I was carrying out my field research.
Therefore, not only had I come to know these women quite well, but they had also given me
much assistance in suggesting areas of research, creating interview topics and providing me
with other contacts. Their participation had therefore been fundamental to the research
design and practice. With the other respondents, I had only talked to them on the phone or in
person about my research before conducting the interview. It is worth noting here that
although I knew some of the women I interviewed much better than others, this did not seem
to affect the quality of the interviews I gained. All the women interviewed seemed willing and
able to talk openly about not only the wider concerns of the communities, but also personal
aspects of their lives. I shall discuss this in more detail further on. All the interviews were
tape-recorded and were based on a broad list of topics and questions to be discussed. They
ranged in length from one and a half, to four hours, sometimes conducted in two or three
separate sessions. A full transcript was undertaken for data analysis.
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Personal Reflections on the Research Process
In the final part of this chapter, I want to attempt to analyse my personal experiences of the
research process itself and how this relates to my position as a white non-Muslim female
researcher, as well as to other aspects of my identity. As highlighted earlier, there have been
many debates over the issue of white researchers studying ethnic minority communities.
Sandra Harding (1986) for example argues that although black women have been
encouraged to speak out about their own lives, white women still claim the privilege of
describing the lives of 'women'. This has led to the creation of simplifications and ideological
distortions on research of women in general and ethnic minorities in particular. One way I
have tried to overcome this problem in my own research is to actively involve many of my
informants in the research design and process: carrying out pilot studies, formulating topics
and questions for discussion and following other leads and contacts given to me by my
informants. In addition, I have tried as much as possible in the following chapters to the
illustrate attitudes and opinions of my informants by letting them speak for themselves. The
comments that are included aim to provide additional information, as well as drawing out the
main points discussed. The aim therefore has been to provide a platform for the expression
of the diverse views of the women interviewed on the issues discussed. Nevertheless, I am
aware of my influence on the selection and interpretation of information used.
There were of course some disadvantages in not being Turkish Cypriot or Pakistani
myself, the main one being lack of language skills in Turkish, Punjabi and Urdu. I have a
limited knowledge of Punjabi and Urdu, which I acquired through personal study and classes
attended when conducting previous research, although I am not confident in speaking either.
With reference to Turkish, however, my general lack of language skills meant that my ability
to learn Turkish was severely hampered. Consequently despite spending two years working
with a number of Turkish speaking organisations, my Turkish remained very poor. Although a
knowledge of Punjabi, Urdu or Turkish was unnecessary for my interviews as all of the
women were second generation, and consequently fluent in English, it would have been
beneficial for interacting with many of the first generation who attended the organisations.
Although I could understand most of what was being said by my Pakistani informants, I could
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not reply or ask them questions in Punjabi or Urdu, which I found frustrating. On the other
hand, however, the majority could speak English and were happy to talk to me through this
medium. Indeed, some of the women, and particularly more recent arrivals from Turkey
would often like to practice their English with me, and this in itself provided another outlet for
data collection. In addition, those who did speak English, and particularly those who worked
in the associations were always happy to interpret for me, or provide me with a running
commentary of proceedings at events and official meetings. I owe a large dept of gratitude to
the patience and time of these women and the enormous help they provided me in this way.
It is interesting to note that Kucukcan (1999) found in his research that on a number
of occasions he received 'discouraging personal reactions' from some people he approached
for information because he was Turkish. He states that on several occasions he was
accused of being a Turkish intelligence officer, trying to gather information about Turks and
Kurds from Turkey in order to report this to the Turkish Embassy in London, or to his
'sponsors' in Turkey. A Turkish women's organisation refused him to give him any details of
their organisation or members because they were suspicious of his use of the information,
despite his assurances. With reference to my own research, however, I was often surprised
at how readily people accepted my presence and my research status. Not once during my
entire period of field research was I refused access, information and assistance from any of
the organisations, groups or individuals that I came into contact with. Perhaps my position as
an 'outsider' made people less suspicious of my intentions and objectives, and therefore
more able to trust me. It is, of course, difficult to say for sure, but certainly I did not
experience any of the problems that Kucukcan mentions.
My status as a woman was, however, vital for my research as many of the activities
and events within the organisations were confined exclusively to women. Indeed much of the
data could not have been gathered if I were male. Several male researchers who have
carried out studies within various Muslim communities in Britain have highlighted the
problems involved in interviewing Muslim women, who are discouraged from any contact with
unrelated males. For example, Anwar (1985) stated that he had difficulties in talking to
women for his research, especially when the segregation of the sexes was more strictly
observed in the form of purdah. Similarly, Kucukcan (1999) stated that he experienced major
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difficulties in his efforts to access the 'women's word' with the Turkish communities in
London. Being female, therefore, was a necessary part of the research project.
In considering my relationship with the women I interviewed and observed I would
argue that with reference to the former, they were able to identify with me not just because I
was a woman, but for a number of other key reasons. Although I was neither
Pakistani/Turkish Cypriot, nor Muslim, we nevertheless shared a number of things in
common. On a rudimentary level, we were all professional women of a similar age, educated
within the British system. We all displayed interests in the issues concerning Pakistani and/or
Turkish Cypriot women in Britain, the interviewees by virtue of the positions within specific
organisations, myself by virtue of my research interests, which I always made explicit to the
women I interviewed. I also attempted to share the research process with these women by
seeking advice on topics to be explored for their concern, significance and/or importance.
The women themselves were very keen for someone to take notice of what they were saying
about issues concerning their own communities, and the provisions and changes they felt
were necessary both within and outside of these communities. They therefore saw my
research as a chance to publicise these views and were consequently very helpful and
enthusiastic about the study, giving me advice, information and other contacts.
However, although they were interested in the research topic, and many participated
in the research design, they nevertheless placed an enormous amount of trust in me, and in
my role as researcher. Whilst some of the women I interviewed had come to know me over
the preceding year or two that I had been carrying out my fieldwork, many I had met with only
briefly before conducting the interview. Yet the level of trust displayed in giving me very
detailed and often very personal information on their own communities, on the women they
worked with and on their own lives, seems to have been the same in both cases. The
interviews that they gave me were very frank and open; and although their professional
status meant that most were used to talking about their own communities, they seemed
equally forthcoming in talking about their own lives. This may seem surprising, as many of
these women stated that they tried to keep their personal lives very much separate from their
work, and particularly from the women who attended the organisations they worked for. Part
of their willingness to disclose detailed and personal information about their own lives could
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stem from the fact that they felt able to identify with me in some way; or because they felt that
the information was important to my research interests and to the opinions that they wished
to put forward; or simply because I was an outsider, because I represented someone to talk
to about aspects of their lives that they otherwise had little opportunity to discuss. Whatever
the reasons behind this frankness, it seemed clear that the women I interviewed did feel able
to trust me, and all our conversations were thus easy and open.
With reference to the women I observed, I felt my identity, as a white non-Muslim
researcher was more of an issue, particularly with the older women. Like Oakley (1981) and
Finch (1984), I found that the women were keen to 'place' me as another woman with whom
they could share experiences. Indeed, this 'placing' was a vital part of my fieldwork. The
younger women I observed (usually second or third generation) seemed keen to have
someone of their own age to talk to, regardless of religious or ethnic background. On the
basis of age and gender, as well as the fact that they had been born and educated in British
society, we shared much more in common. In addition, they had a good knowledge of the
British education system and therefore some understanding of what doing a PhD involved.
They were thus completely accepting of my role as a PhD researcher and displayed much
interest in my study. These various factors all helped to produce a very easy relationship with
the young women I observed.
With the older women in my fieldwork study, there was a lot more curiosity about who
I was and why I was there. This curiosity was not hostile, but stemmed largely from the fact
that these women could not understand why a white non-Muslim should want to study
Pakistani or Turkish-speaking communities. The significance of their need to 'place' me was
very apparent here. Initially these women felt that my involvement must stem from personal
interest, either had a Pakistani or Turkish partner or that I had a desire to convert to Islam.
They therefore asked many questions about my background and my marital status, as well
as about my role as researcher. My continued presence among these women helped
considerably. They were still aware of my ethnicity and religious status, but accepted it, and
thus a much greater level of trust developed between us. Once they saw that I was willing to
open up to them about myself and willing to contribute to the groups' activities, my presence
was accepted far more readily. Indeed, over time not only was my presence accepted, but it
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was also expected. If I missed a particular occasion or function, or if I had not been to the
centre for a few days, the women would ask me where I had been, tell me everything I had
missed, and why I would have found it interesting. In addition, the women became keen to
explain things to me about their culture and/or religion in much more detail. With this in mind,
I was taken to mosques, taken shopping, and showed how to cook Pakistani or Turkish food
in the 'correct' way. With the Pakistani women I observed, they found me shalwar kemiz (the
traditional Asian suit) to wear for particular functions, and showed me the 'correct' way to
wear them. My knowledge of various Asian cultures and customs learnt both through my
research and through personal experience further showed these women that my interest was
genuine and encouraged them to explain things to me in more detail. In the case of the
Turkish-speaking women I observed, my knowledge of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot cultures
and customs was less comprehensive. What I had learnt had come from my reading of the
limited literature available, from Turkish friends, and from backpacking holidays in Turkey.
However, this basic knowledge, together with my continued involvement with these women,
seemed enough to show genuine interest and for my presence to be accepted. Thus
although the women I observed still perhaps saw me as an 'oddity', they nevertheless
accepted my presence among them.
It is worth noting here that the Turkish-speaking women I observed seemed to
accept my presence among them far more readily from the beginning. I would suggest that
this could be largely explained by the fact that they are much more used to seeing indigenous
Britons in the organisations that they attend. The recent arrival of Turkish refugees over the
past few years has brought an increasing number of officials into these organisations. Many
of the Turkish women therefore have had more dealings with outsiders, and answering
questions from them, with both positive and negative results. My continued presence in these
organisations, however, did make my role less formal, and hopefully more positive for them,
and the women, therefore, over time felt more able to trust me.
My own research experiences highlight many of the points that have been raised by
feminist researchers, outlined earlier. Firstly, the idea that the researcher should keep a
certain amount of distance from the people she is studying in order to remain objective, as
purported in traditional methodology textbooks, is neither practical nor helpful when
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interviewing women (Oakley 1981, Finch 1984). Although it is often argued that this approach
is particularly important when asking sensitive questions, I would suggest that the opposite is
true. When carrying out in-depth, semi-structured interviews with women, it is important to
develop a level of trust between interviewer and interviewee, in order for the women to feel
comfortable enough to discuss such issues. In addition, the more conversational style that I
chose to adopt in my interviews not only made the women feel more at ease, but in itself
produced more information. To give a example from my own research, when one of the
women was describing the attitudes and behaviour of her much-loved, but in her view rather
strict and old-fashioned father, I commented that I had one like that at home. This comment
not only added a note of humour into the proceedings; it also encouraged the interviewee to
discuss her own situation in much more detail. This sense of identity and commonality is
important in interviews, it also allows the researcher to take a closer look at the attitudes and
behaviour being described and to see how they vary according to factors such as culture,
"race", class, gender and so on. The comment I made was not deliberate, to gain a specific
effect, it was just part of natural conversation, but its effect was to illuminate the situation
further. This shows the importance of responding to interviewees as people, not as objects
under study, and as equals, whilst acknowledging any differences that may exist.
But how is the researcher to define her or his identity, and how are differences to be
interpreted? How should I define myself? I could describe myself as a white, middle-class
woman, or as an anti-racist socialist feminist, but I am also a sociologist, a single parent
(although I was not at the time of my fieldwork), a daughter, mother and sister. I am British,
but also half Canadian; I was born in Birmingham, but grew up in the countryside, and have
spent the last half of my life living in cities. I could chose any or all of these categories, and
others, to define myself; and other people will use them to define me. I am all of these things,
yet I may choose to prioritise one over another at different times and in different situations. All
of these things, and others, are relevant to me and make up what I call my identity. Do I lack
identification with a married woman with children because I am a single parent, or does the
experience of being a mother override this 'difference'? I would agree, therefore, with
Maynard (1994), that we must be aware of diversity whilst not letting is obscure any
similarities that may exist.
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I would argue that both with the women I interviewed and with those I observed in my
fieldwork, that the greater the similarity, the easier the identification, and therefore the quicker
the 'rapport'. Where there was less similarity between the women and me I interviewed or
observed, it was necessary to work harder in order to gain their trust and confidence. Yet at
the same time, where there was a lack of knowledge (or a perceived lack of knowledge), the
women were often keener to fill in that knowledge and this in itself helped produce a rich and
invaluable source of information.
Terminology
Three points need to be emphasised in relation to the use of terminology by my informants
and myself and included in the discussions outlined in the following chapters. Firstly, although
the women interviewed are referred to as either Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot, and all of the
women had at least one parent who was born in Pakistan or Cyprus (and more commonly
both) many of the women did not refer to themselves in this way. This was particularly the
case among the Pakistani women, as the following chapters will illustrate. Nevertheless, in
order to distinguish between the two groups the use of such categories was considered
necessary. All of the women interviewed were quite happy to be identified in this way.
Secondly, in the following chapters, the term 'practising' has been used according to
the women's own definitions, to describe someone who actively and consciously follows the
laws of Islam. For most this meant, among other things, praying five times a day, keeping the
fasts and carrying out the specific prayers and rituals laid down in the Qur'an. The term is of
course open to much interpretation, but all of the Pakistani women described themselves in
term of being 'practising' or 'non-practising'. The term has therefore been used accordingly.
None of the Turkish Cypriot women interviewed referred to the term; it has consequently not
been used to describe any of the women from this group.
Thirdly, the term 'English' was used by many of my informants to refer to the white
indigenous population of Britain (Scottish, Welsh or Irish were not referred to by any of the
women). They therefore used the term to distinguish the indigenous population from
members of other ethnic groups. Where discussion is made of an informant's views or
experiences, the term has been used, but only if the individual concerned used it herself in
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discussing that particular issue. More generally, I refer to the 'indigenous population' of
Britain.
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Chapter Five
Implementing Ethnicity: Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot
Women's Organisations in London
During my two-year period of field research I had contact with a number of Turkish, Turkish
Cypriot, Pakistani and Muslim associations and organisations. In particular I worked very
closely with four organisations, two Pakistani and two Turkish Cypriot, and spent time with
the female workers from these groups. Because I interviewed many of the women working in
these organisations I have decided not to disclose the names of the organisations. To do so,
I believe, would risk identifying the women I interviewed. For this reason, instead of providing
a detailed account of the specific associations I shall give a brief overview of the different
organisations in terms of their roles and objectives, as highlighted by the workers
themselves, the various literatures obtained from the groups, such as pamphlets and annual
reports and my own observations. I shall then go on to examine in more detail the views of
my informants on the organisations they worked for and their experiences of working within
the Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani communities. However, I shall begin by providing a brief
overview of the literature on Pakistani, Muslim, and Turkish speaking organisations in Britain.
The establishment of Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot ethnic organisations and
associations can be seen as an acknowledgement on the part of the migrants of their
permanent settlement in Britain, and of their need to adapt to the new environment and to
face the challenges of living in a 'multicultural' and multi-faith society (Anwar 1985, Kucukcan
1999). George and Millerson (1967) state that one way Cypriots have sought to establish
their own community in Britain is through the various voluntary associations with the objective
of keeping alive and re-creating traditional cultural practices, values and activities. For
Muslims in Bradford, Lewis (1994) argues the creation of ethnic and religious institutions
resulted both from commitments to their settlement in Britain, and from their desire to pass
on traditional and religious customs and values to their children. Likewise, Shaw (1988)
suggests that organisation among Pakistanis in Oxford represented their need to safeguard
religious and ethnic values from the threat of western influence. As Pakistanis and Turkish
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Cypriots became more settled in Britain, therefore, they established ethnic and religious
organisations in areas of Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot concentration in Britain.
Many of the Pakistani associations established in Britain, Saifullah Khan (1976)
notes, have been set up by urban, educated professionals. These associations have often
been unstable in nature and consequently not long lasting. This is partly because their
leadership derives from self-appointed status and consequently they often only receive active
support from those directly involved in the initiation of the association. In addition, Saifullah
Khan argues, the majority of the rural, uneducated Pakistanis remain indifferent to these
associations. Their everyday lives revolve not around issues of nationalism and ethnicity, but
those of kin. As many were believed to maintain the intention to return, collective action in
Britain was not seen as important. Furthermore, the majority are suspicious of the
associations and their members who, they feel, are involved purely for their own financial
gain. On the one hand, Saifullah Khan argues, Pakistanis may at times require intermediaries
to represent them in wider British society, because of their own lack of communication skills.
On the other, no similar pattern or experience of such leaders exists in the Pakistani villages,
where decision making and authority is vested in the kin group, and in particular with the
elders in these groups. According to Lewis (1994:21), 'in such an environment, the very
concept of community representation is alien'. These 'leaders' therefore find it difficult to
mobilise support amongst the majority of Pakistanis in Britain.
Similarly, there was less evidence of Turkish Cypriot organisation in London in the
1970s than amongst Greek Cypriots. This was partly believed to stem from their small
numbers vis-à-vis Greek Cypriots, their more scattered settlement and their later emigration.
In addition, Ladbury (1977) argues that the central organising force for Turkish Cypriots has
been that of kinship ties and interdependence with neighbours. Like the early Pakistani
organisations, those associations established by Turkish Cypriots tended to be run by urban
educated elites, and to cater mainly for the middle class. Working class Turkish Cypriots
were little influenced by these associations, and had minimal contact with them other than
through the provision of Turkish language classes for their children and sometimes through
social functions and national holidays.
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Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot ethnicity in Britain, therefore, has largely been
sustained through kin-based ties, which also accounts for the lack of ethnic solidarity in terms
of politics or interest groups. Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain are not homogeneous
groups, but divided along class (caste), ethnic and sect lines (Lewis 1994, Kucukcan 1999).
According to Shaw (1988), the Pakistani communities are composed of numerous different
kinship groups that are in competition with each other for access to political power. This often
results in internal conflict and division, in which allegiances are shifting and fluid as
individuals and groups attempt to consolidate their positions both in relation to their own
community and outside it. Furthermore, as Anthias (1993) and Anwar (1985) note, the nature
of community dependence and help has differed from one occupational group to another. For
example, professional and other middle class educated Pakistanis were providing help in
day-to-day life while working class Pakistanis were mainly on the receiving end. Similarly,
dependence on kin for help and companionship differed between working class and middle
class Pakistanis. The professionals tended to depend much more on friends than of kin.
In addition to these forms of differentiation within the ethnic communities, according
to Kucukcan (1999), the changing political landscape in Turkey and identity politics among
Kurdish and Alawite people have had repercussions among the Turkish community in
London. The distinct identity claim of the Kurds and Alawites has led to the further
fragmentation of Turkish identity on ethnic lines. Nevertheless, he argues, the existence of
certain organisations that cater for Turkish speakers as a whole demonstrates that while
competing identities might clash with each other in their country of origin, there is the
possibility of reconciliation of these competing identity claims in the British context. As far as
the activities and the ethnic origins of their members and clients are concerned, a number of
organisations are widening their ethnic base to include all migrants from Turkey or Cyprus.
Increasingly, therefore, the documents and statements of these associations refer to 'Turkish
communities' rather than the 'Turkish community' as a single category.
Turkish speaking organisations and associations, Kucukcan (1999) argues, are very
diverse in terms of their different organisational structures, membership, clientele, strategies
and purposes.. Such diversity stems from the construction of the Turkish community itself and
is shaped by the needs generated within wider society.
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Here we have at least two forces, if not more, at work that not only guide but
also fashion the shape of the organisations under question. One of these
emanates from within the Turkish community. During the process of the
formation of the Turkish community from that of a fragmented ethnic group,
specific needs of the community and the strategies adopting left a mark on the
structures of organisations and associations. This inside stimuli is matched by
an outside impetus originating from being situated in a multicultural
environment, which has its own distinct social structures and organisational
forms that are not available in the country of origin. (Kucukcan 1999:167)
In his study of Pakistani associations in Rochdale, Anwar (1985) aims to classify these
associations in terms of their functions into: welfare, religious, political and professional. For
Kucukcan, on the other hand, Turkish/Cypriot associations in London display such diversity in
terms of their foundational purposes and subsequent activities that such classification is
impossible. Rather, the Turkish speaking organisations tend to provide a range of services
that address the various welfare, education, social and cultural challenges, and the religious
needs of the Turkish community in London. These associations, he argues, therefore play an
important role in the various Turkish communities, with each displaying a different emphasis
on the politics of identity. Furthermore, as Turkish speakers have moved to new areas of
residence, and as their concentration has increased, new ethnic organisations have been
established to provide for the needs of Turkish speakers in their new surroundings. Turkish
speaking organisations, Kucukcan argues, are therefore not only diverse in terms of their
orientation, clientele and politics but also dynamic because they are open to change to adapt
to new situations and address new challenges.
Two of the main challenges that ethnic organisations must address are the changing
position of women and young people in Britain (Lewis 1994). With the increasing numbers of
British educated Muslim women furthering their education and/or developing careers, working
increasingly in the public, private and voluntary sectors of society, the Muslim communities,
and other ethnic communities in general, face the challenge of addressing the new found
aspirations of these women. As Au (1992) argues, Muslim women are beginning to challenge
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the 'hegemony of male community leadership' and the patriarchal and oppressive religious
and cultural traditions of their communities.
According to Brah (1996), Asian women in general are actively engaged in political
struggles both within and outside their communities. The diverse range of organisations that
have been established by Asian women seek to develop support networks for one another,
organise social and cultural activities, provide information and advice and offer women
somewhere to organise and campaign on issues they see as relevant. 'These self-help
groups speak to the shared experience of Asian women and address issues of common
concern in an atmosphere of trust and self-respect' (1996:82). Such organisations, Brah
argues, are difficult to categorise politically as they represent the 'multifaceted' nature of
oppressions, which requires resistance and struggle to be made on many different levels.
Asian feminism is one of the most creative and vigorous forces within
contemporary black politics in Britain. It draws upon the political traditions of
women and men in the sub-continent, but its identity is indelibly composed with
the British social and political dynamic. Asian feminists have had to address
issues surrounding the ways in which factors such as caste, class and religion
configure in the British situation (Brah 1996:83).
Similarly, in relation to the second and third generation, Lewis (1994) argues, many
community leaders and Muslim elders remain confused as to how to respond to the emerging
'Muslim youth culture', a hybrid of British and South Asian forms, expressed in music,
magazines and local media. Schools, youth and community centres are places in which
British Muslims enjoy space to experiment with their multiple identities, relatively free from
parental control. According to Brah (1996:47) the emergence of youth groups marks the
'coming of age of a new form of Asian political and cultural agency'. These new groups
should not be seen, she argues, as more 'progressive' than those of the first generation:
rather, their originality lies in having grown up in Britain. They articulate a home-grown British
political discourse. Their identity claims lie in Britain, and from their position as 'insiders', no
matter how much they are constructed as 'outsiders' by others. Organisations that seek to
represent ethnicity institutionally need to take these internal differences into account, as well
as those constructed externally by the dominant regimes in society.
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Profile of the Organ isations
Field research for this thesis was carried out within the Boroughs of Islington, Hackney and
Haringey in the North and East of London. There is a fairly high concentration of Turkish
speakers in these areas, gradually dispersing eastwards towards the suburbs of Enfield. It is
estimated that one in ten of the local population of Hackney is of Turkish, Kurdish or Turkish
Cypriot origin. There are a number of Turkish shops and services available in these areas, as
well as a small number of Turkish mosques. Green Lanes in Haringey is considered the main
centre of the local Turkish area. The majority of shops in this area were previously owned by
Greek Cypriots, then Turkish Cypriots, and are now mainly Turkish or Kurdish owned. There
is also a whole range of political, social, cultural and welfare organisations scattered
throughout these boroughs. The Pakistani population is much more dispersed in these areas,
with a larger concentration in Walthamstow in East London. There are a number of Pakistani
shops and businesses, as well as several Pakistani mosques, Islamic bookshops and Muslim
information centres. The Pakistani associations are scattered throughout the boroughs as
are the Turkish speaking organisations.
Overall, those families who originate from the Indian sub-continent are under-
represented in Haringey, Hackney and Islington (see Table 1). In Haringey they constitute 5.8
per cent of the borough's population compared with 7.8 per cent in Greater London as a
whole, though the Borough has a slightly higher proportion of Bangladeshis (1.5 per cent
compared with 1.3 per cent). Indian, Pakistani and Asian people tend to be more evenly
distributed throughout the borough than black groups. Nevertheless, in three wards (Green
Lanes, Harringay and Woodside) around ten per cent of the population comes from the
Indian sub-continent that represents a quarter of the Borough's total.
Similarly in Hackney, while those who originate from the Indian sub-continent in
general is slightly lower than the average for greater London at 6.29 per cent (with only 0.95
per cent Pakistani), in certain wards the number is much higher than the average. In
Leabridge, for example, the percentage of residents from the Indian sub-continent is 15.58
per cent of which Pakistanis make up 2.95 per cent. In Homerton the percentage of those
from the Indian sub-continent represents 11.46 per cent of the Population, 3.42 per cent of
which are Pakistanis.
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Table 1: Ethnic Group Projections for the Year 2000. Source: Greater
London Authority 2000
Category	 Hackney	 Haringey	 lslington	 Greater
London
	
Total	 Total	 %	 Total	 %	 Total	 %
White	 117,226	 61.25	 138,910	 63.13	 129,989	 73.25	 5,206,198 73.11
Black
Caribbean	 21,512	 11.24	 21,520	 9.78	 9,565	 5.39	 335,649	 4.78
Black African	 17,302	 9.04	 19,869	 9.03	 12,245	 6.90	 288,514	 4.2
BlackOther	 9,416	 4.92	 7,261	 3.30	 4,348	 2.45	 120,788	 1.71
Indian	 6,852	 3.58	 7,701	 3.50	 2,875	 1.62	 418,980	 6.03
Pakistani	 2,258	 1.18	 2,046	 0.93	 870	 0.49	 128,691	 1.92
Bangladeshi	 3,426	 1.79	 4,302	 1.91	 4,419	 2.49	 124,390	 1.83
Chinese	 1,780	 0.93	 2,420	 1.10	 2,538	 1.43	 68,544	 0.97
OtherAsian	 2,756	 1.44	 4,973	 2.26	 2893	 1.63	 148,013	 2.13
Other	 8,880	 4.64	 11,112	 5.05	 7,737	 4.36	 234,337	 3.32
Total Ethnic	 74,162	 38.75	 81,136	 36.87	 47,474	 26.75	 1,932,749 26.89Minorities
Total	 191,390	 100	 220,038	 100	 177,460	 100	 7,188,049	 100
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In the Borough of Islington the number of residents who originate from Pakistan,
India and Bangladesh is 4.6 per cent and they tend to be more scattered than in the other
Boroughs. Two wards, Gillespie and Sussex have the highest number of residents who
originate from the Indian sub-continent, representing 6.66 per cent and 5.89 per cent of the
population respectively. The highest proportion of Pakistanis is in Highbury although here too
they represent less than one per cent of the population. Bamsbury, on the other hand,
contains a higher proportion of Bangladeshis at 3.45 per cent.
While the 1991 Census included for the first time a question on ethnic origin, people
of Greek, Turkish or Cypriot origins are classified as 'white', since these communities were
not thought by OPCS to be sufficiently large nationally to warrant separate identification.
According to the Greater London Authority (2000), an estimated 10 per cent of London's
population are from white minority groups: Irish, Cypriot, Turkish, and some Arab people,
making the total ethnic minority percentage 37 per cent rather than 27 per cent as shown in
the figures. According to the 1991 Census of population for Haringey people whose head of
household was born in Cyprus represented 5.7 per cent of the population of the borough.
Those just born in Turkey constituted 1.9 per cent of the population. In Islington the number
of people born in Turkey or Turkish Cyprus, according to the 1991 Census represented 0.61
per cent of the population. Similarly a housing needs survey carried out in the borough of
Hackney in 1997 found the number of people with a head of house hold born in Turkish
Cyprus to represent 0.6 per cent of the population. The percentage for those born in Turkey
was significantly higher at 3.4 per cent.
The majority of the organisations that I worked with during my field research catered
specifically for Pakistani and Turkish speaking women. Others catered for both men and
women, but employed female workers and had female only sessions. The aims and functions
of these organisations can roughly be divided into social, cultural, political, welfare, and
educational; they usually include specific activities for both the elderly and young women. The
welfare section is concerned with specific problems experienced by Pakistanis or Turkish
speakers arising from their settlement in Britain. The aim is to help individuals and families on
a personal level, as well as bringing issues to the attention of the authorities concerned (the
police, hospitals, schools, social services, etc.). This is becoming an increasingly important
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part of their work, providing trained female workers to offer advice on issues concerning
welfare benefits, housing, social services, immigration and asylum, education, health,
domestic violence, racial harassment, etc. Most of the centres provide a drop-in service for
women, and offer interpretation and counselling. They also organise seminars and courses in
relation to health promotion and awareness. Immigration and asylum rights were major
issues for many of the organisations, particularly the Turkish speaking ones, as a result of
the larger numbers of refugees that they were increasingly dealing with. This often involved
petitioning and campaigning for certain individuals and for a change in Government policy
generally.
The cultural role is seen as important to many of the organisations, and they arrange
cultural, national and religious celebrations for their members and clients. Many also
participate in 'multicultural' events in their local boroughs, where members of different 'ethnic'
groups and associations put on displays of dance, drama, music and poetry recitals,
providing samples of 'traditional' Turkish or Pakistani food, fashion shows of 'ethnic' dress
made by some of the women attending the organisations, and make-up demonstrations, etc.
These festivals gave many women, young and old alike, the opportunity to participate more
directly in the cultural side of their ethnicity. While one might want to question the effect that
these 'multicultural' events have on the population as a whole in terms of inter-ethnic
relations, certainly among the women involved it was a chance to focus on the positive
aspects of their ethnic heritage. Young people in particular were very keen on these events.
The political role varied from organising or attending events for visiting dignitaries or
artists from Pakistan, Turkey or Cyprus, to publicising particular issues that they felt were
relevant, such as highlighting the suffering of the people of Bosnia by many of the Pakistani
associations, or the situation in Cyprus for Turkish Cypriots, or holding vigils for people who
had 'disappeared' in Turkey. Their political work also involved representing their 'community'
within mainstream society concerning particular issues, such as educational and health care
provision, immigration and asylum rights, and issues surrounding domestic violence. The
organisations varied to a large extent in terms of the weight they placed on this political role.
Some preferred to keep politics to the background; others were much more overtly political.
Some of the respondents were often critical of the events organised around visiting
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dignitaries or politicians. It was felt that these individuals were merely coming to Britain for
their own political gain, rather than for the benefit of Pakistanis or Turkish speakers in this
country. In addition, some of my informants believed that these functions were purely for the
middle class elites and did little for the working class. According to one of the Pakistani
respondents who had recently attended Eid celebrations at the Pakistani Embassy, the
women attending this function were all wearing very expensive suits, diamonds, nail varnish
and make-up, which she felt was very different from the world of the 'ordinary' Muslim. These
activities, however, demonstrate the continued importance of links with their countries of
origin, as well as those political activities focused much more on issues relating to their
country of residence.
On the educational side, the organisations provide a range of classes in English,
Urdu/Turkish, adult access, assertiveness, first aid, keep fit, sewing, cookery, arts and crafts,
etc. The majority also provides supplementary education for young people in Urdu/Turkish,
Maths, English, as well as more general classes about Pakistani/Turkish Cypriot history and
cultural heritage. In addition, one of the Pakistani women's associations provided an Asian
craft training and employment project. This included training in pattern cutting, sewing,
embroidery and framing, as well as business skills and basic numeracy. The aim of the
course was to assist women in selling their own products as small businesses. For many of
the women, these classes are as much a social occasion as a class. They give them a
chance to meet and talk with other women of similar and different backgrounds. They
discuss what they have been doing and the plans they are making. It is a very informal
atmosphere and the women can talk freely to each other. In addition to these classes, the
organisations provide a whole range of social activities, events, and excursions. For many of
the women attending, it is a break from their everyday lives and the day-to-day difficulties
they may experience. It helps them with the feelings of isolation, loneliness and depression
that many can experience living away from relatives and kin. The social side that is most
important for many of the women attending these organisations.
Most of the associations organise special activities for the elderly, and some have
specific workers .in this field. They provide support and advice, and arrange activities for
elderly women, many of whom face isolation, both social and economic. They also offer
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interpretation services, take women to hospitals and clinics if they have limited abilities in
English or there is no one to accompany them, and provide information and seminars on
health issues and health promotion and awareness. They have regular get-togethers that
give the women a chance to meet others, to share their experiences and exchange views.
Many also arrange regular shopping trips or visits to mosques (predominantly the Pakistani
organisations), as well as trips to other towns. Most have a luncheon club especially for
elderly women.
Many of the associations have activities and classes especially for young people,
including youth groups, music, cookery, arts and crafts, and fashion classes, holiday
playschemes, crèches, careers advice and organised events and trips. They provide
supplementary education in Urdu or Turkish, at various levels, as well as maths, English and
other curriculum based subjects. It is interesting to note that whereas all of the Pakistani
organisations that I visited provided specific activities and classes for young people, only
some of the Turkish speaking ones did, and these were predominantly those that catered for
both men and women. However, there was a large Turkish speaking youth organisation in
the area, which will be discussed a little later. The Pakistanis had no similar organisation, but
instead the associations aimed to cater for young people by arranging separate youth
sessions and activities, and the majority had a part-time or voluntary youth worker.
The associations of course vary in the extent to which they offer these services or
participate in these activities, but the majority contained these elements. Interaction with
mainstream organisations also varied from organisation to organisation. On the welfare side,
most had dealings in relation to individual clients, interacting with immigration officials, the
police, the welfare agencies, doctors, teachers, and other educational and health
professionals, as well as with other women's groups and women's refuges, local Race Units
etc.
Since the break-up of the GLC, funding has been much more difficult to access, and for
much of the time the organisations in this study were seeking funding for general running
costs, as well as for specific projects. Although the majority of the organisations received
funding from the. local London Councils - lslington, Hackney and Haringey, the London
Borough Grants Unit, local Race Units, Women's Units and education and health authorities,
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this tended to be very limited and was declining year by year. Increasingly therefore funding
was sought from outside of the Borough. They receive funding for specific projects from
various charitable institutions and Trusts, and increasingly acquire funding from the National
Lottery Board and charities such as Comic relief. They also receive a number of donations. In
addition, they may receive some funding from other trusts, which help with one-off costs, for
example furniture or trips for the women.
Seeking funding from outside the Boroughs where the organisations are based is
always very competitive as several centres throughout London may offer similar services and
projects and must therefore compete for funds. Funding is usually obtained for a fixed term
period of between one and three years on average, however, many require yearly renewal.
The temporary nature of this funding means that there is no stability for the project or the
worker/s involved, which can lead to negativity on the part of those involved with their
employment under constant threat. Many of the workers are therefore constantly looking for
possible sources for funding, as well as positions in other organisations should their attempts
prove unsuccessful. Funding is therefore a major priority, and takes up a lot of the workers'
time.
A further problem in relation to funding concerns the funding agencies themselves,
many of whom have in-projects or issues which they are looking for in relation to funding
applicants. During the period of research for this study, the key issue among many of the
funding agencies was elderly people. Consequently the overwhelming majority of the
associations had projects catering specifically for elderly members, as funding could be sort
relatively easily. Currently, however, the key issue seems to be young people with more and
more funding being made available to this target group. While this provides the opportunity
for many of the organisations to set up new projects catering specifically for young people in
their communities, many have found their elderly projects under threat. One of the Turkish
Cypriot organisations that I worked with has been running a very active elders project for the
last three years, however with their funding about to run out and unable, as yet, to secure
further funding, the future of the project and its worker is uncertain.
In general, the Pakistani associations tended to be more social and cultural in nature,
although they provide a large and increasingly popular advice service. Nevertheless, the
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majority of the women who attend on a regular basis are primarily concerned with the social
and cultural side. Religion tends to be far more prominent in the Pakistani organisations,
although they are not overtly religious. Rather, religion is seen as part of the cultural make-
up'. Many events and celebrations will often include Mushaira (verse reading), and religious
celebrations such as Eid form an important part of the social calendar. Often trips and
outings will include visits to the local mosques, as well as activities such as shopping.
The Turkish speaking associations tend to be much less religious in their approach.
For many it does not feature in their activities at all, although some will celebrate Bayram (the
end of Ramadan) to some extent. In addition, their welfare advice service has become the
main focus for many of the organisations. This is largely due to the increase in the number of
refugees coming from Turkey and Cyprus since the 1980s. Indeed, many of these
organisations began catering specifically for Turkish Cypriot people/women in London and
have subsequently expanded their services to cover Turkish speakers, as a result of the
needs of more recent arrivals. For the majority of these organisations, refugees and recent
arrivals now represent the majority of their clients, although some of the women attending
these centres will also be those who came in the 1 950s and 1960s, especially more elderly
women. Consequently the welfare side of their organisations has become much more
important, and most have a specifically designated refugee worker.
Domestic violence was also a major issue for the Turkish speaking organisations.
They receive a growing number of cases and aim to raise awareness of the issues within
their communities, as well as establishing contacts with other organisations and agencies
such as women's refuges, women's aid organisations, the police, social services, solicitors
and housing departments. Although cases of domestic violence were apparent among both
Pakistanis and Turkish speakers, it was considered a much more major issue for Turkish
speakers. For the Pakistani associations domestic violence came under general welfare
provision, although they received a growing number of cases. Among the Turkish speaking
organisations, however, and particularly those specifically dealing with women, they tended to
be much more outspoken about domestic violence and some had specific projects
concerning this issue. According to one Turkish speaking association's report:
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Domestic violence is common among the Turkish community. Within culture it is
considered an acceptable form of control by husbands, who are seen as having
the right to physically punish their wives, especially if the wives are disobeying
their wishes. The majority of women suffer violence, it is perceived as the
woman's fate; sometimes it is even interpreted as the husband's sign of love to
his wife. There is little support in the community for women suffering domestic
violence; they are expected to suffer in silence. There is also a lack of wider
family support; there is very little community or statutory support, which makes it
difficult for women, especially with children, to leave their husbands. This affects
the children, and many may also be subject to violence from the father.
One organisation also employed two crèche workers who dealt specifically with children with
behavioural problems, linked to domestic violence issues. The Turkish speaking
organisations were therefore very active in relation to this issue, campaigning both within and
outside their communities.
As well as these organisations catering specifically for Pakistanis or Turkish speakers I
also interviewed a number of women and visited several other related organisations. One of
these was a professional development centre which aims to promote the role of parents in
education through the provision of advice, information, advocacy and partnership schemes
with community organisations and schools. The project has been set up to raise achievement
levels amongst children from specific ethnic minority groups that are underachieving in
education. One of my respondents worked with the Turkish speaking communities, and there
were also individuals working with the Kurdish, the African Caribbean, the Somali, and the
Bangladeshi communities. Although the needs of these different communities varied, all were
targeted as being the lowest achievers educationally. In relation to the Turkish speaking
communities, the major issues were considered to be cultural and the linguistic barriers
which prevent many families from playing an active role in education. The aim of the
development centre was to empower parents by providing them with advice, information,
advocacy, training sessions on a wide range of issues such as admissions and transfers,
special needs, national curriculum matters, and so on. The majority of those who use the
service tend to be newcomers, as my informant pointed out:
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I mean it's quite sad really, within the Turkish Cypriot community, as a
community we've been underachieving for years, and we are the most settled
community, but a lot of families think because they know the language it's fine,
but it's not. But we do find that a lot of our clients are new arrivals, who are not
familiar with the system, who have language barriers, who aren't aware of the
culture. And we're basically there to have the cultural imput as well, I mean
families come and there's a real culture shock.
The effect of educational underachievement among Turkish Cypriots is explored further in
subsequent chapters.
I also spent some time in, and interviewed one the female workers from, a large
Turkish speaking youth organisation. This organisation provides activities for young Turkish
speaking men and women between the ages of 14 and 25, although some of those who
attend are older; approximately 50 per cent are Cypriots, 30 per cent Kurds and the
remainder are from Turkey. About 50 per cent of the young people are from Haringey, about
35 per cent from Hackney, and the rest from other wards. The organisation has six paid
employees, including an HIV worker, an educational worker, a drug worker and a youth
worker, as well as a number of volunteers. The main aim of the organisation is to educate
young people and increase levels of achievement and self-confidence through educational
activities. They also organise supplementary classes and provide information and advice on
education and career development, as well as issues to do with social welfare.
This organisation differs from other youth services for Pakistanis and Turkish
speakers in that it is very much concerned with issues of integration and incorporation of
young people into wider British society. Therefore, they do not teach language or culture
because they feel that these are being offered by other organisations. Rather, they draw on
the 'multicultural' experiences of Turkish speaking young people. Nevertheless, Turkish
culture, particularly in the form of music, is becoming increasingly popular, as highlighted in
chapter nine. The presence of an HIV worker and drugs worker also demonstrate their
different approach and the strategies they adopt for providing practical solutions to everyday
issues and problems for Turkish speaking young people. Most importantly, they provide
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young people with a separate space in which to challenge and negotiate their identities. As
one of the workers commented:
It's a lovely atmosphere here; it's great to see them altogether. We run music
workshops here as well. But they've got their own talent; it's amazing to see it.
They're all good at something, it's brilliant. And the ones who don't feel they
have any specific skills to offer just come and hang out.
Like other Turkish speaking organisations, they do not project a religious dimension in any
way, as they believe this would deter many young people from attending. They also feel that
religious services are offered elsewhere.
Two of my informants worked for a Muslim women's counselling service, which
offered a more Islamic approach to dealing with clients. The organisation was established by
professional Muslim women to cater for the needs of women like themselves in Britain. It
provides a telephone and, where appropriate, a face-to-face counselling service to all Muslim
women whatever their cultural, ethnic or linguistic background. According to their publicity:
'Muslim women are confronted with problems, out of confusion or lack of support, which they
are unable to overcome isolation, language problems, and welfare issues'. Counselling is
founded upon the Islamic model of the self and based on the teachings from the Qur'an and
the Prophetic traditions, which they claim provides 'a positive approach that enables the
growth of the individual and allows the person to tap into and release their potential'. Clients
are referred to specialist counsellors if necessary, but the communities generally lack such
specialists. The organisation also has a consultancy role, offering advice to social workers,
the police, the probation service and hospitals, and such establishments are increasingly
approaching the organisation to deal with clients. The greatest proportion of their clients are
British born Muslim women, followed by women born on the Asian sub-continent and those
with dual parentage. The overwhelming majority are ethnically from the Indian sub-contintent,
followed by Arabs and English.
Impact on the Local Communities
Although the organisations vary in their aims and approaches, they all seek to cater for the
needs of Pakistanis, Turkish speakers or Muslims in London and to empower individuals to
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achieve their goals and aspirations, despite the restrictions and discriminations they face. As
a Pakistani advice worker commented:
Racism forces Pakistani people back into their own communities to a great
extent. In a way our job is to try to empower our community so they can do stuff
for themselves, but obviously that's not working so much. They're all coming
here and they're going to their own community organisations to do stuff for
them. So it forces them back and we're trying to get them out, but it's not really
working.
Part of the problem, many of my informants believed, was not simply lack of language skills
and lack of knowledge of the British system, but the continuation of ethnic discrimination.
Nevertheless, the increase of services available for Pakistanis and Turkish speakers
provides a very important role within their communities. A Turkish Cypriot development
worker believed that the expansion of services provided for Turkish speakers was largely a
result of the arrival of people from Turkey:
Since the coming of the Kurdish community, definitely that's accelerated it.
Because like before the Turkish Cypriots were very much just trying to fade into
the background, and trying to integrate as much as possible. But now there are
more services, and people have somewhere to go and speak to people from
their own community. The needs have been met a lot more than what it was,
some people had been here thirty years and they never had community centres.
They had cafes where they used to meet, but nothing provided by the local
authority. So their needs are gradually being met.
The unwillingness of many Turkish Cypriots to become actively involved in voluntary
organisations and activities was mentioned by many informants. A refugee and advice worker
commented:
Well the thing about Turkish Cypriot women is that they hate to go out of their
way, I mean I was recently trying to start a mother's group within one of the
schools in South London, but they won't go out of their way to do anything. I'm
saying 'well, it's for the benefit of your children', you know, 'you do this and we'll
get a link worker to improve their English'. But they won't, they won't go out of
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their way. I know from my experiences as well, like I've done voluntary work in
the past, and my parents said 'it's a waste of time, why do you do it?', you know,
'you're just wasting your time'. And I've done voluntary work in a women's
refuge, they thought I was crazy. You have to get paid for your work. So it's not
as strong as it should be, it would be nice, but...
This would further explain the fact that many of the Turkish Cypriot organisations have now
become Turkish speaking organisations as the majority of their members and clients are
more recent arrivals from Turkey.
The majority of the women attending these associations tend to be first generation and
working class, although some middle class women do attend. In addition, many of the
women felt that there was limited interaction between the different groups. As one woman
pointed out, although some interaction may occur in Pakistani women's centres, like the one
where she worked, in reality very few middle class Pakistanis would feel the need to use the
services they offered:
People who are middle class will not come here anyway, and even if they are
living in Islington borough, in a richer place, they'll not really be coming to this
place and utilise the services, because they are already fulfilled in their own
needs. So you'll only find people who are either lonely or need the services, you
know, income support and all that kind of stuff.
Similarly, it was felt that the majority of second and third generation did not attend such
organisations because they believe their needs are being met by mainstream institutions.
However, while the second generation may choose not to use their services on a regular
basis, they are there if they need them for a specific problem or issue; for example if they
want to learn more about their culture or religion, if they would like to learn their mother
tongue, or need help with interpretation in their mother tongue. In addition, some young
women had visited the centres in order to gain specific help and advice on issues to do with
marriage, divorce or death in the family. Several of the women whom I met had started
attending the centre after a parent had died, initially to seek help and advice on burial
arrangements, etc., and as a result had gained a greater interest in the organisation, their
culture and/or religion. Some had also become more regular attendants as a result of
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bringing their mothers or older female relatives. In addition, some second-generation women
may attend the organisations to increase their educational skills. The co-ordinator of a
Turkish Cypriot association commented:
We had a number of clients who maybe at school didn't get the right support
and they don't have the right writing skills, where they can't complete basic
forms and their English language is obviously like ours, being born and brought
up here, which is quite sad, again I try and work with them too.
However, predominantly the majority of the women attended the organisations were
first generations. Although all of the Pakistani associations provided services for young
people, the numbers of young people using these services was small. Among the Turkish
speaking women's organisations, very few aimed to cater for young people, they felt that their
needs were being met elsewhere.
However, while these organisations provide invaluable support for some of the second
and third generation, apart from youth provision, generally they are not well supported from
by groups. Does this mean that the centres are not adequately providing for their
communities in general? Or should they merely be catering for the different needs of the
women within these communities? Is it feasible that they can provide services for all? Many
Pakistani, Turkish Cypriot, and Muslim women in general would not use the organisations
regardless, because many would not wish to, or do not feel they have the need. This is not a
criticism of the organisations, simply a recognition that many women will not want to
participate for various reasons.
For those who participate in the associations, however, the services on offer are
extensive and 'all-encompassing' in many respects. It would be difficult to think of similar
mainstream organisations that provided such a vast array of services. They act in many ways
as 'one stop shops' where women can come to get information, help, and advice on a whole
range of issues; or can come simply to meet other women like themselves, to chat, socialise
and make friends in an informal and safe environment. For many, this is the major reason for
attending. It is somewhere to go, something to do, where they can chat to other women
whom they see as having a greater understanding of their lifestyles, language abilities,
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potential problems, and so on. As a Turkish Cypriot woman active in many areas of the
various Turkish-speaking communities stated:
Essential, vital, very very important. A lot of women wouldn't have made it in a
number of ways, they would actually have just succumb or cracked up, and
might have ended up in mental institutions, or have ended up with severe pscho-
symatic illnesses, would have led totally unfulfilled and wasted lives. Some of
the young women wouldn't have been able to realise their dreams, would not
have been able to go onto further education, they would have not become
professionals, as they had wanted to. Some women would now have gone back
to further education. A lot of it was to give women confidence, that you were
there if they needed you, and they trusted you.
The help and support that these organisations provide for women is evident on both a formal
and an informal basis. On a formal basis, the women have somewhere to go where they
know they can get advice, support and help if they need help with a specific issue, or simply
to talk to someone who is prepared to listen to them. The women can also receive help
through formal networks that provide health advocates, educational development officers,
welfare advisers, and so on. On an informal basis, there are women in these organisations
who are prepared to lend a friendly ear, just to listen, to act as a sounding board for women
who may not necessarily require practical help, but support and encouragement. Many of the
organisations provided an on-call service, for women to speak confidentially about any issue
at any time. Among the Turkish speaking associations in particular, some of the workers
were often required to make house calls or visits to hospitals or police stations out of office
hours on behalf of their clients, dealing with issues to do with domestic violence or
immigration. Many of the informants reported that the organisations were a lifeline for
women, helping them to make a real difference to their lives.
Career development was also considered an important role for many of the
organisations, offering advice, support, information and encouragement, giving many women
a chance to increase their educational skills and giving them more self-confidence generally.
As a Turkish Cypriot woman put it:
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Possibly career development, maybe they can do something else apart from
being a woman with three kids and pulling her hair out, is there anything she can
do which is different. Or sometimes all the qualifications that they have from
Turkey are not recognised, you've created posts for them, we used to create
jobs for them because of the groups we set up. One woman who is now a co-
ordinator started as a crèche worker, for example, because we set up the
crèche, we set up the women's centre and then we set up the crèche, and some
of these young women who couldn't get jobs any where else because the
parents wouldn't allow them or the racist system wouldn't allow them, we had
that.
Several of the informants had begun working for their organisations or similar ones, on a
voluntary basis and had gained full-time or part-time employment as a result. Many of the
associations provided training for their staff on relevant issues.
The significance of these organisations, however, is not simply in terms of the help and
support they provide for individuals, although this is of course important, but the fact that they
provide a space for women of similar ethnic backgrounds to meet and socialise. While
ethnicity and gender may provide a common bond for these women, their experiences are
nevertheless diverse. These organisations therefore provide a forum for these diverse
experiences. One of the respondents ran a coffee morning for Kurdish women at a local
school. Many of the women had children at the school and they were also encouraged to
bring friends along. Different representatives from the health authority or social services
would come to talk to the women and provide them with information about the various
services they offered. They also had links with other voluntary organisations and ran
workshops and seminars. However, as my informant pointed out, the aim of these coffee
mornings was not merely to inform the women of their own rights and of the services
available to them, but also to educate them about the experiences of their children:
It's trying to help young people in a more indirect way. Very often in our
community that's what you have to do, you have to approach it through the back
door. Talking to the mothers about their relationship to their kids and how to
recognise substance abuse and things like that. With our community it's very
138
difficult to talk about sex and things like condoms. You have to talk about related
issues; maybe 90 per cent of our work is in the indirect way.
These organisations, therefore, give the women attending a chance to mix with women with
diverse and heterogeneous experiences, but also to introduce them to alternative
perspectives in an indirect and informal way. Through the activities, classes and social
events they run they cover a diverse range of issues relating to both their own communities
and to wider British society. Two of these issues include the rights of women and the
experiences of the younger generation. Thus in an informal way, many of the workers are
trying to facilitate changes to established values and patterns of behaviour which may restrict
women and young people. The presence of the workers themselves helps to demonstrate to
many of the first generation that despite their more 'western' appearance and way of life, they
are nevertheless still committed to the maintenance of their ethnicity. Change does not
necessarily mean abandoning traditional values and customs or ethnic solidarity.
Another important element of the organisations is that they provide a collective voice.
As a Turkish Cypriot woman emphasised:
It is very important to be able to bring women together so that they recognise
that they're not the crazy one, they're not the only one and that collectively they
can sort of support each other, emotionally, physically if necessary, as well as
finding a collective voice. Things like there is an issue, and then you write about
it, you create a platform for women to say things in a collective way about an
issue. And it gets printed in a magazine or paper and it gives them a voice which
they would never had if they were left on their own, because they are not
important as women. Who wants to hear women, especially around political
issues or ways of running communities or societies? And of course we learn
quite a lot from other women, you know, African Caribbean women, Pakistani
and Indian women, and English women too, so I was very much aware of a lot of
struggles that were going on around those communities.
The importance of having a collective voice was something that many of the informants
mentioned. Whether campaigning over specific issues such as domestic violence,
educational underachievement, immigration and asylum rights, or more broadly challenging
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gender and ethnic discrimination, having a collective platform to address these issues was
vital. These issues, however, also demonstrate the diverse nature of their struggles and the
cross-cutting of gender, ethnicity, class and 'race' on both an individual and collective level.
Campaigning on such issues often involved prioritising different elements at different times
and within different contexts.
Each organisation has a management committee made up of elected members and
co-optees who are wholly responsible for the organisation, with a co-ordinator to manage the
organisation according to the wishes of the committee. The management committees usually
meet monthly, and there are regular staff meetings. In addition some of the organisations
have monthly-supervised meetings with individual staff, the co-ordinator and a senior
management committee member. However the involvement of committee members varies
enormously from organisation to organisation. In some of the associations, committee
members are very active in the day-to-day running of the organisation, helping out regularly
as volunteers or in setting up and running projects, as well as providing support for the staff.
In others, however, management committee members may only be seen at high profile
events or committee meetings. Organisations that are less hierarchically structured in terms
of staff and the management committee tended to be more successful and display a much
more positive and friendly atmosphere among staff. Where tensions were more evident these
tended to be in organisations where the management committee were much less involved on
a practical level. The proportion of first to second generation members also seemed to make
an impression, with a greater number of second-generation members often proving to be
less hierarchical in their framework than those where the majority was first generation.
The Pakistani, Turkish speaking or Muslim associations are of course also limited by
the goals and aspirations of the management committee and those who run the
organisations. Some of the women argued that they would like to offer additional services but
were constrained by those running the associations. It was also considered that in many
ways the first generation had different needs and aspirations from those of the succeeding
generations. Hence there was sometimes tension and conflict there. In addition, there was
also some conflict between the aims and aspirations of the men and women involved in the
organisations, especially if the organisation catered for both. All such organisations had
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women-only sessions and female workers, but often the women felt that more provision and
time was needed catering especially for women. Furthermore, many of the women attending
would have liked there to be a greater religious presence in the centres. This was particularly
the case for the Turkish-speaking women. These organisations, as stated earlier, tended to
play down the religious side, but many of the women would have like for there to be more.
The workers, on the other hand, preferred to keep religion in the background, to do
otherwise, they felt, would put many women off attending. This was true for both the Turkish
speaking and the Pakistani organisations to some extent. Even the Pakistani organisations
have more religious celebratory events, but it was not the main priority in any way. They
would organise special trips to mosques, but these would merely be attended by those who
wished to. Again they felt if was better to keep religion in the background more, although this
varied from organisation to organisation. Generally it was felt that there were other
organisations that provided more religious-based services and facilities.
In summary, the organisations offer a vital service for Pakistani and Turkish speaking
women in London, catering for a wide variety of different needs. Whether it is for specific
help, or just for somewhere to go and socialise with other women, these organisations are
important for Pakistani and Turkish speaking women. They have somewhere to go for
advice, support, encouragement, and comfort.
Intermediaries
A study of Turkish women in the Netherlands and Germany working with and for other Turks
was made by Helma Lutz (1993). Although it focused on different aspects of social work such
as social welfare, community work, teaching and care, many of her observations apply to my
informants. She describes these women as 'mediators' or 'intermediaries', which refers to
their professional role of mediating between the migrant community and the wider society.
Her aim is to explore the extent to which their ethnicity was vital for their professional role and
how far their personal experiences were institutionally useful and appropriate for the
integration of the Turkish communities in the Netherlands and Germany. Lutz argues that for
these women 'being a Turk' was crucial for their entry into the labour market, far more so
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than their education and training. In her view, 'ethnicity in the sense of ethnic membership is
crucial for the material, social and professional existence of this group' (1993:487).
For the women working in these various areas of social work, their 'Turkishness'
serves as both a personal and political resource, an essential component of their access to
the labour market, as well as a basis for the improvement of the marginal political position of
the Turkish communities. In this way, 'the structure of the labour market imposing the
conditions of bargaining on the agents involved' (1 993:491). Ethnically segmented job areas
such as 'ethnic' social work, she argues, tend to promote exclusion rather than social
integration. Lutz therefore follows Anthias (1992) in arguing that traditional gender divisions
within the wider society, together with ethnic discrimination, affect ethnic minority women in
terms of both their participation within wider society in general and their access to the labour
market in particular. As social work is regarded as a typical female occupation in welfare
state societies ethnic minority women often find themselves channelled into these areas.
Similarly, Josephides (1988) draws attention to the number of young professional Cypriot
women working increasingly in the 'ethnic context' in Britain. As a result of Section 11 funding
and the expansion of race relations units and 'ethnic specialists', many Cypriot women are
being 'channelled' into areas such as social work, community development officers,
'multicultural advisors', and so on, in relation to the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
communities. However, Josephides believes: 'In different circumstances many professional
young women may not choose to work in an "ethnic" capacity' (1988:52).
Second generation Turkish women working in these areas, Lutz argues, can
experience difficulties because their education and training has been undertaken in a western
society with a 'western agenda'. This includes the valuation and 'problem definition' of their
ethnic identity and cultural background. As intermediaries they learn to solve problems using
the professional strategies they have acquired during their western training and education.
Such strategies require a mutual acceptance of the 'problem definition' in order to deal with
them successfully. The clients must therefore come to evaluate the situation in a similar way
to that of the professional; they must learn where to go to seek help for a specific issue and
to discuss this issue in a way that both parties can understand. Lutz terms this process
'proto-professionalism', which she views as an essential characteristic of the Western welfare
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state, and inherent in all social work training. The role of intermediaries is to translate and
transfer the 'western' terminologies and concepts into something that more easily fits into the
migrant's own day-to-day experiences. Such a process is not part of the intermediaries'
professional training, but must be negotiated by the individual.
A co-ordinator of one of the Pakistani associations that I worked with claimed that
Pakistani people need the services that the centres' offer because their needs are not being
met by mainstream provision. He believed that Asians are not adequately catered for
because of the curriculum involved in training social professionals. Many more Asians are
being recruited into the social services, but this in itself does not expand the provision. The
Eurocentric nature of the training limits the focus of the work. What is needed, he believed,
was a more open curriculum. Having these specific Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot
organisations therefore provides individuals with somewhere to go for the majority of the
problems they may be experiencing. However, this does not in itself alleviate all of the
difficulties that Lutz mentions. Most of the people working for these organisations, especially
the women I interviewed, are second generation and therefore experience very similar
difficulties to those of Lutz's respondents. Most of their clients are first generation with
different educational and social experiences from those of the workers. Similarly, therefore,
the women must learn to translate their British-based knowledge into more accessible
information for their clients.
For Lutz, therefore, being Turkish is not an automatic guarantee of acceptance by
other Turks. Boundaries can arise from within and from outside. Like many of my own
informants, Lutz noted that many of these 'social workers' had to challenge sexism from
within their own communities as well as structural and personal discrimination on the part of
the indigenous population. Lutz therefore argues that successful mediators must have an 'all
round ability' (1993:491). They must possess a good knowledge of the regional, social,
economic and religious background of their clients in order to carry out their professional role
successfully. Yet to function effectively they must also have an expert knowledge of the social
institutions, cultural traditions and values, and 'psychology' of the wider society. 'Bridging
gaps means to put that which is taken for granted on both sides into relative terms; an ability
which is not easy to achieve' (1 993:491).
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Similarly, Philip Lewis (1994), who examines Muslim organisations in Bradford,
states that Muslims who mediate between their communities and wider society must be able
to operate within two different cultural worlds, and must be both bilingual and 'bicultural'. A
good knowledge of Urdu and English, he argues, is therefore vital. 'Without this it is not
possible to win the confidence of the elders in the Muslim communities, many of whom have
little English, and at the same time be active in the majority community' (1994:204).
Furthermore, their role with both their communities and wider society requires them to have a
thorough understanding of South Asian history, culture, religion and languages, as well as
that of British politics, law and culture. Indeed, many of my informants pointed out that their
knowledge of Urdu or Turkish and of Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot values and traditions had
improved greatly since working with the various associations, or within the Pakistani or
Turkish Cypriot communities generally.
Lutz therefore sees these mediators as advocates for their compatriots, who manage
their role despite the limits and restrictions of operating on the margins of wider society. They
rely on the dominant society's discourse in order to represent themselves as 'spokespersons'
for 'their' group, even though they have no official status to do so within their own
communities. It is the power structure operating in society that creates this position.
If power is not so much that gender, class, ethnicity, sexual preference, age and
so on make the difference, but what counts is how the differences are made,
then the accounts of the mediators provide us with a rich resource for
researching the difference. Listening to their accounts provides a clue to the
nuances and the cross-cuttings in ethnic, class and gender relations on the
structural level as well as from the agency's point of view. (Lutz 1993:492)
For Lutz, therefore, ethnicity needs to be examined with reference to social structures,
'discursive constructions', identity formations and at the level of concrete social practice. In
this way, ethnicity can be seen to be appropriated and transformed by both the individual and
the group. 'Bridging the gap is a fine balancing act' (1993:492).
As previously stated, my informants were chosen because they worked directly
and/or were active within their local communities. This was not because they were
considered to have a better understanding of the Pakistanis or Turkish Cypriots in London,
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but in order to examine their experiences and influences in relation to their own identities and
how they were seen in terms of the collective identities (ethnic or religious) of the groups and
communities within which they worked. Certainly these women are likely to be more aware
than most of the problems that many women and young people in their communities face, as
they are dealing with these on a daily basis as part of their work. However, it should be added
that as such they see, in many ways, the worst side of the situation. Indeed, many pointed out
that it is the women with the most problems who predominantly tend to use their services.
Many who do not have problems, or perhaps more appropriately, do not think they have
problems, are less likely to use their services or attend the centres in which many of the
women interviewed work. Nevertheless, the respondents maintained a strong commitment to
their ethnic communities, whilst acknowledging the diverse problems that some women can
experience both within these communities and in relation to wider society.
What effect did working in these organisations have on the women themselves? Why
had they started working there in the first place? Some felt that they had developed a greater
pride in their respective heritages, but they were aware of its partial nature. Some had
become more wary of men, as they saw the realities of some of the problems many women
had to face. Many had become more aware of the struggles and hardships that the first
generation had faced, and continues to face, as well as the problems they can cause the
second generation by their behaviour.
All of the women interviewed were very committed to promoting the rights of their
respective communities, to providing for their needs and offering help and support to women
in order to empower them. As a Pakistani advice worker admitted:
If you ask me truly, if, when I first joined, my main reason for joining was to help
the community, because I was doing that anyway. These kinds of organisations
can do wonders for the people provided it's not a whitewash, you understand?
We are helping a lot of people; I have done so during the time I've been here
personally. And I think there's so many people we can reach out to, believe me.
People who are not coming out because they haven't got means to come out,
and are disabled and all that, and we are here to do that for them.
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A Turkish Cypriot refugee worker similarly expressed her desire to empower people within
the Turkish speaking communities, and now this had made her come to value her ethnic
heritage much more:
Before, as I said, I used to hate it but now, working in the Turkish community as
well, it's become an important part of my life and when I apply for jobs I always
try to apply for jobs within the Turkish community. Not just to improve my
Turkish, but to try to empower the community, if you really want to get
something done, you know, get peopTe out of the chip shops, kebab shops, the
textile industry. It's definitely important. I'm not going to change anything, but I
could try.
However, several of my informants also pointed out that despite the enormous benefits that
their work, and that of the organisations in general, brought for many women, they often felt
frustrated because they could not do more to help them. A Turkish Cypriot advice worker
stated:
I work a lot in the evenings as well and that's going to police stations and
refuges with women, and we've got an on-call service as well and I do a lot of
work from home as well with clients for counselling or just phoning up to talk.
Because a number of clients although they're experiencing domestic violence,
they don't generally do anything about it because of the fear of the unknown
really, and the family environment. So it is sometimes mainly talking, which is
frustrating for me as well because I hear what happens at home and I can't
really do anything physically about it.
Many of the informants felt that they would often have to take a back seat' with their clients,
that they could only go as far as the client was prepared to take it. This was often very
frustrating, as they were aware that they could do far more if their client would let them.
The majority of the women felt that their experiences of working within these
organisations had also had a profound effect on their own lives. A Pakistani advice worker
explained:
It's hard for me to analyse my own life when I think of particular clients who've
gone through so much and come up trumps, you know. They really want to
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change their life because of something that has occurred that is major in their
own life or their children's lives, It's made me think that life's too short as well,
I've got to do a lot in life, or see a lot of things. Not push myself for the sake of it,
but really do the things that I want to do and perhaps I sometimes push away
because I think I can't be bothered. And it's maybe made me more cautious of
men, because I tend to, I know it's wrong obviously, but you sort of tend to group
them all together when you hear the same story. And obviously you have to take
it with a pinch of salt as well because women can lie as well. But when you've
got the evidence and the proof in front of you and you see what they've been
through, you tend to lump them all together and see them as the same. But I do
try to push women, to get them off their seats and do something, because if you
don't I think they'll just pass their life away like that.
Several of the respondents said that they tried to keep their private lives separate from the
organisations where they worked. Some preferred to live away from the areas in which they
worked in order to maintain a certain amount of distance, and to keep their work and home
lives separate. A Turkish Cypriot woman explained that:
I try to keep my life very closed from the women. If you work with Turkish
women, and you're Turkish yourself they tend to want to know about your life.
And to them you're their friend, but they don't look at you as their advice worker
or counsellor, you're just someone from their community so they're entitled to
know about your every move, your life.
She also pointed out that she tried to encourage the women she worked with to keep her
name and the organisation out of the family household. In the past she had been followed
home from work several times by the husbands or other family members of clients. As a
result she was very cautious about her activities. This situation was considered very
frustrating because she wanted people to know more about the services they offered, but at
times had to keep their activities secret. This was a dilemma that several of the informants
mentioned. They were keen to publicise the work they did in order to reach as many women
as possible. However, in terms of family interaction this could often threaten the effectiveness
of their work, and some of the workers were concerned that their work could put them in
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physical danger, as well as subjecting them to criticism from family members of the clients
and the community in general. This was particularly significant for women working in
sensitive areas to do with domestic violence or family breakdown.
Another Turkish Cypriot woman who was active in a number of areas within the local
Turkish speaking communities told of her experiences:
Some of us, women on our own and being very active in the community, some
were divorced, some had never married; and the truth of it was very interesting,
that women in particular defended us against a lot of attacks because they could
see that we were there generally helping them and responding to them.
Although they might not have approved officially of what we were doing or how
we were living our lives, because we were there and they need us, it was
accepted for us to be such oddballs, you know; either not married at such a late
age or living on your own with your child. So I think a lot of us in the early
eighties, we won that battle and I think once we got the women to defend us,
and it wasn't really important what the men thought about us in many ways. And
a lot of us were strong enough to take it because we had come through a lot of
other battles and struggles in this country.
She believed that it was easier for women like herself to go their own way because they did
not depend on the Turkish speaking communities either politically, economically, socially or
career-wise. Despite being active in the communities, she was employed by the local
Education Authority and therefore did not rely on her ethnicity for her living. Her link to the
communities was through a desire to help. She believed, however, that for women who do
depend on the ethnic community, many are forced to compromise in their own lives, just as in
any 'societal gatherings' be they Turkish or English: 'if you want to be accepted in a certain
society or circles, then you would have to play according to certain rules, and you play that
game'. She argued that independent women like her presented a challenge for many
members of the communities because they were not prepared to compromise. She believed
that it had been important for her relations with the women she worked with that she had
been open and honest with them about her own life. And because of the support and help
she had provided for many of the women, they gave her their support. Consequently she did
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not feel that she had been subjected to the same level of community pressure that other
women working within the ethnic context may experience. However, she stated that for her it
was not a problem because she had made her choice to live her own life regardless of how
others in communities may view her.
Several of the Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot respondents took a similar approach to
their lives. They were very upfront and open about their own beliefs and practices as they
believed that it was this openness that would help to bring about changes for women within
their communities. Many were consequently keen to use their own lives as an example to
show that just because the second generation were adopting some of the 'western'
educational and cultural values did not mean that they would necessarily abandon their ethnic
heritages. This often meant criticising certain aspects of traditional values and norms that
they felt restricted the opportunities available to women within their communities, while at the
same time seeking to foster ethnic solidarity and empower their communities to improve their
lives in Britain.
Generally the women seemed to be able to acknowledge the reality of the vast range
of problems that people can experience both from within and outside of their communities.
Yet at the same time, their ethnic/religious commitment was still very important to them and
in most cases more important. Hence being critical of aspects of their culture or religion and
of the practices of many members of the communities does not mean that they came to
reject their ethnic/religious heritage. Rather, it seems to make them more determined to
maintain the key elements of their parents' culture, while seeking change in those areas that
they disagree with.
Summary
If the second, third and successive generations are developing individual strategies and
forming specific identities on the basis of their differing experiences and in terms of their own
aspirations and desires, what is the future of these national or religious based organisations?
Where do their future roles lie? They are still very important because of these differences.
Some people will have need for them, others will not; some will need them at certain times
but not at others. Yet there will still be a need because mainstream society fails to
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accommodate and provide for minority ethnic communities. Their task will be the need to
respond to these varying and changing needs. They need to be flexible enough to do this. So
far I think they are successful, although many of the workers felt that they did not go far
enough; many are still controlled by the first generation.
There are some tensions and rivalries between the women, which are inevitable. Yet
these issues are minimal compared with the enormous benefits which accrue to them. They
undoubtedly have a great influence on all of the women involved, helping them come to
terms with their own lives and those of the people around them. They are empowering many
of these women, giving them the support they need, whatever this may be, to realise and
achieve their goals and aspirations. There are of course limits and restrictions, but despite
these, the organisations achieve an enormous amount. The vast numbers of women whom I
saw helped are a testament to that. It might not change their lives, but it certainly helps.
The presence of these organisations is therefore very important. They provide
valuable spaces for the negotiation and translation of identities; where issues of gender and
generation, of ethnicity and community are negotiated and translated on a daily basis. They
do not represent places of deep-seated traditions, norms and values, but places where these
traditions and subsequent identities are negotiated. This is what the second generation
working within these organisations are trying to do, provide a space for negotiation between
new and old, between tradition and translation. Yet they are also key protagonists in terms of
representing the face of Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain, whether this is done
through 'multicultural' events celebrating their traditions and ethnic heritages or through their
interaction with other groups, both marginal and mainstream.
These organisations in their varying ways are not merely challenging what it means
to be Pakistani, Turkish Cypriot or Muslim, but also what it means to be British, and what it
means to be a woman. What is significant is the way in which different elements are
prioritised at different times and in different contexts in order to achieve collective
representation and to bring about change. The difficult and challenging task for these
organisations, and especially for the women working in them, is that challenging
disadvantage does not just mean confronting racism, sexism, and ethnic and class
discrimination within mainstream British society, but also resisting the prejudice and
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discrimination within their own communities. Fighting for their rights as women means
challenging patriarchal oppression both within and outside of their communities. It means
addressing the elements that unite and divide them as Pakistanis, Turkish Cypriots/Turkish
speakers or Muslims, as well as those that unite and divide them from other women. To see
how notions of difference and commonality are utilised in the formation of collective
representation, it is necessary to understand the process by which different social, cultural,
political and economic factors are experienced and evaluated on both an individual and
collective level.
The following chapter will explore the experiences of the women interviewed and
their attitudes and opinions towards their communities as a whole, and the second and third
generation in particular. It examines the various influences that affect Turkish Cypriot and
Pakistani women in Britain, and how they affect their identity formation. In the conclusion, I
seek to draw out some overall observations about this process and its relation to ethnicity
and collective identity.
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Chapter Six
Difference and Diversity: The Influence of 'Ethnic' Relations
Ethnicity involves the creation, maintenance and transformation of notions of difference and
commonality, and is essentially, therefore, evaluated and interpreted in relation to interactions
between people of both similar and different ethnicities. This chapter examines some of
these interactions in terms of internal and external relations, through the attitudes, opinions
and experiences of the women interviewed. The area in which people live is assessed in
terms of its influence on the maintenance of religion and culture, together with the perceived
divisions among Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain, and their interactions with other
groups. It will then go on to look at intergenerational relations, and the opinions and
experiences of the women interviewed in relation to their own parents and family. Finally, it
will examine the women's experiences of racial and ethnic prejudice and discrimination, and
the influence of these experiences on Turkish Cypriots and Pakistanis in Britain.
The Influence of Location
It has been argued that Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots have 'chosen' to settle in inner city
areas close to their centres of employment and where housing is more affordable. In
addition, like many migrant groups, they have 'chosen' to live near friends and relatives
already settled in Britain. The aim, it is argued, is to recreate village life and help preserve
social and cultural patterns of behaviour and interaction (Anwar 1979, Oakley 1979,
Kucukcan 1999). Such residential clustering provides support and security for the migrants
and ensures that traditional norms are maintained within the community. This is considered
especially important for the maintenance of ethnicity among the second generation.
Several of my interviewees believed that the area where an individual grew up as a
child was a significant factor in the development of their identity in terms of their commitment
to both religion and culture. Many of the Pakistani women believed that Muslims living in
areas where there was a large concentration of Muslims were likely to be more religious and
conformist than their counterparts living in areas where there were fewer Muslims. One
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woman believed that the reason she had not been very religious until recently was because
she had grown up in a predominantly white area. Thus, the experience of growing up in a
religious environment is likely to have a significant influence on the identity of the young
Muslims. Access to Islamic facilities for teaching and worship, was very much dependent on
the area where people lived. In addition, several of the Pakistani women argued that the first
generation tended to be far more 'traditional' culturally in areas of high Pakistani
concentration such as Bradford. As one woman commented:
I think in a society where there is a large concentration of Asians, tradition is still
there, like Bradford and Birmingham, there's a stronghold. But in, let's say
Walthamstow, there's a lot of Asians, a lot of Pakistanis there actually,
concentrated Pakistanis, but the values traditionally are, I think they've still got
them, but they're not so strong now, I think. They're there; they're mixed now. It
depends on individuals, how they've been brought up. I mean, for instance, in
my family, let's say my immediate family, tradition is not so much now because
we were all brought up in this country and our children have got both East and
West values, so we don't bring tradition into it so much now.
Similarly, the Turkish Cypriot women also stated that people living in areas where there was
a high concentration of Turkish speakers tended to maintain their traditional cultural values to
a much greater extent.
The women were asked about the area they lived in and their preference for living in
areas where there was a high concentration of Pakistanis or Turkish Cypriots. Among the
Pakistani women, three stated that they preferred to live in an area where there were other
Muslims, although they considered nationality to be unimportant. One woman explained what
she perceived as the benefits of living in an area where there were other Muslims:
It can be very good for you living with other Muslims. Especially if you haven't
been practising at home, you begin to question things 'why don't we do that?
Why aren't we like that? A lot of children do that, Why don't we pray Mummy?
Why don't we do this?' so its healthy to mix with your own people as well.
Because you have an identity, which helps you, grow and develop.
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Another stated that although she could see certain advantages to living in an area where
there were more Muslims, she also believed that this could lead to isolation:
If you live in an area where you have a lot of Muslims, you have more
integration, you mix with them more, you socialise. But at the same time you
become isolated, because you don't mix with anyone other than your own
community, which can be unhealthy. So even if you live in an area where there
are no Muslims, it can be unhealthy too, so you need a balance. So it does
affect you. It depends how you see people.
Many of the Pakistani women agreed with this view. The majority stated that they would
prefer to live in an area that was more ethnically mixed, although they would like to live near
enough to have access to religious and cultural services. Among the Turkish Cypriot women,
two stated that they preferred to live in an area where there were other Turkish speaking
people. One commented that she felt uncomfortable in areas where there were few
minorities. However, she also pointed out that there were disadvantages to living in an area
with a high concentration of Turkish speaking people:
I think it's easier because like I don't feel comfortable when I go somewhere and
I don't see any ethnic minorities. Like where my uncle lives in South London, it's
like you won't see any black people, you won't see any Asian people, you won't
see any Turks, and that makes me feel uncomfortable. It's like when we go
there, and then come back, I think 'oh I'm glad I'm back', it's difficult. There are
disadvantages, because everybody knows what you're doing, it's like you can't
keep anything to yourself... It's difficult because there's a lot of gossip. That's all
they basically do, Turkish women, drink coffee and gossip basically. Like talking
about what somebody else's daughters been doing, because your daughter's an
angel basically, and this is what somebody else's doing. So you can't really get
away with a lot in a close-knit community, everybody's watching you, and waiting
to say 'oh look what she's done', you know, it's difficult.
The majority of the Turkish Cypriot women reiterated this view and stated that they preferred,
or would prefer, to live in an area where there were fewer Turkish speakers, although they
would not like to live away from the communities totally. Most of the women felt that in a more
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TurkishlFurkish Cypriot area there was a lot of gossip, and consequently less privacy,
whereas in a more ethnically mixed area, as one woman commented, 'your business stays at
home'.
Both groups believed that although the majority of their parents' generation preferred
to live in areas where there were other Pakistanis or Turkish Cypriots, many of the second
and third generation tended to prefer areas where there is a greater ethnic mix, and where
they felt their children would receive a better education. In general, they believed that as the
first generation became more competent with the English language, and felt better able to
mix with people from other groups, there was a tendency for them to move to other areas. As
a Pakistani woman stated:
I feel that when they come to mix better themselves they do move out of the
existing boroughs if they feel that they are not good for us, you know, they're
poor or dilapidated or not racially mixed, to better locations, to the suburbs.
A Turkish Cypriot woman made a similar comment:
I think a lot of people if you gave them choices they would not live with Turkish
Cypriot people or Turkish people actually, quite interestingly. And the evidence
also is that a lot of them are moving outside London, those who have a choice.
Those who have the money do move out, both for themselves, for their own
privacy so they are able to come in and go out of the community, as they want.
As well as for their children, because they feel that if their children are educated
in an area where there is a higher concentration of Turkish speakers they may
not be getting the best educational advantage.
Furthermore, as one of the Pakistani women pointed out, as more Pakistani young people
move into the professional ranks, they are choosing to move out to the suburbs and into the
countryside:
I think there is probably a distinction with people of my generation, they're not
necessarily opting to choose areas close to their parents. Because their parents
have settled in one area with their friends from the same region, you're finding
people are moving away from that into other areas which are conventionally
white areas. And as more Asians and more Muslims move into the professional
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ranks, and those jobs might be anywhere round the country, then that's where
they'll go, regardless of the fact that there's less of an Asian community there.
There's less of a need to be in a predominantly Asian or Pakistani area for my
generation, whereas that would play heavily on my mum.
Many of the women stated that although they liked to have access to Islamic and/or cultural
services and facilities, they would not choose to live in areas of high Pakistani or Turkish
speaking concentration as these tended to be largely deprived areas, with poor housing and
under-funded schools.
For both Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots, the choice of where to live depended to a
large extent on people's financial positions, how long they had lived in Britain, and their
degree of English literacy. For many, living in an area where there were many Pakistanis or
Turkish speakers providing services in Urdu, Punjabi or Turkish was essential. As a Turkish
Cypriot woman commented:
For those who don't have a choice, the majority of the working people, and the
poor, it's not a choice whether they live where the Turkish speaking community
is or is not. For those who are not articulate in English it is not a choice, they
would want to be around where they can shop in Turkish, they can go and get a
video in Turkish, where they can get their insurance in Turkish, they can get
their lawyer in Turkish, their doctor in Turkish, the hospital has facilities for
Turkish speakers, there are Turkish organisations. So it isn't a choice for those,
for them of course it's essential that they live near the Turkish community. For
those who do have a choice it's a question of whether they exercise that choice
or not. But there is preference to go out.
For those with greater literacy skills and higher income levels the preference was
predominantly to move away from areas of high concentration to the suburbs.
Thus while all of the women felt that living with other Pakistanis, Muslims or Turkish
Cypriots had a significant influence on the second and third generation in terms of
maintaining religious and/or cultural conformity, the majority of the women preferred to live in
more ethnically. mixed areas. Although the first generation was considered to prefer areas
where there were other Pakistanis or Turkish Cypriots, there was nevertheless a preference
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to move further out towards the suburbs as their literacy skills and income increased. Living
in deprived inner-city areas, where the majority of Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots resided,
was not a choice that most people would 'choose' to make. This would seem to imply that the
predominance of large numbers of minority ethnic groups in inner-city areas has more to do
with structural factors than it does with cultural 'choice'.
Internal Divisions
Ethnicity, it is argued, can function in a number of ways, and is appropriated differently
according to class position. Thus the working class have a greater reliance on ethnic ties for
employment and services because they lack the educational and economic resources
necessary to manage the ethnic disadvantage they face. The middle class, on the other
hand, possess much greater resources, and are therefore more able to transcend ethnic
boundaries and aspire to more British middle-class lifestyles (Raza 1991, Anthias 1992).
Class can therefore be a significant determinant in the maintenance of ethnicity.
The majority of the women did not believe that there was a significant class divide
among Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot people in Britain, although some felt that it was
becoming more apparent in Britain. Of greater significance were income levels, which as the
previous section illustrates, were often linked to where individuals chose to live.
Consequently, those with higher income levels tended to live further out of town towards the
suburbs, which some felt represented an element of class division. As a Turkish Cypriot
woman commented:
I wouldn't put myself in a class, but it happens within the Turkish community and
they think that because they have a big house and their children went to
university, and their children have good jobs, it makes them better than anyone
else. Yes, it happens, it happens a lot.
Another woman argued that although Turkish Cypriots in general do tend to mix with one
another, regardless of their financial status, when it came to inter-marrying, such divisions
might manifest themselves: 'I think when it comes to crunch of perhaps a very rich family's
son marrying a poor girl, with a poor background, then there's a problem there. Because
everybody wants to have this thing of showing off, showing their family background and so
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on'. Several of the women believed that within the Turkish Cypriot population there tended to
be an element of 'snobbery', with many of the women competing with each other in terms of
material possessions. Such competition, many argued, had a major influence on the way
they lived their lives. As one woman explained:
I think when I hear it from friends who live in a predominantly Turkish Cypriot
area, and everyone is trying to be better than each other in a very sort of middle
class road (she laughs). I mean everybody is trying to compete with each other,
you can see it from the outside. I think it's horrible actually, I prefer to live in a
very deprived area and have my own life. I mean when certain friends tell me
about their lives, and they tell their daughters off for coming home late because
there is twitching curtains and things like that. I think I would live a very false life
if I lived in a road like that, even though it is really lovely and houses are three of
four times as expensive than my own. I wouldn't like to live in an environment
like that. I think that's more horrible than living in a very deprived area.
Four of the women pointed out that many Turkish Cypriots may choose to live in Turkish
speaking suburban areas because of the status implication involved. However, although
most of the women did not consider these differences to constitute a class divide, they
nevertheless believed that they had a significant influence on the lives of Turkish Cypriots in
Britain.
Similarly, the majority of Pakistanis also did not see class as a major issue. Nor did
they consider caste to have any major significance for the majority of Pakistanis in Britain,
although it was still maintained by some of the more traditional families. Yet, it had largely
ceased to be important and very few marriages were sanctioned according to caste.
However, like the Turkish Cypriots, they did feel that there were significant differences in
terms of income and financial status, often highlighted in the area where they chose to live.
However, of greater significance to many of the Pakistani women were the
differences between rural and urban Pakistanis. One woman explained how her parents felt
very different from the rural Mirpuris who lived near them:
Although .the area I went to school in has quite a large Asian population from
Mirpur, my parents didn't have very much to do with them because the way they
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lived their lives, and the way my parents lived their lives was completely
different. So there was that kind of barrier there. My parents had a middle class
background from Lahore, and didn't feel that there was much connection with
the people from Mirpur, so there was that. So that's why we didn't have a social
circle consisting of many other Asians.
Those from rural backgrounds are considered to be far more traditional in terms of both their
cultural values and their levels of integration within mainstream society. As one woman
commented:
People who have come from a peasant's background, from the villages, they're
the ones who have kept the tradition, because they don't know anything else.
Where as the educated from Lahore and all that, middle class and things,
they're more modern. So it tends to be the more rural and working class people,
they're the ones who've kept the tradition, for a very long period actually, till the
last generation really got them (she laughs), the third generation.
Another woman commented that most urban Pakistanis distinguish themselves from rural
Mirpuris. The differences are quite evident in the clothes they wear; the urban middle class
from Lahore and Karachi are considered far more fashionable in their dress. She argued that
it was the Mirpuris who were viewed as giving Pakistanis a 'bad name' in Britain. They are
considered much more traditional and observe customs more than Islam. They are also
believed to be far stricter with their children, particularly the girls. It is within these families, it
was argued, that there are problems between the generations and examples of girls running
away from home.
Thus while income and status were considered to be more important in the British
context, and caste distinctions had become much less significant, traditional rural/urban
divisions continued to be a major determinant of difference for Pakistanis. The Turkish
Cypriots did not make such distinctions, because in Cyprus, being such a small island, they
are not considered relevant. However, the women did point out that there was a major
rural/urban divide among people from Turkey. It was argued that Turkish Cypriots have much
more in common with urban Turks than those from rural backgrounds who, like the rural
Pakistanis, tended to be much more traditional. These traditional rural/urban divisions among
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Pakistanis and Turks/Turkish Cypriots have therefore persisted in Britain, despite the
increasing significance of financial and educational status differentials. Pakistanis and
Turkish Cypriots therefore can be seen to differentiate themselves in relation to a number of
different axes, of which these internal divisions form a part. The following section examines
some of the external axes of differentiation, created and sustained in relation to other ethnic
groups in Britain.
lnterethnic Relations
In order to preserve their traditional norms and values, it is argued, Pakistanis and Turkish
Cypriots make a conscious effort to avoid interaction with the rest of British society.
Nevertheless, it is impossible for a community to live in isolation and some level of contact
and interaction with other ethnic groups is therefore inevitable (Anwar 1982, Ladbury 1977).
Such contact is greatly increased for the second and successive generations, who mix with
other groups to a much greater extent both at school and work. Furthermore, it is through
contact with other groups that perceptions of difference are created, sustained and
transformed. lnterethnic relations therefore are likely to have a significant influence on ethnic
identity.
Generally it was believed that first generation Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots
preferred to mix with people from their own country and of similar background. As a Pakistani
woman stated, the existence of specific Pakistani organisations like the one she worked for
was an indication of the first generation's lack of integration:
Now I have come to realise that they aren't very mixed. Traditionally, as well as
Islamically, Indians have their own groups. Pakistani Muslims will have their own
groups, you know, like you can see here, this organisation is Pakistani, next
door you'll see, although it's an Asian Centre, the majority you'll see are Indian,
and Indian values, Indian films, Indian thought. And I feel they want to keep up
their culture and their values as well as their traditions alive, and in order to do
that you need your own organisations, don't you? So interactions are not very
much.
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Thus on the one hand, the existence of these separate organisations was considered
necessary for the maintenance of specific customs and traditions; but on the other, it was felt
that this could often lead to isolation on the part of the first generation.
Both the Turkish Cypriot and the Pakistani women believed that the second
generation was much more integrated into wider British society than the first generation. The
majority of the informants had an ethnically mixed group of friends and most considered
nationality and religion to be unimportant to their choice of friends. Largely friendships were
the result of circumstance rather than actual choice, and had varied at school, college and in
their working lives. As a Pakistani woman stated 'It's a mixture, a big cross section. It's lust
the people around me, in the area here'. Some, however, stated that their closest friends
were Asian or Muslims, Turkish or Greek Cypriot because they felt they had more in common
and there was therefore a greater level of understanding between them. A Turkish Cypriot
woman commented: 'I'm closer to my Turkish friends and my Greek friends, basically people
who have more in common with me, who are similar in appearance and background, things
like that'. Others felt that although nationality and religion were unimportant, sharing similar
experiences was vital. A Pakistani woman, for example, commented that she felt much more
comfortable with other women who had been to university or studied, because they had more
experiences in common that she could relate to. A Turkish Cypriot woman stated that she
preferred to have less contact with other Turkish speaking women because 'they are too
concerned with gossiping and I don't like that'. She added that her sister refused to associate
with Turkish people altogether because of this. In terms of friendship choices, therefore, the
women's preferences varied significantly, according to their own experiences and lifestyles.
However, while most of the women considered the second and third generation to be
much more integrated than the first, a few of the women pointed out that the third generation
seemed to be increasingly separating themselves into distinct groups. As a Pakistani woman
commented:
But the third generation, you know, I am finding there is more segregation now
than there was in the old times. Because I've found that they make their own
groups now and I said to my son 'Look, why are you all separated into groups,
the blacks and blacks, the Asians and Asians, and the Sikhs and Sikhs? Why
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aren't you all together like we were at the time?' But they find that there is more
of a gap now than there was ever before. Now I don't know why this has
happened, especially in university and colleges. I'm finding it very very difficult to
understand that. And all that 'this is Sikh and this is Hindu', I never had that, you
know. But my son's views I'm telling you, they're the views of all the other
generations.
This comment was reiterated by a young Turkish Cypriot woman:
At university the Asian girls would cluster into their groups and the three of us in
our group. It's not racist, that's just the way they are. They cluster into their own
groups, so so did we. They accuse others of racism, but they hold themselves
back as well, they don't mix with us.
Some of the women felt a similar situation was now occurring among young Turkish speaking
young people, particularly in the schools. This had increased dramatically since the arrival of
more people from Turkey, and many parents, teachers and educational workers were
concerned that it might lead to a ghettoisation of Turkish speaking children in schools.
Nevertheless, despite these concerns over the possible segregation of the third
generations, all of the women believed that they were much more integrated than the first
generation. The desire of the latter to resist integration as much as possible was most strictly
reinforced in terms of suitable marriage partners. Generally the women felt that the first
generation expected their children to marry another Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot. Marriage to
someone outside of his or her community was generally frowned upon. A young Pakistani
woman, who had married an English man herself, argued that for most parents this was still
something that they found unacceptable:
But I think that's one custom which hasn't been as let go as others, that is
marriage to your own kind and a lot of families cling to that. I'm talking about one
of my cousins, she was recently getting married, and she said 'my parents would
die if I ever married a white man, they'll let you do it, but it would kill them'. So
perhaps that's one custom that hasn't let go as much as others.
Similarly, a Turkish Cypriot woman told of her family's reaction to her brother marrying an
English woman:
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Well they weren't happy at all. There were so many arguments at home that he
finally left and he got a flat with his girlfriend. And for years my mum kept
thinking 'well sooner or later he's going to leave her, or something's going to
happen'. That's how she was always thinking, and little did she know that they
were married, they married as soon as he left home. My mum and dad only
found out about four years ago. They still had contact, they used to moan at him
basically, but I think he had the support of all of us as brothers and sisters. But
he was still upset about how my mum and dad reacted, because now they get
on really well with my sister-in-law, plus they have two children. So it's more
what people would say, rather than if they like this person.
All of the women believed that there was still much pressure to marry a fellow Pakistani or
Turkish Cypriot. However, for the Turkish Cypriot women, while marriage to an English
person was generally considered undesirable, marriage with a Greek Cypriot received the
most disapproval, as one woman commented:
I think that's a taboo subject, you know, I mean people have done it and I think
their family has disowned them. My younger sister was actually engaged to a
Greek Cypriot but it didn't work out because of that fact. And it's affected her a
great deal because of him being Greek Cypriot, although it didn't matter to either
of them because they were both born and brought up here. And obviously if they
had children, they still wanted to try to integrate both cultural communities. But
she had a lot of problems when she told my mum and dad, and I don't think she
will ever forgive any of them for that, because they had to separate because of
that and because of his family as well. I think it's really sad when two people
want to marry each other or want to be together, but because of this pressure
it's not possible. Whereas if they had been English I don't think there would have
been so much of a problem, but because it was a particular community, the
enemy so to speak.
Although all of the women believed that relations between Turkish Cypriots and Greek
Cypriots were much better than in Cyprus, many of the tensions and animosity between them
were still evident in Britain. The two groups were much more integrated in London, living in
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similar areas and working together in factories. Indeed, most of the women had Greek
Cypriot friends, but these friendships were not without their complications. One young woman
stated that although her best friend was Greek Cypriot 'her dad hates Turkish people, so I
hardly ever go round to her house'. Thus while many of the second generation did not see
the problems in Cyprus as a barrier to relations with Greek Cypriots; the first generation,
despite being on friendly terms with Greek Cypriot neighbours or fellow employees, was still
keen to maintain certain divisions, particularly in terms of marriage. An older woman who had
been born in Cyprus believed that some of the divisions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots
were also replicated in Britain, furthering the tension between the two groups:
But I think it is a major influence even within the council structure, you know.
You think if there is a specific worker that is supposed to be working with the
community, Haringey Council and other councils always employ one worker to
help both communities, and most of the time it always turns out to be a Greek
Cypriot worker. And then you find that this particular worker isn't helping one
side of the community. So I think again we've remained passive in that, but
things are changing and our community is getting up more and standing up for
their rights. I feel quite strongly myself about this particular issue, and I do do a
lot of campaign work in my spare time. I always talk about this with my Greek
Cypriot friends, it's not so much about 'oh we want them to listen to us and not
to you', it's about finding some kind of solution to living and working together.
Rather than seeing us as the persecutors, because that's how we are looked
upon by most of the countries, because of Turkey intervening and helping our
community in Cyprus during the war.
Thus although all of the women believed that relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots
were much more amicable than in Cyprus, certain tensions and conflicts were reproduced in
Britain.
However, many of the women were keen to point out that despite these tensions,
generally they felt that Turkish Cypriots had a lot more in common with Greek Cypriots than
they did with people from Turkey. All of the women pointed out that were huge differences
between Turkish people and Turkish Cypriots. These differences were considered to include
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immigration and settlement patterns, as well as differences in terms of the dialect spoken,
cultural traditions and values, and religious allegiance. As a result of these differences, all of
the women believed that Turkish Cypriots were keen to maintain their own cultural values
and their own traditions. Consequently they did not tend to mix with Turkish people to any
great extent. As one woman commented:
In London, there are differences; people keep themselves to themselves if they
come from smaller villages. In London there are a lot of dinner dances
throughout the year, charity functions. 99% of the people who go to these are
Turkish Cypriot, not Turkish. This is very visible, I don't know why. Religion and
language are the same, the dialects vary, but that's all. Turkish Cypriots look up
to the Turkish more, but they keep their own identity. They have their own folk
dances, and different traditions. For example, marriage in Turkey, there is more
influence on the male side; the wife goes to the male's family. This is not the
case in Cyprus. These traditions also remain in London. Turkish Cypriots are
more European, from the English influence when it was under British rule. This
is very much part of the make-up of Turkish Cypriot culture.
This comment was reiterated by most of the women, who generally considered themselves
very different from Turkish people. Another woman pointed out that even in the centre where
she worked, although it was attended by both Turkish and Turkish Cypriot women, they did
not tend to mix with each other because of the differences that they perceived between them.
The attitude towards Turkish newcomers was generally quite negative on the part of
many of the women interviewed. The following quotes are typical of many, although not all, of
the women's views:
The people who are coming here now, in the last few years, both from mainland
Turkey and from Cyprus, and they come here, I don't know with what kinds of
expectations; they come here with very very high expectations because they
have the wrong information. And they come here and they expect everything in
front of them, all ready. Which the people who came years ago, they didn't even
think about it, they just came here to work, and they are working still. But the
people, who are coming now, they don't come here to work, they just come here
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to sit around and get money from the government. And every benefit that's
going, that we have never heard of, they know about it, and that is worrying me.
It upsets me because it's not right.
For many of the women, the general attitude was that it had been far harder for the Turkish
Cypriots who had originally came over to Britain than more recent arrivals. Many were
therefore critical of these newcomers who, they felt, were abusing the system in Britain and in
so doing making Turkish speaking people as a whole 'look bad'. These views therefore
provided further cause for the Turkish Cypriots to maintain their distance from Turkish people
in Britain.
Among the two groups, therefore, all of the women believed that the first generation
tended to confine their relationships to other Pakistanis or Turkish Cypriots as much as
possible, in order to preserve their traditional values within their communities. However, for
Turkish Cypriots, because of the continuing tensions and problems in Cyprus, weakened, but
nevertheless still apparent in London, some of their interaction with other groups, such as the
Turks and the Greek Cypriots, were still highly charged. While contact with these two groups
was more common than with others, the first generation restricted the extent of their
interaction in terms of socialising, and most significantly in terms of marriage.
Intergenerational Relations
Relations between the first and second generation have been the focus of much attention.
Commentators have been largely divided over the extent to which there is a generation gap
between parents and children, and the amount of conflict that this can generate. Earlier
studies tended to focus on the problems that the second generation experiencd, due to a lack
of communication with their parents and as a consequence of being 'caught between two
cultures, leading many to suffer an 'identity crisis' (Thompson 1974, CRC 1976, Watson
1977). Later studies, however, have stressed that although conflict can arise between the
first and second generation, its impact is much less significant than previous commentators
implied (Ballard 1994, Brah 1996, Anwar 1998). The formation of ethnic identity among the
second and successive generations is therefore much more complex than is suggested by
the notion of intergenerational conflict. This section will examine the attitudes and opinions of
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the Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women to the first generation, together with their own
experiences in relation to their parents and family.
The majority of the women believed that the first generation strongly maintained their
traditional norms and values. Very few felt that the first generation had adapted much in
Britain, and certainly not enough. As a Pakistani woman commented: 'it is also hard I think for
the older generation to adapt. They are set in their ways and they try, they do their best to
enforce that on their children'. Some believed that many of the first generation were keen to
hold on to their traditions and values because they intended to return to Cyprus or Pakistan.
Others felt that they were too busy working and earning money to absorb any British cultural
values. As a Turkish Cypriot woman commented: 'they didn't better themselves, they didn't
adapt here, they didn't; they just worked with their eyes closed, and that's it'. Furthermore, the
majority felt that the first generation was still following traditions and customs from thirty or
forty years ago, whereas Pakistan and Cyprus had 'moved on'. As one young Turkish Cypriot
woman commented:
This is a big thing people talk about in our community. It's like if you go to
Cyprus, it's not like that; they're more modern. People who are there are more
like people of their own age group, more modern than the people who are here
because they've come here and they've wanted to hold on to what they had
back in Cyprus, that's fifties morals basically, what they had then. Things have
moved on in Cyprus, whereas in our community they haven't. They're stiU
basically stuck in the fifties and sixties, you know, making your daughters stay at
home, marry when she's 16, she can't have boyfriends. It's not like that in
Cyprus, everybody's more open and free, but here it's not.
As a result, all of the women felt that there were significant differences between the
generations. Many argued that conflict was inevitable because the second generation had
adapted to life in Britain to a far greater degree than their parents had. As one young
Pakistani woman commented:
There's a lot of conflict. I mean you try to preserve it, the culture, but it's hard,
you have to adapt as well. We have adapted me and my sisters, we have
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adapted, but our parents would like us to become more Pakistani. So there's
always a conflict at home, always.
Most of the women felt that the family was a site of much conflict for young people,
whose parents were often unable or unwilling to understand the changes they were
experiencing growing up in Britain. A Pakistani woman argued that the first generation was
concerned that their children would lose their traditional values and was therefore very strict
on the children, as her own example demonstrates:
Well, the first generation was very scared I remember, because the language
was the first problem. Women didn't know where to go; they didn't have groups,
there weren't many people. And they were absolutely secluded. OK the
husbands were going to work, but the mothers, the daughters, the wives, were
left at home, and lonely and all that sort of thing. And then when the children
were born they were absolutely scared because they would drop their traditions
and values, whatever. And they were scared that their children would be taken
away from this with this western culture which they didn't understand and so
they did have a lot of problems. And I remember when I was growing up my
mother was very strict with me, absolutely strict to the point where I felt I had to
lie to her to go with my friends. And I wasn't doing anything, all I wanted to do
was go with my friends and to their homes, and stay with them, you know, like
teenagers do. And my mother wouldn't accept that. So I think there was little
understanding. They were scared, basically, that we will go out with boys and
spoil our reputation. I mean I did go out with a boy but I didn't spoil my reputation
(she laughs). We did it behind their backs anyway.
Many recounted similar experiences in relation to their own parents. Five of the women
believed that parents had been too strict on young people forcing many to adopt two different
roles, one at home and one at school. Several of the women pointed out that the experience
of different cultures could be very confusing for young people, as one of the Pakistani women
commented:
They do continue with their traditions and I think they are really confused as well.
They learn English in school, they have English friends, they have another
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culture at school, and then they come home. You know they see people kissing
on the street, fifteen years old and going out with boyfriends. And then they go
home and they're not allowed to go out after three o'clock in the afternoon. And
at home, they're forced to continue their traditions, but outside they have a
different world, a different life.
A Turkish Cypriot woman told of her own experiences of coping with two roles when she was
younger:
And also being born within a sub-culture and having loyalties torn between the
family and life outside the home. Having grown up here I felt that I had two roles,
I was a different person at home and a different person outside the house. And
they're under a lot of pressure, you know, a lot of conflict. They are taught a
different cultural system at home to school, and they act a lot more Turkish at
home. You often find that a lot of girls, in particular, are two different people.
They are definitely more respectable at home, even like clothes and make-up. I
remember that when I used to go to school, as soon as the girls would get to
school the skirts would roll up, the make-up would go on (she laughs), so it's
physically as well. And it's like before you go home, everything comes off. So
you do find that a lot of girls do adopt two different roles. If they act more
westernised at home they will have problems, so the pressure is always there.
Another Turkish Cypriot woman told how parental pressure had made her hate the fact that
she was Turkish Cypriot. She also felt that such pressure was responsible for her sister
leaving home and becoming a single mother.
I'm a lot happier now than I was before being a Turkish Cypriot. Before I used to
hate it, but that was because of all the pressure I used to get from my parents.
And I was sort of pressurised from my parents for my sister being a single
mother and that wasn't fair. But they pressurise you so much, until you rebel and
she wasn't as strong as say me or my older sister, so it was her way out, her
logical way out was to have babies and get her own place. And they sort of
turned round and said 'look what she's done to us?' And often I've wanted to say
'no, it's what you've done to yourselves', but I haven't had the heart to say it.
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Many of the women felt that although some parents were changing, there was still a large
number who were very strict with their children, and particularly young women who tended to
receive the greatest restrictions. Eight of the women also pointed out that many of the second
generation who were married at a young age, brought up their children in very similar to way
to their own parents. As a Turkish Cypriot commented:
I'd like to say they were, but my older sister thinks exactly like my mum and dad,
you know. And she will bring up her kids in exactly the same way as my parents
brought her up... Maybe when I have kids I'm going to become like my parents
as well, God forbid (she laughs).
The majority believed that the first generation needed to adapt more, and learn
to trust their children. Seven of the women felt that communication was vital in order
for the first generation to change and to prevent clashes between parents and children.
A young Pakistani woman stated that in areas such as Bradford, many young Muslims
were trying to conceal their activities from their parents, rather than explaining them.
As a result, she felt it would take a lot longer for the first generation to change their
views.
All of the women believed that they were different with their own children, or would be
very different once they had children. A young Turkish Cypriot woman believed that she
would treat her children very differently from the way her parents had brought her up. She felt
that communication was vital to avoid many of the problems she and her sisters had faced:
I won't, because before even, we would never even have conversations with my
parents, we were too frightened. But now, the last sort of four or five years, since
my younger sister left home, and she had the kids, it's changed a bit. We sit and
we talk, we actually have a conversation. But as I said, there isn't enough
understanding. I'd like to bring them up Turkish, but there won't be that pressure
and I definitely won't be as strict as they were with us, because I know they'll just
lie, because we've done it, and I'm sure they've done it with their parents as
well.
This was reiterated by most of the women, who believed that it was important to give their
children more freedom and choice than they had experienced from their own parents, and
170
allow them to develop their own potentials in ways best suited to their individual needs and
aspirations.
Many of the women felt that it was important for parents to find a balance otherwise the
younger generation would rebel against both their culture and their religion. As one young
Pakistani woman commented: 'there has to be a balance. If you're living in this country, you
have to have a balance, because otherwise you have the younger generation rebelling
against custom and Islam'. However, five of the women felt that the second generation who
were now parents themselves often went too far the other way, and allowed their children to
become too western. A young Turkish Cypriot woman explained some of the reasons for this
more lenient approach.
But because like now, I think because a lot of third generation as well, people
that were like my age are having kids. I was born in the seventies, but there
were like second-generation people that were born in the sixties, and now have
teenage children, and they're like letting their children do the things that they
couldn't do. I mean I always say I'm not going to be like that to my children, I'm
not going to be as strict with them as my mum was with me either, basically. And
it's like they're going too much the other way, they're forgetting the fact that our
community doesn't really accept that you can do whatever you want, run around,
you can't really do that. You can do it to a certain extent if your parents find out,
but you can't really do it as openly as maybe English people do it or non-Turks. I
think it's them letting their kids do the things that they couldn't do when they
were young.
A Pakistani mother reiterated this point, and stated that the third generation tends to be far
more 'western' in their lifestyle because their parents did not teach them about Pakistani
culture or about Islam. She went on to tell of her own experiences with her eldest son who,
she believed, had no real knowledge of Asian or Islamic values.
Because I know when I was in the Western culture and all that sort of thing, I
made a mistake with my older son. I thought by giving him all the freedom of
choice, the freedom of girlfriends, it backfired. Of course it backfired on me. Of
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course I found that he, OK he's a good boy, but apart from that he doesn't have
the Islamic values, and culturally Asian values, he's lost that as well.
She believed that because she had been too lenient with him and not instilled Pakistani or
Islamic values, he had lost those values. At the time she felt that she had a very 'western'
lifestyle, and religious and traditional cultural values were not important to her. However, she
had taken a much greater interest in Islam in the last few years and now considered herself a
'practising' Muslim. She was therefore making a conscious effort to teach her younger son
more about Islam and Pakistani values and traditions, and to bring him up more strictly than
she had with her elder son.
Despite some of the clashes and conflict that many of the women had experienced
with their parents, particularly when they were younger, they all pointed out that their families
were very important to them. Some also spoke of the hardships and suffering that their
parents, like many of the first generation, had experienced. As a Turkish Cypriot woman
commented:
The first generation, they didn't know the rules and regulations; they had nobody
to go to for advice. Like we have proper advice bureau's now, we have
community groups. There's nothing really that you can't find out now, no matter
which language you speak. Because we have the system in London, in England
they recognise it more. Whereas years ago it wasn't recognised and you didn't
even have time to think of it or organise it, or have the money to do it. People
were too busy working to try and survive.
Generally the Turkish Cypriot women believed that it was far easier for newcomers now that
it had been in their parent's day. As the first generation of Turkish Cypriots who came over in
the fifties and sixties had to adapt far more than those who came later. Similarly the Pakistani
women were very appreciative of their parents and were aware of the sacrifices they had
made, and the difficulties they had had to confront. Thus although many of the women felt
that their parents had been too strict with them, and had made life quite difficult for them
when they were younger, they were still very committed to their parents, and had great
respect for them.
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Racism and Discrimination
The experience of racial discrimination and prejudice is considered by many to be
fundamental to the maintenance of ethnic identity among the second generation, leading
young people to develop a 'reactive pride' in their respective ethnic heritages (Ballard and
Ballard 1977). These pressures are believed to force migrants and their children back into
their communities, where they receive support and security from their own ethnic group
members (Ballard 1979). Others, however, argue that the influence of racism is not as
straightforward as these studies imply (Hewitt 1990). Nevertheless, it is clear from the
literature review that both Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain are subject to prejudice
and discrimination on the part of the indigenous population and the British State in general
(Anwar 1998, Sonyel 1988). The following section will examine the attitudes and experiences
of the women interviewed to racial prejudice and discrimination within the Pakistani and
Turkish Cypriot communities in London.
Although all of the women believed that racism was still a problem for the second and
third generation, they felt that it had been far worse for the first generation. They had received
far more racial abuse, it was argued, because they were considered easier targets. In
addition, some of the women felt that because the first generation may act differently from
the indigenous population, they were therefore subject to more abuse. The second
generation, on the other hand, had a better understanding of the system and knew how to act
in certain situations, consequently they were more prepared to stand up for their rights. As a
Pakistani woman stated:
The first generation, they came and felt an exclusion but probably couldn't call it
racism, and accepted it more. The second generation, just like the African
Caribbean communities, are less willing to accept it, and more aware of it as
racism, because of a lot of the work we've done I suppose. They're more
prepared to challenge it, and they're more equipped to challenge it. They're
more articulate in the language, they have gone through the system, they're
born here, they feel that this is where they belong, if you belong anywhere, they
feel that their parents have contributed to the establishment of this society. We
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talk to them, and the schools teach them about equality and democracy, and
they're much more willing to have a go at achieving these rights.
Most believed that the first generation had generally been more accepting of racism, perhaps
'unable to give it a name'. Six of the women felt that racism and discrimination had improved
since their parents' day as a result of people gaining a better understanding of their religion
and culture. Nevertheless, they all believed that racism was still evident in Britain, although
some felt that they had not experienced it personally. Five of the women stated that their
awareness of racism had increased since working within their own communities. As a
Turkish Cypriot refugee worker stated:
I think there's still a lot of it around, and I was not aware that there was so much
against Turkish people until I started working here. We have like one client a
day sometimes, suffering from racial harassment from their next door
neighbour, you know, verbal and physical as well. Where we lived, we never
experienced it, thank God. But now it seems to be getting worse. You think
because it's such a cosmopolitan city it wouldn't happen, but it seems to be
happening more now. I think it thrives on greed as well, everyone just wants
something for themselves, and they just don't want other people getting in the
way, and because they're a different race, a different colour, it's enough to start
picking on them I suppose. But yes, it exists, unfortunately
A Pakistani woman told how shocked she had been when working as a teacher in Camden,
to discover the extent of racism experienced by some of her pupils and their families:
I've heard people talk about it, particularly guys, and what they've had to go
through and it's pretty much an alien experience to me. I mean I've never had
any actual physical torment or verbal torment, I've never had to put up with any
of that. So it's still a shock, particularly when I was working in Camden, when I
was talking to parents in the Bengali community, and what's been going on in
their sort of housing community and it's just frightening. And it felt like a really
alien thing to me, it was a shock. And when you hear that Britain had the highest
rates of physical and verbal racism in Europe, it comes as a shock. I'm thinking
'who's doing it? Why's it happening still? I thought we'd all sorted it out.
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Thus while both of these women were aware of racism and the effects of such prejudice and
discrimination, they had not experienced it to the same extent as others obviously had. The
Pakistani woman stated that she had been the only black girl at her primary school and had
therefore been seen as a novelty. However, although she had experienced some name-
calling at first, she did not think it 'amounted to very much'.
School seemed to be one of the major sites of racism for many of the women.
Another Pakistani woman, who had also been the only black person in her school, reported
that she had been stared at and received some abuse from the other children. She also said
that some of the teachers had refused to teach her because of her religion and 'colour'. Nine
of the women, both Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot, stated that they had been picked on at
school and had often felt left out. A Turkish Cypriot woman claimed that although she had not
experienced racism herself, her own children had, and she had been forced to move one of
her daughters to another school as a result. Nevertheless, in discussing her own educational
experiences, she also stated that she felt that the children from ethnic minorities had
generally been 'lumped' into separate groups, with the white English girls in the higher ones.
Many of the women mentioned similar experiences of being separated or streamed on the
basis of their 'colour' or ethnicity
Several of the women also pointed out that schools tended to assume that Pakistani
and Turkish Cypriot young women would not do well educationally, or would not be allowed to
further their education. Consequently, they were not given the same attention as other
children. As a Turkish Cypriots educational development worker explained:
And also stereotypical assumptions as well, that children from our communities
won't do well, that sort of thing, low teacher expectations. And these are the
concerns that a lot of parents have within schools. It's quite sad really, because
with the stereotypical assumptions that a lot of girls for example wouldn't want to
study and would prefer to take up girls' jobs like banking or secretaries, and that
sort of thing. It's quite sad because to an extent it can be true, but with the more
westernised families, it's very difficult to combat those stereotypes. So that to an
extent is still an issue today.
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Generally the women felt that it was harder for people from ethnic minorities to do well in
Britain, and there were very few in top management or government positions. Eleven of the
women also mentioned experiencing racial discrimination in employment, and particularly in
terms of applying for jobs, where they felt that their names worked against them. Several
believed that things were going to be more difficult for the third generation because of the
lack of jobs available, and the fact that it was much harder for Pakistani and Turkish
speaking people to find employment. Education was therefore seen as the main weapon with
which to fight racial discrimination and prejudice.
All of the Turkish Cypriot women believed that racism was a major problem for the
Turkish speaking population, but many felt that they experienced a different type of racism.
One woman, who had carried out research on this issue, argued that the effect of racism on
the Turkish speaking communities had not really been considered because of the absence of
visible differences. Thus the focus was on the African Caribbean communities, who
represent a much more visible target. However, she believed, Turkish Cypriots in Britain
could be seen to experience both direct and subtler forms of racism. The rise of anti-Islamic
feeling in Britain and the criminalisation of Turkish youth and asylum seekers further
compounded the prejudice and discrimination they experienced. She commented:
Other issues that have affected the racist approach are directed at the
communities. Some of the criminal element is around the huge heroin
smuggling and drug smuggling, and this has affected the community, bringing
the police in and their racism towards the black communities in general. But the
Turkish communities are being targeted in relation to the issue of drug
smuggling, and the criminalisation of people in relation to asylum seekers, and
bogus asylum seekers. The issue is around regarding the community as on the
edges of criminality, or harbouring criminals. The raids on factories, to again
accentuate the criminalisation of the communities. So racism is alive and well in
a lot of the spheres of the community; it is still rife. And the attitude is, you know,
they're economic refugees, they're not political refugees. It all fuels this concept
that black and bilingual communities, the Turkish speaking community, are here
to sponge off the state, and they contribute nothing, which is not the case, they
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contribute a hell of lot through the businesses they've set up, the taxes they pay,
etc. And that somehow is washed away in an attempt to portray all the black and
bilingual communities as living off the state.
Thus while Turkish speakers may not be as visibly different from the indigenous
population as the Pakistanis, they nevertheless suffered similar forms of prejudice and
discrimination, although sometimes this was expressed differently and subsequently
affected the communities in different ways.
Many of the women, and most notably the Pakistanis, mentioned the increased
attention that Islam had received in the media and amongst people generally in Britain. A
Turkish Cypriot woman believed that the negative portrayal of Muslims in Britain stemmed
from Christians viewing Islam as a threat. Two of the Turkish Cypriot women argued that they
found the use of the term 'Muslim' offensive, because they felt that people were focusing on
their religion rather than their nationality because of the increased focus on Muslims in
Britain. However, as one woman pointed out, there are vast differences between Muslims
from different countries, and they could not all be 'lumped' together and considered that
same.
To be honest, I find the word 'Muslim' offensive, and I don't like to be called
Muslim. It's as though we are all the same, but we're not, It's like the
Yugoslavian crisis, they talk about Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, they don't call
them Bosnians, but Muslims. I find that very offensive. I have written many
letters to people in the media complaining about this, but I have had no
response. The same thing happens with the term 'Muslim women', it really
annoys me. Muslim women are not all the same. For example, some Muslim
women don't drink, but Turkish women do; some don't go to the Casino and put
a bet on, but Turkish women do. So we are not all the same.
Several of the Pakistani women also believed that the media represented all Muslims in the
same way and failed to acknowledge different viewpoints. One woman mentioned the media
coverage of the Gulf war, in which all Muslims were reported as being in favour of Saddam
Hussain. Whereas in reality, she argued, these views represented only a minority of Muslims
in Britain.
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Eight of the Pakistani women also mentioned the increased focus on Muslim women in
women's magazines and television programmes, which tended to stress the stereotypical
image of the oppressed and downtrodden Muslim woman. As one of the women commented:
I try to watch the BBC magazine programmes and the occasional documentary
that comes out about Asian issues. But sometimes I think it's just the same old
thing, Asian women being oppressed and repressed. And I just think why can't
they change the record, what about talking about Asian women who've been
successful for a change. I know there are women being oppressed but in a way
it's kind of continuing that myth, that all us Asian women have the same
situations and circumstances, that we're all chained down and we can't do
anything. That's an issue not just for Asian women, but for all women living in
this country, no matter what class they're from or what religious background. So
I just feel that we need a balance.
The reproduction of these stereotypical views through the British media was seen to further
the hostility towards Muslim groups by portraying them as a threat to British society. This
'Islamophobia' has affected the Turkish speaking and Pakistani communities equally, as
several of the women pointed out, and has subsequently contributed to the prejudice and
discrimination they experience. However, it was those who were most visibly identifiable as
Muslims who were believed to receive the most prejudice. Indeed a few of the women who
wore the hijab stated that they had experienced more discrimination as a result. One had
even taken to wearing her scarf differently because of such pressures.
Many of the women felt that experiences of these different forms of racism and
discrimination had the effect of pushing Turkish Cypriots and Pakistanis back into their own
communities. As a Turkish Cypriot woman argued, anti-Turkish feeling and hostility was one
of the reasons why the Turkish communities tended to stick together. A Pakistani advice
worker reinforced this view:
It forces people back 100 per cent. If you're getting it day in day out, if you know
you didn't get that job because you're bTack, you're going to go back into you
own community, you're going to try and find a job there. But at the end of the
day you need to be able to put food on your table. If you're not getting anything
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because of the colour of your skin, you're going to go back to your community
where you know somebody is going to be there to help you out or offer you a
job. You get that secure feeling where somebody's going to look out for your
children, somebody's going to look out for your wife if she's walking down the
road and three or four people are abusing her. So I guess it does, there is that
security. That's why when the first groups of Pakistanis came over they settled
together. You knew what was around you and you could help each other out
when times were hard.
However, a Turkish Cypriot woman who had carried out research among the Turkish
speaking communities in London, qualified the extent to which racism can be seen as forcing
Turkish people back into their communities:
I don't think it's racism, racism may be one of the factors but the other factors
are to do with the availability of the communities, where are you going to get
help from? Whether it's housing or finding a job, or knowing who to ask what,
whether it's their cultural needs that are met, you know. I think those are the
things that make the community hold on together, and congregate in certain
areas. And it's not an accident that the communities congregate in areas where
there's been previous areas of Turkish settlement, which were the Cypriots, as
well as where cheap housing is, as well as where a lot of the ethnic minority
industry is, so that they're able to get jobs in those areas. I think racism operates
in those areas, very much so. I think there would be less racism if they went
outside, so I think it doesn't hold. In fact it's almost the opposite. But I think if
they're together I think they probably feel safer from racist attacks, although
racist attacks happen where they are, not out in the country somewhere.
Several of the women felt that they experienced less racism and prejudice living in a multi-
cultural area, where there were more ethnic minorities in general. A Turkish Cypriot woman
believed that London was generally more 'relaxed' in terms of racism, but that outside
London racism was much more prevalent. However, five of the women also pointed out that
racism tended to be more overt in areas where there was a high concentration of minority
groups, particularly where one group was more identifiable. In addition, many of the Turkish
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Cypriot women felt that racism had increased in the last few years due to the number of
refugees who had come to Britain. Most considered racism to be far more of a problem for
newcomers, whose English was generally poor, and who in many cases looked very different
from the indigenous population. These more recent arrivals tended to receive more direct
forms of racial abuse than the second and third generations. Nevertheless, it was clear that
prejudice and discrimination were still very much an issue in Britain and had a major impact
on the lives of minority groups.
However, several pointed out that it was not just the indigenous population who could
be racist. Five of the women mentioned the experiences of some of their clients who had
received racial abuse from members of other ethnic minority groups. Some of the women
also mentioned the racist views of their own communities towards other ethnic groups.
Several pointed out that racism was not just experienced from white English people, but was
evident on both sides. As a Turkish Cypriot woman commented:
Turkish people can be racist too, especially against black people. Yet they're
classed the same in a lot of forms and surveys and stuff, yet very few Turkish
people would consider themselves black. It's sad actually that it does exist
because their needs are very often quite similar, and they can learn a lot from
each other; united they can get a lot of support, you know, it's a shame.
These views emphasise the wide variety of ways in which racial or ethnic
discrimination and prejudice can be activated. It is therefore experienced differently by
specific groups, as well as by individuals within these groups. It is also clear that many
Turkish Cypriots and Pakistanis also display stereotypes and prejudice towards other ethnic
minority groups, which further divide the possibility of common resistance to mainstream
discrimination. In terms of racism pushing people back into their own communities or towards
their own ethnicity, as Modood, Beishon and Virdee (1994) point out, the influence is not
clear cut. While many may rely on fellow members of their ethnic group for employment,
housing, and to generally help 'manage' the ethnic disadvantage they face, it is exactly in
these areas of high concentration of one minority group that racial hostility tends to be
greatest. Thus although their own group members may offer them security and support,
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making them less aware of the effects of racism, such ethnic concentration is likely to
increase the extent of the racial prejudice they experience.
Summary
This chapter demonstrates the significance of levels of integration and the extent of
interaction with other ethnic groups. Regular contact with other members of the ethnic group
can reinforce the maintenance of ethnicity in both the first and successive generations. Thus
the women believed that where an individual grows up can be a significant influence on their
ethnic identity. Nevertheless while most of the women stated that they liked to have access to
religious and/or cultural facilities and services, most would not choose to live in areas where
there was a high concentration of Pakistanis or Turkish Cypriots. Some because these areas
were considered to be deprived and run-down, and therefore were not considered desirable
places to live. Others because living in these close-knit communities can place restrictions on
individuals, due to wide-ranging gossip networks and strong community sanctions governing
people's behaviour. However, the majority of the women did not consider their preference to
live elsewhere as an indication of their lack of commitment to the ethnic group, but merely
providing an environment that gave them more freedom to exercise greater independence
and foUow their own aspirations.
Class, in terms of levels of income and status, is of course relevant here. Those with
greater resources are better able to exercise choice in terms of where they choose to live,
and the extent to which they participate in the 'ethnic community'. However, as Raza (1991)
points out, while middle class Asians may aspire to British middle class values, racial and
ethnic discrimination and prejudice prevents them from assimilating into the mainstream
British middle classes. Thus although some may choose to withdraw socially from the ethnic
group, although they may be economically reliant on ethnic ties; others may prefer to remain
both socially and economically integrated because of the status implications involved. Thus
many of the Turkish Cypriot women felt that although those with higher income levels tended
to move out towards the suburbs, they still preferred to live in areas where there were other
Turkish Cypriot families. This was perceived as relating not so much to the support and
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security which that may provide, but because they judged their own success and status in
relation to other Turkish Cypriots, rather than wider British society.
However, factors that influence the maintenance of ethnicity do not only relate to
relations with other members of the ethnic group, or indeed to interaction with the indigenous
population; also of significance is relations with members of other ethnic minorities in Britain.
For the Pakistani women such relations, as far as the first generation were concerned, were
largely kept to a minimum, because most did not consider them to be necessary of
particularly desirable. For the Turkish Cypriots, however, relations with other groups such as
Greek Cypriots and Turks was seen as a major influence on the maintenance of ethnicity.
Relations with these two groups were certainly better than in Cyprus; nevertheless Turkish
Cypriots were keen to emphasise what they perceived as the differences between them.
However, the motivations behind the reinforcing of these differences, as Ladbury (1977)
points out, are not the same as those in Cyprus, but result from their experiences in Britain.
In distinguishing themselves from other Turks or other Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots reinforce a
sense of their own distinct ethnicity, as a minority within a minority. Thus, as Bhachu (1985)
illustrated in relation to East African Asians, a 'two-fold' identity can be seen to have emerged
among Turkish Cypriots in Britain. One in response to the 'internal dynamics of the
community', based on their interaction with Turks and Greek Cypriots, and the other results
from their interaction with the indigenous British population.
'Race', ethnicity, and class can therefore be seen as significant factors in the
maintenance of Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot ethnicity in Britain, influencing the first as well
as successive generations. Nevertheless, as the discussions in this chapter illustrate, they do
not do so in exactly the same way. The greater levels of integration and participation of the
second and third generations within mainstream society increase the resources available to
them, and increase their ability to manage ethnic disadvantage. In terms of its effects on the
maintenance or transformation of their ethnicity, this will be examined in subsequent
chapters. However, suffice to say that factors such as 'race', class, gender and ethnicity can
be seen to have a greater influence on the second and third generation than intergenerational
relations. Some may have experienced problems in their youth that could be seen in terms of
a 'crisis of identity', or a 'splitting of roles', but all of the women believed that this was merely
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a temporary situation which they had subsequently confronted and dealt with in their adult
lives. The strategies adopted in this process, as the following chapters will demonstrate,
varied to a considerable extent.
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Chapter Seven
Gender, Islam and Culture: The Contradictions
Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot women, as the literature view indicated, are considered to face
specific difficulties and tensions arising from patriarchal norms and values that seek to
control their sexual behaviour (Joly 1987, Afshar 1994, Josephides 1988, Anthias 1983,
1992, Kucukcan 1999). In addition, as the previous chapter demonstrated, they are subject to
the racial, ethnic, class and gender disadvantages operating within wider British society,
which combine to further restrict and limit the range of opportunities open to them. This
chapter aims to evaluate the position of women within the Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot
communities, and within British society in general. It will begin by examining their views on
the position of women in Islam, as well as in relation to Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot
cultures. It will then go on to look at their opinions of the changing experiences of the first,
second and successive generations. These changes are believed to be greatest in relation to
marriage, education and employment choices, and these will subsequently be examined in
more detail. The aim is to gain a broader picture of the experiences that influence Turkish
Cypriot and Pakistani women in terms of their identity formation and their commitment to the
maintenance of ethnicity.
Women in Islam
It is widely believed that Islam raised the status of women in Arabic society in the seventh
and eighth centuries. Under the laws of Islam, laid down in the Qur'an, female infanticide was
forbidden, polygamy was limited, and the rights of women guaranteed. Islam upheld the
sanctity of a strong family unit, which provided protection and safety for women and children,
and gave women legal status as independent individuals (Saifullah Khan 1997). Men were
encouraged to treat women with kindness and respect, while at the same time women were
urged to dress modestly and restrain their behaviour (Tames 1982). In Britain, however, as
the previous chapter indicated, the common assumption expressed in the media and other
sections of British society is that Muslim women are suppressed and isolated, subordinate to
'their' men and kept like prisoners in their homes. Such media attention undoubtedly affects
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Muslim women and the Muslim population in Britain as a whole. This section therefore
outlines the attitudes and opinions of the women interviewed about the position of women
within Islam.
What was most notable was the extent to which the two groups of women were
divided on their attitudes towards the position of women in their religion. All but one of the
Pakistani women considered men and women to be equal in Islamic law. Many believed that
the position of Muslim women was misrepresented in the West, and they were portrayed as
having few rights in relation to men. The majority of the Pakistani women, however, believed
that Islam had given women many rights and opportunities. As one woman argued:
Men and women are equal, but different. There are distinct roles, and there are
different expectations of men and women, and that is what Islam had laid down,
but you are both equal. Islam is all about pushing forward the role of women,
encouraging women to be independent and asserting their identity.
Several pointed out that although it may appear to some that women are subject to greater
restrictions than men, the laws which have been introduced by Islam were there to protect
women rather to restrain them. A 'practising' woman argued that Muslim women only
experienced difficulties from such laws when they were ignorant of the reasons behind them.
To some, she pointed out, the laws may seen unfair, but she felt that if people were to read
the Qur'an and understand what it said, they would be happy to abide by these laws. She
mentioned laws to do with inheritance, whereby women can only inherit half that of a man.
This was not, she pointed out, because women are considered to be less important than
men, as is often portrayed, but because according to Islamic law men are obliged to provide
complete financial support for their wives and families, whereas women are not expected to
contribute to the expenses of the household. Consequently, a woman's money was
considered her own. This was the reason, she argued, that under Islamic law women did not
inherit as much money as men.
In addition, six of the women believed that they had far more rights now they were
'practising' than previously. One woman, who had become more religious in the last few
years and now.wore the hijab, commented: 'I mean Islam has given me a lot of rights and I
can walk more free and liberally than when I was a teenager, when I wasn't practising'. Her
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comment was reiterated by many of the 'practising' women. Another believed that women
who were 'practising' Muslims were much more assertive than other Pakistani women:
I think practising men and women, women per Se, are more assertive actually
and more confident in fact, doing everything. Whereas culturally, tradition and all
that, they're very timid and scared of what she should do because that's what
the tradition says. But once you know in Islam you can do anything you want, do
you think women will stop (she laughs), you know what I mean.
Many of the 'practising' women believed that once women became aware of the rights that
Islam gave them as women, they developed a much greater level of confidence to challenge
the restrictions that their parents and communities imposed upon them. For these women,
therefore, a greater knowledge of lsam was seen as a way of empowering women, and
expanding the range of options available to them.
For the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, all of the women believed that Islam was
used to suppress women and keep them in the home. Although two stated that they thought
this had more to do with how it was interpreted and practised, rather than what was wriften in
the Qur'an, for most such a distinction was not made and they blamed Islam as a whole for
the suppression of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot women. One Turkish Cypriot woman spoke
out violently against Islam, which she considered one of the worst religions:
I mean they ask you to stay at home, they get married three times, you know,
they're married to three women. The woman doesn't have any rights at all. A
man can go out, do whatever they want, and they use this, the religion to stop
women going out, so definitely not. I think Islam is the worst amongst the
religions. At least Christianity, you know, all the religions are male-dominated,
but I think Christianity at least gives a little bit of space for women, but Islam
doesn't.
Another, who referred to herself as an atheist, commented at length on the extent to which
patriarchy and gender segregation were due to culture or religion. She believed that in many
ways, religion was used to continue and support patriarchal activities or to put pressure on
women to restr(ct their activities.
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Well this is a long debate, isn't it, it's been going on among sociologists and
anthropologists for a long time, whether religion has been taken over by these
patriarchal societies for their own purposes and I think that's probably true, and
to perpetuate that already existing system. But if you look at the Qur'an you also
find parts in there which reflect the society that existed at the time, which was
patriarchal, which was a society that did not provide equality for women, and
politically that will reflect in the Qur'an. And there are elements in that which
actually continue the subjugation of women to men, to her man who is the
husband, the father, the uncle, the older brother or whatever, and Muslim law as
well. Although it gave some rights to women, in the sixth and seventh century.
And some people argue that those laws gave rights to women which western
women didn't have in Europe, and that might have been true, but that doesn't
mean that just because that was the case in those days that is so the case now.
I think it's a dialectic process, and interaction, so it's both. Because a patriarchal
society which can use religion to enable it to continue and the contents of the
Qur'an, but most importantly the interpretation of the Qur'an reinforces the
existing power structures in society.
She pointed out that some women in Turkey (like several of the Pakistani women
interviewed) have claimed they have been able to use the Qur'an in order to promote their
rights, in education for example, or to gain more freedom and independence for themselves;
thus using Islam as a liberating force. However, she believed that this was a perfunctory
interpretation, and in reality the essential nature of Islam had not changed; 'It has superficially
changed shape, but it is still the same at the core'.
These comments illustrate quite clearly the differences between the two groups in
terms of their opinions of the position of women in Islam. The women were similarly divided
on the issue of the wearing of the hijab (headscarf), although all of them believed that it
should be a matter of personal choice for the individual whether to wear it or not. None of the
Turkish Cypriots interviewed wore the Hijab. Among the Pakistani women, four wore the hijab
in the traditionI way all the time, one always covered her hair, and one woman wore it
occasionally; none of the other Pakistani women had ever worn the hijab. One of the
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Pakistani women had become more interested in Islam when she was studying at university
and started to wear the hijab then. She felt that she appreciated herself far more now as a
result of wearing the hijab. Another, who had only been wearing the hijab for a month,
reiterated this view: 'it's wonderful, I feel much more confident wearing it than when I don't. If
I don't wear it, I think 'Oh God, everybody's looking at me, but as soon as I put it on I don't
care who looks at me'. She also stressed that the decision to wear the hijab was a very
personal and spiritual thing for a woman, one between herself and Allah. Another Pakistani
woman in her early forties, who had only become a 'practising' Muslim in the last few years,
also commented on how important a decision it was, and how deeply she had been affected
by it. She stated that she had previously lived a very 'western' lifestyle, and that she had
found it very difficult at first to adjust to wearing the hijab.
Well, that is something (feel that one has to really feel, truly inside their heart to
do it. I wear the hijab because three years back when my husband said to me, I
just put it on because I saw someone wearing it and I felt that they looked really
good in it, and I wore it and he says 'oh, I like it on you, why don't you keep it for
good'. And I said OK and obviously I didn't really understand the implications of
it and the feelings I would have afterwards. But believe me for a year or two
years I found it absolutely difficult to keep it on, somehow it looked so dowdy, it
looked absolutely different and it didn't suit my clothing. And when I go to the
park or for dinners and that sort of thing, and they clashed and I looked such like
an old woman sometimes, you know, with the hairstyle and with your ornaments,
you have to give them up, you can't wear them. And I did find it very difficult to
be honest and I'd say 'I don't want to go because of this scarf, I can't wear this'.
And I was feeling sometimes depressed, but as the time progressed, you know,
my values changed. You see your values change with life as well, there was
music, parties, there was this and that, you don't want to go to these anymore.
So those things aren't important anymore, clothes aren't important anymore. So
the hijab has become more important than anything else. I feel that anyone who
wants to. commit to the hijab has to be thoroughly committed to Islam and its
values.
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Despite the difficulties she had experienced when she first started to wear the hijab, she now
felt very comfortable with it and considered the hijab to be very important to her life. Some of
the Pakistani women stated that they were not against people wearing the hijab, but they did
not feel it was appropriate for them. Just under half of the Pakistani women, however, were
not in favour of it. Several pointed out that far from making women less visible, wearing the
hijab in Britain was likely to make women more prominent. This was reiterated by another
young Pakistani woman, who also saw it as a way of controlling women:
If they feel totally comfortable with it, then go ahead and do it as far as I'm
concerned. I don't actually see any benefit in fact. I mean I've read numerous
books on this issue, and I've come to the conclusion that it actually does nothing
for women. It causes curiosity; it will never stop anybody from looking at you, in
fact it probably increases the risk. So if they want to do it, if they want to wear it,
fine do it. But personally I see no value. I think there are greater things that
Islamic countries need to be aware of, need to concentrate their resources on,
rather than on making women cover up. And I just think it's just one way of men
actually controlling women, that's how I view it to be honest, and it has no value
at all.
Generally these women felt that the hijab was not in the interest of Muslim women, but rather
it represented a form of male control. This was also the view taken by all of the Turkish
Cypriot women interviewed. The majority was very critical of the wearing of the hijab, and
only three said that they did not disagree with those who chose to wear it, although they too
argued that it was an unnecessary practice. For most, it was merely seen as another way of
men controlling women. One woman also argued that covering the hair was now a redundant
Islamic law that no longer had any meaning for Muslim women:
I think you shouldn't be allowed it (she laughs). I mean, no, they can wear it if
they want to but I don't think it's right. I think lots of the Islamic rules were sort
of, you know, they were OK in those days, but I think they were relevant for
those days, sort of like using your left hand, you know, using your right hand
when you're eating, not your left hand, things like that. I think there was no
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water, you had to do that. But now things are different, during the twenty-first
century, really, I think it's ridiculous, people covering their heads.
The women's opinions on the issue of the hijab again emphasise the differences between the
two groups towards religion. For most of the Turkish Cypriot women, the hijab was just
another way in which Islam tried to suppress women and restrict their rights. For the
Pakistani women on the other hand, whilst many considered it unnecessary and some were
critical of its use, they felt that this had more to do with the way people practised their religion
than with what was actually written in the Qur'an. As the following section highlights, these
differences can also been seen quite clearly in the attitudes of the women towards their
cultural heritages.
'Culture' and the Position of Women
As indicated in the literature review, Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot women are subjected to
patriarchal norms and values, which are far stricter for women than they are for men. This
was confirmed by the women interviewed, although they differed considerably in terms of
where they felt the origins of these oppressions lay. The majority of the women argued that
Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot traditional cultures viewed women as very much subordinate to
men and there was little equality. One young woman who had lived in Pakistan for three
years thought the situation there was even worse: lf you go back home, the men make most
of the decisions, they don't discuss them with the women much. They think that what is right
is right, and women aren't allowed to give their views'. She felt that in Pakistan women just
accepted their role because they had been brought up like that. Another young woman
confirmed this view. She felt that a woman's role was seen to be in the home and there were
few opportunities for them to study or work:
There's still an understanding that women basically, they get married, they leave
their father's house and they come and join their husband's household. I mean
she is someone who is brought in to do the housework, bring up the children,
that's it really, that's all the role I see for women out there. I've met very few
women who are actually working, although I know there are women who work,
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but I don't know what struggles they've had to put up with in order to become
like that.
The Turkish Cypriot women also believed that traditional values were very male-centred. As
one woman commented: 'Men are supposed to be, you know, the boss, the head; the women
are second class to the men, I find anyway. I find that most Turkish men treat women like
that'. Consequently, they argued, Turkish Cypriot women were generally restricted, and were
not given the same rights as men. As one of the women stated: 'I suppose, because of the
culture they're kept at home, they're housewives; they just have children, and don't do that
much'.
Both groups of women felt that the first generation had accepted this position, just as
much in Britain as they had in Pakistan or Cyprus. Subsequently they felt that parents still
treated young men and women very differently in terms of education, employment, marriage
and the amount of freedom they were allowed. In the opinion of a Turkish Cypriot woman:
'Unfortunately the expectations for men and women are still markedly different, men are still
given more freedom, you know, women aren't allowed to have boyfriends'. In addition,
several of the women mentioned that their communities generally were very much centred on
the male. If a woman divorced or became separated from her husband, it was always viewed
as the woman's fault, as a Turkish Cypriot woman commented: 'There's always this thing,
with women as well; they always blame the woman, even though they should be supporting
her. It's like rather than sticking up for the woman; they're just so pro-man'. This view was
reiterated by another Turkish Cypriot woman, who told of her mother's experiences and of
those of many of the women with whom she worked:
I had a lot of problems when I was young. My dad was a gambler and used to
beat my mum. We lived in a Bed and Breakfast for one and a half years
because dad threw mum out. Mum's not that strong a person; she needs a lot of
emotional support. A lot of Turkish women are like that. Even though he did that
to us, when we got a house from the council she took him back. It's like if you
don't have a husband you're nothing. A lot of women we see here, domestic
violence, cases, they come here to get an injunction but they won't take it
seriously, it's like 'it's OK because he's my husband'. They're wasting the
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police's time because you know she'll take him back a week later. It's difficult,
it's to do with their culture saying to them you have to have a husband, without a
husband you're nothing.
Similarly, the Pakistani women also stated that the first generation considered it the duty of
the woman to maintain her marriage at all costs, and domestic violence was generally
perceived as something that they must tolerate. Nevertheless, many of the women also
pointed out that such behaviour was not condoned under Islamic law, and women could seek
divorce if they were being badly treated. In reality, however, very few of the first generation
ever did.
Much of the pressure placed on women to uphold traditional cultural and family values
stemmed from the notion of family honour. As highlighted in the literature review, the
concepts of honour and shame involve the control and restriction of women's activities
through patriarchal norms and practices. Women are therefore seen as representing the
'public face' of their families and communities, and must therefore be seen to behave
appropriately (Josephides 1988, Afshar 1994). All of the women felt that family honour was
still very important to both Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain, and was a major cause
of some the restrictions placed on young women. According to one of my Pakistani
informants:
It's a very big issue, and it's such a burden for a young person to carry. You're
carrying responsibility for yourself, all your family, and your uncles and often
hundreds of people. Just because one young person wants to go out and be
free and explore life.
A Turkish Cypriot woman also spoke of the pressure that the maintenance of family honour
placed on women, which could be very severe:
The parents will do anything they can in order to protect the honour of the family,
and that includes putting pressure on young women, and pressure can take
different forms. And there have been some young women who have been driven
to suicide because of the pressures.
She argued that the importance of family honour was not just an issue for Turkish speaking
women, but for all Muslim women. She believed that as far as their parents were concerned:
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'they're Muslim girls and they're precious'. However, in reality she believed that it was merely
another way of controlling young women and making sure that they did not disgrace the
family name. The maintenance of family honour was not seen as cultural tradition, on the part
of the Turkish Cypriot women, but as an element of their religious heritage. The women saw
it as another way in which Islam tried to control women, and keep them subordinate to men.
For the Pakistani women, on the other hand, family honour was seen as inherently part of
Asian culture, and had nothing to do with Islamic law.
The segregation of the sexes was another area mentioned by the Turkish Cypriot
women, although it was rarely considered an issue among the Pakistani women. One Turkish
Cypriot woman believed that parents were always suspicious about men and women mixing,
and most felt that they had to protect women from men. 'It's always suspicion, men only have
one thing in mind and women always have to be careful, they always have to be protected.
So I mean there's always this attitude towards them mixing'. Many of the Turkish Cypriot
women felt that the segregation of the sexes was one custom that continued in Britain, with
men tending to congregate in cafes and clubs, while women tended to socialise in their
homes. Again, for most of the women this was seen as a religious custom, rather than a
cultural one. Among the Pakistani women, on the other hand, the segregation of men and
women was seen as acceptable by most because it was outlined in the Qur'an. Indeed, two
of the 'practising' women felt that this was one feature of their religion that had lapsed in
Britain, which they did not consider a positive change.
The majority of the Pakistani women, therefore, believed that traditional cultural
values were responsible for the restrictions placed on women and not Islam. Many pointed
out that it was traditional customs that confined women to the home, and discouraged them
from seeking employment or further education. Religion, they argued was not to blame for
the inequality between men and women, but traditional Pakistani and Asian cultural values.
Consequently, most of the Pakistani women were critical of Pakistani culture, which they felt
was directly responsible for restricting the rights of women that Islam had given them. A
'practising' woman argued that customs such as arranged marriages, dowries, and the
confining of women to the home were cultural elements that were directly in opposition to the
rights of women laid down in the Qur'an. Another stated: 'there's so many other things that
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clash between tradition and Islam, it is a big thing'. Five of the 'practising' Pakistani women
argued that for many Pakistanis the religion had become confused with the culture, and that
many people were blaming the religion for restrictions, which they believed were purely
cultural. As one woman commented:
The way we dress up and arranged marriages, in our religion it does say you are
allowed to choose but when culture comes into it, it becomes a confusion, a mix
up. In religion we're not supposed to mix that much with men, but still have the
right to choose. There are lots of things that religion says you are allowed but
culture says you are not, like education, and religion gets the blame for it.
Another 'practising' woman who worked for a Muslim women's support service argued that
the main problems facing Muslim women in Britain were to do with Pakistani cultures and
traditions. She argued that women were generally ignorant of their Islamic rights and were
therefore scared of their husbands and often his family's power over them. The role of the
support service was to inform women of their rights in Islam and in Britain and to show these
women that they do not have to put up with being beaten or abused.
Thus although all of the women were critical of certain Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani
cultural traditions, which they felt suppressed women and treated them differently from men,
they differed quite considerably in terms of where they thought this inequality originated.
Whereas for the Pakistani women, these aspects were largely considered to be based on
Hindu and Sikh customs, which they regarded as 'unlslamic'; the Turkish Cypriot women, on
the other hand, believed that it was their religion that was responsible for the patriarchal
traditions and values that they experienced. These views once again highlight the differing
opinions that each group held of their religion, and of the position of women within Islam.
However, despite these differences, the women's views on the major issues concerning
second generation women were very similar,
The Second Generation
As highlighted earlier, the first generation were largely considered to have maintained
traditional norms and values concerning the 'woman's role', and consequently parents tended
to place much greater restrictions on their daughters to ensure that the honour of the family
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was protected. The second generation, however, was believed to be much less willing to
accept such restrictions. Both the Pakistani and the Turkish Cypriot women argued that the
second generation expected more equality between men and women, and were generally
more assertive in expressing their rights. In the words of a Pakistani woman:
I think the first generation don't speak up much for their rights, if they were told
that they were not supposed to do something, they wouldn't. But now the second
generation will speak up for their rights and say what they want to do, what is
right for them anyway.
Another Pakistani woman argued that although the second generation expected to be treated
on equal terms with men, it was the third generation who were the most forceful in asserting
their rights:
The first generation thought that everything should be done what the husband
says. The Islamic way says that anyway, but the tradition was involved with that.
Everything should be, you know, the child should listen to the mother. Yes, they
were very strict. The second generation says no, we should be equal, both of us
half and half, or they say 'OK I'll listen to you, you're the head of the family but
you have to listen to me a little bit', it was more together, you know. But the third
generation say it should be equal, no matter what.
This was reiterated by a Turkish Cypriot woman who thought that the situation was definitely
changing for the third generation: 'You are having more girls marrying outside the community;
you are having more girls being given more freedom, being allowed to have boyfriends.
There's generally less pressure'. All of the women believed that things were now changing for
Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot women in Britain, and that there were significant differences
between the first and second generation. Many pointed out that the second generation was
becoming more independent, they were taking more control over their lives and making more
decisions for themselves. Some of the women believed that such changes were a result of
living in Britain, and the fact that women were gaining a better education, making them more
aware of their rights and giving them greater confidence. Many stressed the importance of
having centres especially for Muslim, Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot women. Such
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organisations played a vital role in giving women practical and emotional support, together
with increased social and political awareness,
Nevertheless, despite these changes, the majority of Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani
women were still considered that they experienced a number of difficulties as a result of the
greater restrictions imposed on them. A Turkish Cypriot woman described what she thought
were the main difficulties facing women like her:
Being independent, going out and getting a job, and doing exactly what they
want. Moving out, that's like a 'no way', you know. I rate anyone, who does that
and actually gets their parents to come round to the idea as well, because I
haven't managed it. But yes, independence, you know, career-wise. The fact
that I went to university and didn't stay at home was a big thing. I remember my
dad saying swell if you apply anywhere out of London and you move out of this
house, then you can't come back'. But it was just a threat. I've tried to say now
that I need to move out, because it's too far to travel, but he won't have it. But it
would be nice, to be independent, because there are restrictions, who you have
around. Obviously, you can't bring men back, so there are restrictions.
Several of the women pointed out that the second generation had very different priorities
from those of the first. Studying and pursuing their careers were much more important to
some than getting married. For one Pakistani woman:
I think the second generation think more carefully about marriage, whether I
guess it's a priority, and how far down it is on that priority list. Is it at the top, or is
it sort of half way down after getting a degree maybe, or studying or doing a
course, or getting a job, you know, financial independence first. So those
priorities are changing, maybe because they have access to a lot more
information here than they would do in Pakistan. So I guess those differences
have come about.
These changing priorities represent the differing experiences of the second generation, many
of whom will have had a much higher level of education than their parents. These
experiences together with an increased knowledge of the British system, and of the rights of
women within this, have raised the aspirations of many second-generation women. The
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following sections will discuss these changing priorities in relation to marriage, education and
employment choices.
Marriage
All of the women believed that marriage practices and customs represented one of the major
areas of change for the second and third generation in Britain. They felt that there were
generally fewer arranged marriages than previously, particularly in relation to the Turkish
Cypriots, and many women were being given more freedom and choice. In terms of their own
marriages, ten of the Pakistani women were married, four of whose marriages had been
arranged. All of them were married to Pakistanis except one, who had married a white
English man. One of the Pakistani women had divorced her first husband with whom she had
had an arranged marriage and had subsequently remarried a Pakistani man who she had
met herself. Amongst the Turkish Cypriot women, nine were married, only one of whose
marriages had been arranged. All were married to Turkish Cypriots except one who had
married a white English man. Two of the women were divorced from their Turkish Cypriot
husbands, neither of these marriages had been arranged.
The women's opinions on arranged marriages differed to a certain extent between the
two groups. Among the married Pakistani women, six believed that arranged marriages were
acceptable as long as there was plenty of choice for the individuals involved and they were
not forced into them. Two of the single Pakistani women felt similarly, although they said they
would not have one themselves. None of the women expected their children to have an
arranged marriage. All of the Turkish Cypriot women, on the other hand, were against the
custom, and several stated that they thought it 'unnatural'. A Turkish Cypriot woman, whose
older sister's marriage had been arranged, told of her experiences:
My sister had one, and well she's happy. Obviously she's been lucky it's turned
out all right. But I think people should have their choice, after all you're going to
spend the rest of your life, hopefully, with this person. I think people should have
the freedom to choose who they want to marry. I mean it's not that she was
really pUshed into it, dragged down the registry office. But it was the fact that
there was this constant bickering in the home, my mum constantly on about so-
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and-so's son. And I remember groups of people coming every so often, every
week to see my sister. And it's not the right way, I don't agree with it.
Many of the women felt that although the situation was improving there was still a lot of subtle
pressure put on young people to get married, especially on women. As a Turkish Cypriot
woman commented:
I think more and more though the choices are beginning to be there for the
individual, for young people, whether it's a young man or a young woman.
Young women have more choice than they had in the past; there are still some
young women who don't have a choice. But also I think there is a subtle
pressure which is there to get married. And a young woman who doesn't want to
get married is a liability and a problem and questions are being asked why they
don't want to get married. If they are legitimate reasons, like education, then she
can delay it. But some of these women do need strong women who they can
identify with, who will support them if they are under such pressures.
All of the women believed that the marriage system was changing in Britain and that the third
generation in particular were having far more choice. One Pakistani woman believed that
things were very different now, and the third generation was being given far more choice:
The second generation had to do exactly what their parents wanted them to do,
OK, or the only alternative for them was to run away, which I think a lot of them
did. The third generation have got a choice now, the parents are more sort of
easy now, they understand what the values are. Some of them are still very
much traditionalists, are doing still the same.
Another felt that the question of marriage was a major issue, not just for Pakistani women,
but for Asian women in general:
I mean I speak from the point of view of my Hindu and Sikh friends, and they're
all pretty much going through the same thing as well. We've reached a point
where we've been working for a couple of years and you know the time has
come for us to start thinking about a partner and it's not happening, it's not
working. out. They have expectations and the guys have expectations and
they're not clicking together and so time is getting on, they're getting older and
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there's this idea that 'this is an old girl, what's been happening here, what did
she do wrong', or something like that. So there's that assumption that there
must be something wrong with this woman not to be married yet. I think that's
actually one of the biggest hurdles. You know, there's not this understanding
that this girl has been studying for three or four years, she's worked, maybe she
didn't have time to get married, or didn't really think about those things. So I
would say that's one of the things, that idea that marriage has to happen when
you're relatively young rather than in your late twenties or early thirties.
Many of the women felt that time of marriage was still a major issue for young Turkish Cypriot
and Pakistani women. Women were increasingly wanting to study, pursue careers and
subsequently put off marriage until much later. Some women, however, were still being
prevented from going on to further education in order to be married. A Turkish Cypriot
woman argued that many young people were getting engaged very early because they saw it
as a way of being allowed to date someone and of avoiding an arranged marriage. The
majority of the Turkish Cypriot women however felt that although there had been a lot of
pressure in the 1 980s to 'marry women off' at a young age, the age of marriage for women
had increased over the past few years. As one young woman commented:
People are getting away from marrying at 16 and having kids and that. Like ten
years ago for me to be single at 21, it was like 'oh my God, she's on the shelf,
basically, nobody wants her, she's never going to get married'. Now it's not like
that, the average age I would say is 27.
Generally it was believed that the age was increasing as women were given more
opportunities and choices to continue their education or to develop careers. Nevertheless, as
all of the women pointed out, many Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots still preferred to marry off
their daughters at a young age, in order to ensure that they did not go astray.
Divorce was another area that the women felt was changing. Although the first
generation had tended to stay with their husbands, regardless of the problems they may have
been experiencing, many more women were finding it easier to divorce their husbands
because of the increased support they were receiving. As a Turkish Cypriot woman
commented:
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There is evidence that more able to divorce now, well they feel confident about
divorcing their partners. There are more who are living apart and on their own.
Which brings a difficulty with it because a woman on her own is still regarded as
a target by men, to be tried out and pressurised. There are also now more
support systems for women now. They are also more public, known. So they are
able to reach out to those women. Third generation young women, who are at
school, some face the same problems in relation to family pressures and being
young girls, for some it's not going to change. But I think they would still be
much more aware that there are choices that they can make and there are
people that would support them if they needed it. Which didn't exist for the first
generation at all.
Whilst divorce among the Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot communities was generally still
'frowned upon', most of the women felt that the services offered through women's centres
and support groups allowed women to feel more confident about their rights in Britain, and to
seek divorce from their husbands if they felt it necessary. A Pakistani woman who had
divorced her first husband and remarried, told of her experiences:
Like I said to you earlier, my parents wanted to go back home and I felt that I
was going to be sort of lumbered with someone I wouldn't want to, and then
came my cousin's proposal and someone said 'What do you think of him?' and I
said 'I don't want to get married to my cousin', you know. But then I didn't see
any way out, so I said, OK (she laughs). And it was 12 years that we were
together, but something was missing inside me. I didn't feel, I mean he was ten
years older than me, but I don't think age was the problem. I think it was that our
values were different really, and he wasn't someone who I would say was very
orthodox or anything. He was in fact, on the contrary, very easy going in that
matter. But I fell in love with my second husband and we obviously, prior to. I
mean I would say I had an amicable divorce because we felt that we were apart.
Had I been a practising Muslim I wouldn't have done that.
She said that.although she did not regret leaving her first husband, she would not have
divorced him if she had been 'practising', because she did not consider him to be a bad
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person. At the time she considered herself very 'Westernised' and had wanted more out of
life than she felt her marriage could offer her. As a 'practising' woman, however, she felt that
she should have tried harder to make the relationship work.
Many of my informants also believed that women were beginning to stand up against
domestic violence, as the following comment from a Turkish Cypriot woman illustrates:
Also issues around domestic violence at home in more traditional families it's
sort of perceived as a woman's fate to tolerate that sort of behaviour. Whereas
now, the divorce rate is so high among the second generation because a lot of
women won't have it. So you do find that they are more assertive and sort of
tend to challenge. Maybe because there's more support. It is similar for
newcomers, they were under a lot of pressure back home, and they realise
when they come here that they don't have to put up with it. You can see a lot of
divorce because of that. In Turkey they just accept it because they don't have
that choice, but when they come here they have that choice, and there's more
support, There are domestic violence projects who receive a large number of
referrals, whereas previously you didn't have this support. So a lot of women are
being empowered by these services and actually have more options than they
have done before. And economic independence as well. I mean in Turkey if you
just divorce your husband, how are you going to survive? It's very difficult for a
woman to survive. And in some parts of Turkey society would not look at you.
A large number of the women interviewed came up against cases of domestic violence,
through their work, on a very regular basis. Yet most believed that the situation was
beginning to improve for some, as a result of the support they received from the women's
groups and the counselling services that they offered. These services were considered
invaluable for many women, who had nowhere else to turn.
Marriage was therefore considered a major issue for Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani
women. The second and third generation wanted more freedom and choice to decide for
themselves when and who to marry. The women believed that the second and third
generation had different priorities from those of the first. They were keen to delay the time of
their marriage in order to continue their education and build a career for themselves.
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Education and Employment
All of the women believed that education was becoming a high priority for many Turkish
Cypriot and Pakistani young people. As several pointed out, with rising levels of
unemployment a greater focus needed be placed on education for the second and third
generation as a whole, and especially for women. They believed that the time had come for
young women to assert their rights, and develop their own potentials. As a Turkish Cypriot
woman commented:
For women especially, women taking new leads in things and making sure they
are given full rights, that they are given an opportunity to study, and take leading
roles in politics and all sorts of areas, otherwise they're going to miss out on a
lot. I think this is what they should go for, I think this is the next stage.
All of the women interviewed thought education was extremely important, and many had
been encouraged by their parents to go to university. Two of the women, a Pakistani and a
Turkish Cypriot, had wanted to go to university when they were younger but had been unable
to because their parents had returned to Pakistan and Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot woman
was hoping to study for a degree in the near future if she could get funding to study in her
current job. A Turkish Cypriot woman in her late forties explained how much she had wanted
to go to university to do teacher training but had been prevented from doing so by her father:
I did up to what was called then 0-level, but I didn't go on to do A-levels. I did
want to go on to teaching, but at the time it was going to be difficult because it
meant that if I went to university it would not be in London, and that created a
problem. My father at the time didn't believe in that. So it became a problem. My
mother wasn't well at the time, and my father really wasn't for it at all, because
girls didn't go away from home for higher education. And it wasn't because he
didn't trust me, or because he himself didn't believe in it, he felt that education
was important. But at the time he thought that the educational level that I had
reached was far enough for me, I didn't really need to do anymore. And he didn't
want other people to, I don't know, talk about me going away. It was a reputation
more than anything else, which was very hurtful for me at the time. It was very
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very hurtful... Back then, girls were not allowed to be seen with a man, it would
start a lot of gossip. It was all about what other people thought.
Although she was the only one of the women interviewed who had not been allowed to
continue her education, many believed that some parents were unhappy about their
daughters going on to further education. A Pakistani woman stated that education was now a
major priority for the second generation, and although most parents were supportive of this,
some did place restrictions on their daughters:
I think the second generation want lots of education, as much as possible. They
really want to be able to go to University, to be able to progress, to get a good
job and get everything they see all their English friends having. I think the
majority of parents do encourage their children to go for it and get a good
education, some don't, it depends on how educated the parents are themselves.
Some parents will let their children work up to a certain level, say A-level and
then it will be 'Right, you're going to get married now'. So it depends. But I think
most do want them to go on to education and get good jobs.
Several of the Turkish Cypriot women also pointed out that things were improving for women
within their communities, and that many more parents were allowing their daughters to go to
university as long as they studied in London.
Interestingly, two of the women stated that although their parents had been very keen
for them to go to university they were not keen on their choice of career. A Pakistani woman
who had previously worked as a teacher explained how her parents had viewed this as an
inferior profession:
My parents weren't keen for me to go into teaching at all. Teaching is pretty
much looked down upon. In Pakistan if you want to be a teacher you don't have
to take any training for it, you can just go into it. So they had those thoughts.
Plus my brother and sister had chosen business positions, so my parents
assumed that I would go into business as well. But at that time I didn't want to, I
wanted to go into something that was more the caring professions. I put it to
them and they weren't terribly keen, they thought I wasn't giving myself enough
credit.
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A Turkish Cypriot advice worker also made a similar comment in relation to her parents'
views: 'They were keen for men to go to university, but they're not very keen on the job I do
now (she laughs). Because Turkish parents want you to be either a doctor or a lawyer or a
teacher, something like this'. Many believed that parents were keen for their children to go to
university and develop a career that they valued, which were largely considered to be high
earning professions
Nevertheless, it was argued, many women still experienced restrictions in terms of
continuing their education or developing careers. A Pakistani woman who worked as an
advisor and counsellor for Muslim women believed that many parents needed to be
persuaded to allow their daughters to go to university:
They see the key to their futures as really education. We have a lot of
youngsters who are at A-level stage and want to go to University, but their family
are saying 'no, you have to get married now'. And we do try to mediate between
the family and say 'well look, what does it say in the Qur'an? Why are you
stopping her? Why are you not stopping her brothers?' We make them really try
to understand that it is their right.
Amongst Turkish Cypriots in particular underachievement in education has been a problem
for many years, and shows no signs of improving in the immediate future despite the efforts
of both development workers and supplementary schools. A Turkish Cypriot development
worker explained some of the reasons for their underachievement.
For the Turkish Cypriot community, I feel that there is a lack of interest involved
as well. A lot of the families are working and not really showing enough interest.
That's often something that we're trying to pump into parents, that we do want
parents to become more involved. And another problem can be the lack of
positive role models in families. For example in my family there are a lot of my
cousins who studied, so for us it was the norm. But for some families they don't
have that. The norm is to leave school at 16, get married, and you know settle
down, that sort of thing. A lot of families are quite afraid their daughters are
going to. have too much freedom if they study, you know. So in order to prevent
that they're sort of marry them at quite a young age. This is more the case in the
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more traditional families, I think things are slightly changing now. But in the more
traditional families, I know a lot are afraid their daughters will become too
westernised, so they don't want to expose them too much.
Part of this informant's work, as a development officer is to persuade parents to allow their
daughters to continue their studies by alleviating some of the fears they have. In addition, she
claimed that part of the problem is the failure of Turkish Cypriot parents to attend school
meetings. She pointed out that although Turkish parents generally seem very keen, Turkish
Cypriots parents think that they know the system much better because they have been in
Britain for much longer, and therefore think it unnecessary, yet their children continue to
underachieve. As another woman working in the field of education stated:
The educational achievement of Cypriots has been very low, it is still very low.
Which is an indication of whether you are going to have any professionals in the
Turkish speaking community, who have gone through the system here and
actually come through it at the other end.
Thus it was believed that although many Turkish Cypriot women had higher aspirations for
educational and employment success, the vast level of underachievement among Turkish
Cypriots as a whole meant that very few were likely to make it into the professions
Despite these difficulties, it was believed that things were improving for Turkish Cypriot
and Pakistani women in Britain, and many more parents were beginning to allow their
daughters to further their education and develop careers. In addition, the women themselves
were giving an education a much higher priority as they were able to see more Turkish
Cypriot and Pakistani women developing successful careers. A Turkish Cypriot woman who
had worked extensively in the area of education in London stated:
The second generation functioning now, or the third generation, have different
expectations and they have seen other things. They are able to have role
models around them, they understand the system much better, the education
system has moved on because of it sex equality and gender studies. Some
have benefited from that, you know, they've got this pull that they wanted to do it
and they could do it. There are more Turkish speaking professionals who are
able to go and talk to parents and argue and show that just bedause their
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daughter is going to a girls' project or a youth project she is not going off to jump
into bed and get pregnant. Or she is not going to run off with a black kid or an
English kid. And also I think the second generation are economically more
comfortable than the first generation. And some of the young women can
become young businesswomen. They might be running a supermarket or a
restaurant or whatever because their parents have set it up; it was a café and it
was a corner shop, but it has developed. So amongst those there are
differences. And I suppose in the second generation they also have a lot more
choices and are able to get to education and do it.
Thus the feeling was that education was becoming increasingly important, both for young
people and their parents. Second generation women had much higher aspirations than their
mothers and some were developing successful careers. Many of the Turkish Cypriot women
pointed out that although women in their communities had always had to work, the second
generation were beginning to choose different careers from those traditionally associated
with Turkish Cypriot women in Britain. As one woman commented:
I think it's very positive now, I mean I see more young women going into
journalism, or going into perhaps advice work in different fields, whereas it was
predominantly men. I see it more positively than before. Whereas it was like my
age group, my generation, it was hairdressing, over-locking, you know, clothing
factories, machining. So it is changing, but as I said about the community that
have come over recently, I still see it among the young women, the hairdressing
thing. I mean no one is knocking hairdressing, you could be a top hairdresser,
but generally it's in a back-street hairdressers shop where you learn the basics
from someone who's perhaps had a few years training, where does that leave
them? And then eventually they leave because the money's really crap basically.
So they end up going into a clothing factory and working there for perhaps more
money, but more energy loss and less family life and less life. But I think it's
changing now, and I see more and more women, for example, more Turkish
Cypriot women who are counsellors perhaps, who've got top jobs within the
health authority. I mean there are very few, but at least you're seeing them.
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Among the Pakistani women interviewed, they pointed out that traditionally women had not
worked in Britain but been confined to the home. Thus for the second and third generations
being able to further their education and develop a career marked a major change within their
communities. Furthermore, underachievement in education was considered much less of a
problem for Pakistani young people, consequently they felt that there were many more were
going to university and building careers. However, as one woman pointed out, they still had to
juggle these new responsibilities with those of their culture and religion, which required them
to be very strong:
You'll probably find more Muslim women going to college, and studying and then
trying to get a job and build a career. They are probably quite strong in terms of
the ones who are trying to do everything at the same time, you know, they're
very committed to their religion, they're very committed to their culture, to their
families, and they're trying to juggle everything together. So I think they're very
very strong from that point of view. They're trying to make sense of everything
for themselves, trying to adapt themselves and their religion and their culture
and their family to fit in to their own lifestyle. So from that point of view they're
very strong.
A Turkish Cypriot woman reiterated this point. She felt that second and third generation
Turkish Cypriot women were in a much better position because they were aware of their
rights and the choices they could make. This allowed them to choose aspects of both British
and Turkish Cypriot cultural values, and use both accordingly:
Because they are much more certain of the choices they can make in life, the
question of losing or not losing their identity or cultures, I don't think it's an issue
because of that confidence they have. They will be able to claim part of their
culture when and if they want to. But I'm sure there will still be plenty of third
generation women who will continue to work in a supermarket or in the garment
industry or in a shop. I suppose a major difference for them would be that they
have the certainty that they live here, and they have a certain standard of living,
that their children can benefit from all the rights that they are entitled to in this
country. Some will still be subjected to pressure of honour.
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Second and third generation Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women, therefore, were felt
to be in a much more powerful position than the first generation, their mothers. They had a
better knowledge of the British system, they were more aware of their rights; they had more
role models to aspire to and a greater support network to help them achieve their aspirations.
Many still faced restrictions from their parents and from wider British society, particularly the
more recent arrivals, but the support was there to help alleviate some of these difficulties.
The increasing role of Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women in public life, however, did not
mean that they would abandon their traditional cultural and religious heritages, but that they
would have more freedom and choice to maintain their ethnicity in a way that was best suited
to them as individuals.
Summary
This chapter illustrates the wide range of opinions that the women held of their religion and
culture. In particular, it is evident that the women were especially critical of customs and
traditions that they felt suppressed women and led to their differential treatment in relation to
men. However, while the two groups of women were largely in agreement in terms of their
criticism of certain aspects, such as keeping women in the home and their unequal treatment
vis-à-vis men, they were nevertheless divided in relation to what they identified as the major
source of these restrictions. Whereas all of the Turkish Cypriot women believed that it was
Islam that was to blame for the suppression of women within their communities, or at least
the way in was being practised; the Pakistani women largely believed that it was cultural
traditions and customs that were responsible for suppressing the rights of women. For the
majority of the Pakistani women, they believed that Pakistani cultural values had become
infused with elements of Sikh and Hindu cultures, which many considered 'un-Islamic', that
is, that they were directly against the laws of Islam. Far from suppressing them, Islam was
considered to have given them rights as women, which certain elements of Pakistani cultures
sought to take away. Examples of this were considered to be the caste system, the practice
of giving dowries, and arranged marriages. For the Turkish Cypriot women, on the other
hand, they believed that religion was used as a way of controlling women, examples of which
included the wearing of the hijab and the segregation of men and women. These different
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attitudes and opinions, as we shall see in the following chapter, have had a major influence
on the formation of these women's identities.
However, despite these differences of opinion on religion and culture, their views on
the major issues of importance for the second and third generation were very similar. The
need for more independence and freedom in relation to living at home, marriage, education
and employment choices was something that all of the women mentioned as being major
priorities for young Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women in Britain. Whether they felt that
cultural or religious values were to blame, all of the women argued that change in their
communities was necessary in order to allow women to develop their own potentials, freeing
them from some of the restrictions previously imposed and giving them full equality with men.
This increased freedom would allow them to make the most of their lives within the confines
of the economic and social disadvantage of the wider society.
These issues once again highlight some of the difficulties faced by ethnic minority
women. Challenging disadvantage, for these women does not just involve opposing the
sexist, racist and class-based assumptions of the majority society, but also confronting
prejudice and discrimination within their own communities. Furthermore, as the comments of
the women illustrate, these varying and intricately interwoven forms of oppression and
discrimination are not experienced uniformly by Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women, nor
are they experienced in a void. The women's own views and aspirations are therefore crucial
to an understanding of their position in society, and the strategies they may chose to adopt in
pursuit of these aspirations.
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Chapter Eight
Religion, Ethnicity and Identity among the Second
Generation
There were significant differences, as the previous chapter illustrated, between the two
groups of women in terms of their attitudes and opinions on the position of women within
Islam. This chapter begins by examining the importance that the women placed on their
religion, further highlighting the disparities between the Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani
informants. It will then go on to look at their views on the importance of Islam for the second
and third generation as a whole. The influence of Pakistan and Cyprus will be examined
together with the women's attitudes towards the maintenance of traditional values and
customs in relation to both themselves and the second and third generations. The
maintenance of mother tongue languages will be also be explored in relation to ethnicity.
Finally, the chapter will examine the women's assessment of their identity and the
significance of this to the maintenance of ethnicity among Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in
Britain.
The Importance of Religion
The increase in Islamic activity among young Asian Muslims in Britain, as highlighted in the
literature review, has received much attention since the events surrounding the Rushdie affair
and the Gulf War. Young Asian Muslims, it is argued, are increasingly turning to a more
religious-based identity that cuts across racial and ethnic barriers (Scantlebury 1995,
Jacobson 1997). For Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, religion is not considered to
constitute a major part of community life in Britain, but is merely seen as an aspect of their
ethnic and cultural identity (Ladbury 1977, Sonyel 1988). This section examines the attitudes
of my informants towards their religion.
The importance that the women placed on religion was by far the main contrast
between the two groups. All but two of the Pakistani women considered Islam to be very
important to them, whereas only three of the Turkish Cypriots believed their religion played
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any part in their lives at all. Of the two Pakistani women who considered Islam to be
unimportant, one stated that although she still believed in her religion she did not follow the
Islamic laws: 'I believe in it, but I don't exactly follow it strictly. I mean I drink, smoke, and
break some of the laws you see.' The other felt that Islam was not important to her at all, she
had never prayed and did not consider herself to be a Muslim. For the majority, however,
Islam was considered very important, and many responded with a straightforward statement
of orthodoxy, which was justified, if at all, in terms of providing the individual with the basics
of life. This idea was emphasised in particular by many of the 'practising' women, who felt
that Islam represented a whole way of life to them and was therefore a major influence on
how they lived their lives. One 'practising' woman commented that she always tried to put
Islam first in everything she did, even though at times she could be distracted:
It's my life. To me my Islam is first, even everything that is going on around me, I
would put Islam first. Well, I'm trying to anyway. Sometimes Eastenders takes
the better of me than my Salah (she laughs). So I should really perform it on
time, but sometimes I say 'OK let me watch Eastenders first, then I'll do my
prayers'. But I should put that first. But then again we are human beings and we
are prone to errors.
Despite the importance that the majority of the Pakistani women placed on Islam, their
commitment to following Islamic laws varied considerably. Whereas six of the women felt that
Islam was not a strict religion, others stated that they found some of the Islamic laws very
difficult to keep. One of the hardest rules to maintain, many believed, was praying five times
a day, and there was a major contrast in terms of the extent to which the women prayed: four
prayed five times a day, three prayed once or twice a day, the remaining six stated that they
prayed when they could or when they needed help. The two women who considered Islam
unimportant to them did not pray at all. One young woman, who prayed only occasionally said
of her religion: 'It's difficult, automatically you say it's very important, but if it was that
important I'd actually make more of an effort to study it and understand it'. Four of the women
believed that living in Britain made it more difficult to keep the religious laws, although most
believed they maintained the ones they could. Others, who regarded themselves as
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'practising', argued that although some of the Islamic laws could be difficult to follow at first,
they had found them much easier to maintain since becoming more religious.
Many of the 'practising' women believed that to follow Islam completely involved a
huge commitment. However, such a commitment was seen as an important part of their
religious beliefs and Islamic identity. Nevertheless, although the 'practising' women were
generally seen to be more committed to their religion, for many of the other Pakistani women
allegiance to Islam was not seen to be dependent on their observance of religious laws. For
example, one woman, who did not consider herself to be a 'practising' Muslim, believed that
Islam was still important to her because it was more than just a religion:
It's very important because this is our basic education. I think that our children
should have that basic education of Islam because it's a part of our life. No
doubt we don't practise that much, but our religion is not very strict. I mean it
does say that you have to pray five times, but if you don't get time you can pray
at night. And it's the same for fasting; it's meant so that you can feel the poverty
of the poor. So I think we should have a basic knowledge of Islam because it is
a part of life, you can't say that it's just a religion.
Consequently, Islam was seen as an important part of life for the majority of Pakistanis in
Britain, and all but one of the Pakistani women in my sample believed that Islam was
important to their families. It is interesting to note that the one woman who did not consider
herself a Muslim, also stressed that Islam was of no importance to her brothers and sister.
Although she felt her mother believed to a certain extent, they had not been taught about
Islam as children. Among the other Pakistani women, the majority believed they had a good
understanding of their religion, acquired either through their parents or through formal
religious instruction. Five of the women, however, argued that some parents were too strict in
the religious teaching of their children and that they dictated laws without explaining the
reasons for them. Such an approach, they believed, often had the effect of turning young
people away from Islam. Nevertheless, a good knowledge of their religion was considered
very important for the maintenance of Islam among the second and third generation. Only by
having this knowledge and understanding, they argued, could young people decide for
themselves the importance of Islam to their lives.
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The views of the Turkish Cypriot women about Islam showed a marked contrast to
that of the Pakistani women. Three considered their religion to be quite important to them;
the other twelve did not regard it as important at all. It is interesting to note that the three
women who considered Islam to be quite important were also the oldest by some years, all
being in their forties and fifties and all three women had come to Britain as children 1 . One of
these women felt that it was important to believe in something, although in her opinion she
did not keep the religious laws, but she did fast when she could and she prayed once a day.
Another believed that it was important for Turkish Cypriots to maintain their religion because
'if they lose it, they also lose their identity'. She also believed that she had become more
religious since she had got older. According to a different informant:
I believe in my own religion. I don't believe in any religion as orthodox, I don't
believe in any religion that is very very strict; that I believe is wrong. I believe that
religion should be set so that people have guidelines to live a good life. As soon
as religion takes over your life, like you have to cover your head, that's not right.
The very extreme religions are beginning to take over in the world, which is a
shame, because that is to me not being a Muslim.
This comment again reiterates some of the views of the Turkish Cypriots outlined in the
previous chapter, that many Muslims were considered too strict in their interpretation of
Islam, and used it to suppress Muslim women. Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, these
three women still believed that Islam was 'quite important' to them, because it represented
another element of their Turkish Cypriot identity.
However, for the majority of Turkish Cypriot women religion was not important to
their lives at all, and many did not consider themselves Muslims. As one young woman
commented: 'it doesn't bother me, religion's not a big thing for me. I think I believe in God in
my own way, I don't need someone to tell me how to'. Most of the women were highly critical
of Islam, and especially the way it was practised by many Muslims, believing that some had
manipulated it for their own ends. For example:
All of the women mentioned the increase in religious observance among Pakistani and
Turkish Cypriot people as they grew older; but whereas the Pakistani women viewed this
positively as 'a natural and inevitable progression', the Turkish Cypriot women were largely
more cynical, they felt the older generation were merely scared and therefore it did not
represent a genuine commitment to Islam.
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I feel that would be a problem for me to say that I was a Muslim. I mean I know
very little about the religion and what I do know I don't agree with, but there must
be some good sides to it, there are so many Muslims. I just don't like the way it's
been operated in the past, the way it pressurises really, but that's a cultural thing
anyway, because they take that and they manipulate it, they use it however they
want, so no, I wouldn't say I was a Muslim.
Furthermore, all of the women stressed that Turkish Cypriots tended to be 'very relaxed' in
their approach to religion, and they did not see it playing a large or important role within the
Turkish Cypriot communities either in Britain or Cyprus. Indeed several believed that their
own lack of allegiance to Islam was largely a result of this. As one woman explained:
It's different for people who're from Turkish villages; they're more in touch with
their religion. Because we didn't have it from our parents, and we're not getting
in from school either, so how are we expected to know it's difficult? It's difficult to
say I'm Muslim, I don't even know when Bayram is.
The greater religiosity of people from Turkey was mentioned by all of the Turkish Cypriot
women, although a few stressed that there were major differences among people there, with
those from the East and the villages considered more traditional and more strict in their
observance of Islam than those from the West. Furthermore, most of the women mentioned
the rise of religion in Turkey, of which they were all highly critical, believing it to be detrimental
to the development of the country as a whole. The following comment is typical of most of the
responses:
I feel Turkey's a lost cause at the moment. I mean, if they're going to become a
lot more religious, I don't think it's for the benefit of Turkey, I think it's a way, it's
going backward. It's going in that direction at the moment, but I don't think it's
right. It's not a way forward, but I think the politics in Turkey are a shambles
anyway and I think they're seeing Islam as a way out, as a way to save them,
because there's no other way out, but I don't think it's the right way.
For the majority of the Turkish Cypriot women, therefore, commitment to Islam was seen as
neither important nor particularly desirable.
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The Importance of Islam to the Second Generation
The majority of the women interviewed believed that Islam was becoming more popular in
Britain, and many mentioned the number of black and native British people who had
converted to Islam in the last few years. In relation to the second and third generation,
however, they were more divided in their views. Some of the Pakistani women argued that
although Islam was still an important part of life for Pakistanis in Britain, and most young
Pakistanis still believed, they were generally much less strict in their observance of Islam. It
was argued that many more young people were going out with members of the opposite sex,
girls were wearing make-up, and many young people were drinking, smoking and generally
becoming more 'western' in their lifestyles. Several of the Pakistani women argued that most
of the second generation had lost touch with Islam as they adapted to living in a different
environment with different norms and values.
Six of the Pakistani women pointed out that although some of the second and third
generation were taking a greater interest in their religion, very few practised it to any great
extent. Many young people, and particularly young men, were still drinking, smoking and
going out with girls. Their interest in Islam, it was argued, stemmed from the fact that it had
become fashionable in Britain. One young woman argued that it was difficult for young people
to stick to their religion when they had been brought up in a western country. Another,
commented on her own experience, felt that some of the second generation were beginning
to take more of an interest in Islam through the constant questioning they receive from non-
Muslims, although she also pointed out that some young people were very committed to their
religion. Such differences, she argued were largely results of how they had been brought up
and the experiences they had had in their lives:
I would say there's an interest in it. I think there are people like me who are fed
up with having to kind of explain themselves. And then we explain ourselves and
we don't always have the answers. Because we need to find out more, so you're
ready the next time. So I think there's an interest that's kind of developed like
that, through a negative way. I mean my Muslim friends; they're pretty much
relaxed about the whole thing. They're not first and foremost Muslims; it's not
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something that they're always pushing. But I know there are people of my
generation who are like that, who are very very secure about their faith and
where they stand in their faith. And that is their priority and they will assert that
first and foremost. It really depends on how you've been brought up, on what's
been around you and your experiences.
Another felt that although some of the second generation had drifted away from their religion
because of the influence of 'western' culture, the third generation had much clearer views
about Islam and consequently their beliefs were much stronger than those of the second
generation. Several of my Pakistani informants pointed out that many young people take a
greater interest in their religion as they get older. They felt that at school many young people
turn away from their religion because of the influence of peers. However, after leaving school
they begin to think more for themselves and subsequently return to Islam. Many may return
to their religion when they have children of their own, as they recognise the importance of
passing Islamic values on to the next generation. In addition, one woman stated that there
were a lot more facilities available now for the teaching of Islam, and that many more parents
were sending their children to the mosque to learn about their religion.
Indeed, many of the Pakistani women felt they were more religious than they had
been in their youth. Some had rebelled in their teens and returned to Islam recently. One
woman stated that she had become interested in Islam at university and had started to wear
the hijab; she realised then that religion was the most important thing to her. Another had
lived what she described as a very 'western' lifestyle - drinking, smoking and going to pubs
and clubs. However, she had felt that there was something missing in her life and became
interested in Islam as a result. She now wears the hijab and feels that religion is everything to
her. Another young Pakistani told of her experience:
Islam and religion was very much forced onto me, and the messages I received
were quite negative and this is why I rebelled so much. It wasn't until basically I
got married that I learnt more about Islam in its purity rather than the culture
wrapped around it.
All of those who considered themselves 'practising' Muslims, believed that the increase in the
popularity of Islam had come about through a desire for greater spirituality among many
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people, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. One young 'practising' woman, who worked for a
Muslim women's counselling service, argued that many people were looking for something
more in their lives, and turning to Islam as a result:
I think there's also a desire for spirituality. You may have a career, you may
have a family, you may have material desires that are fulfilled, so what's next? If
you are going through a lot of problems, conflict within yourself, and in society,
the only way to solve it and to develop is to find spirituality and that can help you
move forward, rather than remain in your situation forever.
Another 'practising' woman reiterated this view:
Three years ago I wouldn't have known what's happening around me because I
wasn't aware of it, but you know three years, up to now, suddenly there has
been an influx of converters and also awakenings of Muslims. Also youngsters
who we never ever thought would go into Islam, because parents are such
traditionalists, you know, their values were exactly the same. I mean my parents'
values weren't exactly Islamic, they didn't implement that. And suddenly these
youngsters are becoming believers and practising and they're propagating. You
know, suddenly, this has all happened in three years. Where have these people
come from? There hasn't been any institutions who have implemented this. It
has been like me; suddenly I got up one day and decided that I didn't want to do
those things that I was doing in my life. Now who has given this to me? No
teaching came to me, no Imam has come to me, no religious group have
approached me, no person has come to me and propagated to me and yet
suddenly I was in my own home and I became what I am today. So I feel that
today if Allah has given me that, he has given it to all the youngsters in the
colleges and universities.
Five of the Pakistani women pointed out that many of the second and third generation were
asserting their Muslim identity more than any other, as they considered it more relevant to
their lives than a Pakistani or British identity. As a 'practising' woman commented:
A lot of my friends who are Muslim, they don't feel comfortable with being
Pakistani, they are not fully connected with it, and they're not fully connected
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with the English, British background. So being Muslim really connects you to a
brotherhood or sisterhood which is universal, and where everyone has a
common element. I mean you don't have to be English, Pakistani, Irish,
whatever, you are connected to all these people through one common thing. It
gives you a place; it gives you somewhere to be comfortable.
In this way, a Muslim identity and the notion of Muslim unity that goes with it, can be seen as
providing many young Pakistanis with a universal foundation for identity that does not rely on
allegiance to a specific place (Scantlebury 1995, Jacobson 1997,1 998). It offers, as many of
the Pakistani women pointed out, a universal set of prescriptions that encompasses all
aspects of daily life, as well as a sense of belonging to the world-wide Muslim community, the
umma. However, as Lewis (1994) argues, the perception of a Muslim identity does not
necessarily translate into an Islamic identity, that is, it is not necessarily dependent on
religious observance. Many of the Pakistani women felt that although more young people
were placing a greater emphasis on their religion, only a small minority was committed to
'practising' the Islamic laws. Indeed, most of the women themselves were not strict in their
observance of Islamic laws, despite the importance they placed on their religion. While the
overwhelming majority of the Pakistani women believed that Islam was important to
themselves and to Pakistanis as a whole, opinions varied as to how many and to what extent
the second and third generation were committed to Islamic observance.
The majority of the Turkish Cypriot women also believed that Islam was becoming
more prominent among the Turkish speaking communities in Britain. However, unlike the
majority of the Pakistani informants, all of the Turkish Cypriot women took a negative view of
this increase in religiosity. They believed that the majority of the second and third generation
had little interest in religion, and consequently some thought that Islam was likely to
disappear altogether among Turkish Cypriots in Britain. According to one young woman:
I think it's like the language, as the generations go on people forget about it. I
think that's what's happened to the religion and obviously I feel like this about
Islam now, so my kids won't be taught about it from me. So I think that's how it's
become with us.
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However, while religion was considered to be of little concern to young Turkish Cypriots, they
did believe there had been a slight increase in the number of Turkish speakers 'taking it up'.
One young woman argued, like some of the Pakistani women, that more young Turkish
speakers were becoming interested in Islam because it was fashionable, although they still
drank, smoked and ate pork. Another woman who worked in a large Turkish speaking youth
centre believed that very few young people were becoming more religious. She stated that
she had never seen a woman in hijab at the centre and she knew of only two young men who
had become interested in Islam.
Although traditionally Islam had not been of much importance for Turkish Cypriot
people, One woman, who worked in a number of different areas within the Turkish speaking
communities in London, argued that with the increasing number of people from Turkey living
in Britain there had been a significant increase in Islamic activity:
I think that with their arrival, particularly in Hackney for example, the number of
mosques has increased. Whereas in the old days there was only one mosque,
and that served all purposes, and that was primarily when people died, so they
could be buried according to the laws of Islam. Recently the increase of Islamic
activity and the coalition government in Turkey, which is the Islamic party, has
began to show its influence in Britain. Because they're very well organised, they
have well trained quite intellectual people who can challenge the intellectual
issues around Islam.
The increase in such religious activity, she believed, although as yet still small, was preparing
the ground for a more substantial revival. She stated:
I think in this country the influence to Islam hasn't really been felt yet, but it's
there, it's ever present. And I think it's sort of a period of gestation, it's a matter
of time before I think it makes quite an impact in the lives of the young here.
As an atheist, she was not only concerned about this religious revival, but was also highly
critical of the way funding was 'pouring in' from other countries to fund religious facilities.
Meanwhile, other services such as those around education and women, which she
considered vital for the needs of the Turkish speaking population in London, were severely
under-funded.
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According to seven of my informants more young women were becoming interested in
Islam and covering their heads, some perhaps due to family pressure others in search of an
identity. In the words of one young woman:
I know a girl, she's from Turkey, and she's like starting to wrap up and stuff and
they're going on a pilgrimage to Mecca. I can't understand it to be honest, I think
you're only young once, you can't turn into an old woman when you're 16
basically. I think it can be through pressure from families, but as well, I think
because they are living in this country they are looking for an identity to say 'I'm
this, I'm not the same as you'. I don't know the reason for it, I think it's a lot to do
with identity, to feel that they're Muslim, Turkish, whatever, I don't know.
Whereas I don't have a problem with that, I don't need to prove myself to
anybody.
Most of the women, however, believed that it was predominantly men who were becoming
more religious, although for reasons very similar to those outlined above. As another woman
observed:
Some of the second generation are taking it up, particularly young men, more
than young women, although some young women are taking it up. I think one of
the reasons young men are taking it up is quite interesting to look at it. It's a bit
like what's happening in France, with the young children from Magreb, the
second and third generation are using it as a counter attack against racism,
which has excluded them for a long time, and also as an identity which they
want to create for themselves. So some of them are using it in that way, the
others, some young people who felt they were really, whether they try to ignore
the rejection, the rejection is there, from a racist society of their culture
whatever, no matter how much they anglicise themselves in their manners, in
their language, in their names, etc, there's that feeling that they're not really part
of the society. And I think some of them who are also going towards religion are
those young people who felt rejected by everything, including their parents. So
there's that rejection, there's a rejection from the society as a whole, they have
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been failed by the school system so they are not getting any work, jobs are
scarce, whatever.
In addition, she claimed that many young people had become involved in drugs, and were
using religion to help them fight their addiction. She speculated: 'I think some young people
have used religion to get off hard drugs. I think it is replacing one form of drug with another,
but this is the drug of religion rather than physically injecting themselves or cocaine or
whatever'. For some Turkish speaking young people, therefore, like many Pakistanis, Islam
was believed to offer them some sense of meaning in their lives; it gave them a sense of
belonging to something universal.
The disparity between the two groups of women interviewed in terms of their views
and opinions on religion seems to indicate that religious allegiance and activity are perceived
to be much higher among Pakistanis than Turkish Cypriots. Even the Turkish speakers who
were becoming more religious were predominantly considered to be people from Turkey
rather than Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, for all of the Turkish Cypriot women, it was their more
'relaxed approach to Islam' that marked them out as distinctive from people from Turkey.
Furthermore, for the Turkish Cypriots it was Cyprus that constituted a much greater influence
on their identity, as the following sections demonstrate.
The Influence of Pakistan and Cyprus
The first generation of Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani migrants, as highlighted in chapter
seven, have adapted very little to living in Britain. Pakistan or Cyprus was therefore seen as
the major focus for the first generation, with many maintaining traditional norms and values
from thirty of forty years ago, representing the Pakistan or Cyprus they left when they
migrated to Britain. This section will examine the influence of these two countries on the first,
second and successive generations, through the attitudes and experiences of the women
interviewed.
There was again a major contrast in the attitudes of the women towards their parents'
countries of origin, and towards the amount of influence each country had, particularly in
relation to the second and third generation. The obvious difference is proximity. Cyprus,
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being much nearer, is much easier and much less expensive to travel to. Consequently my
informants' visits to Cyprus were far more frequent than visits to Pakistan. Most of the
Turkish Cypriots visited Cyprus regularly; several had parents who were now living there; and
two of the older women, who had been born in Cyprus, stated that they would like to retire
there themselves. However, the majority stated that they preferred to live in London, and
believed that most of the second and third generation felt similarly. One woman had moved
to Cyprus when she was married but had returned to London after a year. She felt that she
had become accustomed to the 'hectic' city life, and it was in London that she felt at home.
This was reiterated by many of the women from both groups. One young woman who had
been to school in Pakistan for a year had enjoyed her time there, but she felt that most of the
second and third generation had little interest in Pakistan. Another described how shocked
she had been when she visited Pakistan:
It's amazing, when I went on holiday to Pakistan ten years ago, I remember how
liberated the women were there, how materialistic they were. And for me it was
a shock because here I am a humble woman, I dress very humbly. It was a
culture shock. I wasn't into parties, I wasn't into dressing beautifully all the time,
and I wasn't interested in pleasing people all the time. Over there you have to do
things, you have to dress in a particular code, you have to be good, you have to
be like your cousins and your friends and so on. And I couldn't cope with that
kind of pressure.
She felt that as a 'practising' Muslim she did not want to live her life in this very 'materialistic'
and 'ostentatious' way, as she did not believe that this was how a Muslim woman was
supposed to behave. She had subsequently come to appreciate living in Britain much more,
where she was free to focus on her religion and to practise Islam in a way she considered
appropriate and relevant to her.
The majority of the Pakistani women felt that Pakistan had little to offer the second and
third generation, whose lives were based much more in Britain. This is how one woman
explained the differences between the generations in terms of their views on Pakistan:
Well the first generation were absolutely in love with their own past because they
were missing it and were lonely and they were very patriotic and nationalistic.
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The second generation were sceptic, they went and they were hoping they
would go and settle there, they wouldn't even settle in this country because they
wanted to go back and enjoy life there. But found out by going there, they
couldn't come to terms with it, and they found they couldn't adjust there. The
third generation doesn't have any nationalism and patriotism, for them it's United
Kingdom all the way; that's their country. You talk about Pakistan and they say
'what do you want to talk about Pakistan for?'
All of the women considered Pakistan to be of little interest to the second and third
generation who had now come to regard Britain as their home. Consequently their main
orientation was to life in Britain. Indeed, many of the informants felt similarly; and none
believed that they could live in Pakistan.
For the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, the influence of Cyprus was still
considered to be very strong in Britain, and many of the women interviewed were actively
involved in campaigning around issues to do with Cyprus. Although many of the women felt
that events in Cyprus were still very important for the first and second generation, some
argued that many young people merely viewed it as somewhere to go for a cheap holiday. In
the words of a young woman:
The thing with Cyprus is you go there a lot because it's cheap, you can go there,
just pay your flight and stay there with family and have a nice Mediterranean
holiday basically. Whereas if you went somewhere else you'd have to pay for the
hotel and that. That's why people go a lot. It's like me, I'd rather go somewhere
else basically, I like to go to other places and I've only been back twice.
Another, who worked with Turkish speaking young people, believed that most had little
knowledge of, or interest in, events in Cyprus: 'at the end of the day Cyprus did very little for
the young people there, that's why a lot of them came over here basically, for a better life.
And a lot of them don't look back basically'. However, she did feel that many young people
were now gaining a greater knowledge of Cyprus because of the influence of the
supplementary schools:
For the majority, Cyprus was considered to have a significant influence on all Cypriots
in Britain. One woman stated: 'I can say it from my community that any coverage of Cyprus
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within the British media or Turkish media, it's just a quick major instinct to stop what you're
doing and take in what's happening'. Another woman reiterated this view:
They do, very strongly, because like the newspapers from Turkey and Cyprus
are sold here daily, you have cable TV, where you get news continuously, you
get Turkish Radio which promotes and says what is going on. As well as the fact
that people congregate, the fact that there are political party extensions here,
there are the frequent visits backwards and forwards, there are Turkish
newspapers published here. So they are very much affected, and the political
distinctions and party gatherings also continue here. The majority of people are
very aware of what goes on and very influenced by it. But very interestingly also,
it perpetuates some of the myths, the young people adopt some of the
mythology from parents, about the conflicts between the English and Turks in
Cyprus for example. Without having any first hand experience, or even
questioning it or analysing it, they adopt it as truth. Which is sad for me,
because they have different experiences in this country, they have Greek
friends.
Cyprus was therefore considered to have a major influence on Turkish Cypriots in Britain,
including many of the second and third generation 2. This influence, as chapter seven
highlighted, also affected their relationships with other minority ethnic groups in Britain,
particularly in relation to Greek Cypriots and people from Turkey. The perceived differences
that Turkish Cypriots emphasised in relation to these groups, confirming their identity as a
distinct ethnic minority and subsequently reinforcing the boundaries of their ethnicity.
There were, therefore, quite significant differences between the two groups of
women in relation to their perceptions of the relative importance of Pakistan and Cyprus. The
extent to which these differential degrees of influence on the part of Pakistan and Cyprus
affect the maintenance of ethnicity and of traditional values and patterns of behaviour is
examined in the following sections.
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The Maintenance of Ethnic Heritages
The different amount of influence that each group ascribed to Pakistan and Cyprus in relation
to the second and third generation, together with their differential citing of culture or religion
as the basis of patriarchal norms and values that restricted women within their communities,
might lead one to expect a significant contrast between the two groups in terms of their views
on the maintenance of their cultural heritages.
As the previous section indicated, Pakistan was considered to have little influence on
the second and third generation. Consequently, the majority of the Pakistani women believed
that their British identity was becoming increasingly important to the third generation. Several
of the women, as highlighted earlier, believed that many young people were emphasising
their Muslim identity as primary, because it provided a universal sense of belonging that was
not dependent on allegiance to a particular country or place. In addition, it offered a universal
set of norms and values covering all aspects of life, which enabled young people to navigate
the contradictions and conflicts, they experienced living with two cultural systems. However, a
Muslim identity was not the only strategy young people were believed to be adopting to
encompass their differing and often conflicting experiences. Instead, many young people
were coming to identify themselves as British Asians. In the words of one Pakistani woman:
They say British Asians. They say British first, but Asian afterwards. I said to my
son 'You're a coconut, white from inside, black from outside'. That's what they
all are actually. They're born in this country, they don't know what the Asian or
Pakistani or Indian thing is all about. I mean we ourselves have not been able to
accept going back again and seeing everything there. We couldn't fit there,
where are they going to fit in?
Consequently, she believed that many of the third generation were losing their traditional
Pakistani norms and values and adapting their lives much more to the British environment.
To others, however, the ascription of a British Asian identity was seen as a way of
acknowledging the importance of the ethnic heritage that they shared with other Asian
groups, while at the same time recognising their allegiance to Britain as their home. Many of
2 As Kucukcan (1999) points out, concern over the Cypriot issue is central to both Turkish
Cypriots and people from Turkey.
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the women believed that the second and third generations' experiences of different cultural
norms and values living in Britain did not mean that they would necessarily abandon their
culture, or that they would experience an identity crisis; most could identify 'quite happily' with
both. One of the Pakistani women explained:
I don't really think they're suffering from an identity crisis to be honest. For some
people, they have an identity crisis because they haven't got both cultures. Most
Asians who have both East and West values, they know where they belong, yes
they do. They know exactly where they belong, like myself, I should say, I mean
I can identify with both.
Similarly, the Turkish Cypriot women also believed that the second generation utilised
elements of both British and Turkish Cypriot cultural norms and values. As one young woman
commented:
I mean we're here, we should take something from this society. I mean maybe
I'm being contradictory, I'm taking what I like from the British, I'm taking what I
like from the Turkish. I mean there's bits I do like and bits I don't like and I'm
sort of utilising both. I mean stuff like marriage, for instance. OK, yes, I do want
to get married but I don't want an arranged marriage. I would actually like to
know someone before I marry them; I would like to have been living with them.
But how could I do that? It's confusing as well.
However, in terms of the third generation, she felt that they would generally become more
British in their lifestyles and less Turkish. Others, however, pointed out that although most of
the second generation tended to utilise aspects of both cultural systems, it was the third
generation that was most comfortable with this.
The influence of both British and Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot cultural values and
traditions was evident in the lifestyles of the women interviewed. Most of the women felt that
their home life was fairly equally divided between British and Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot
customs and traditions. They believed that because they had been brought up in Britain they
had subsequently taken on many British cultural values and behavioural patterns, however,
they stifi maintained certain aspects of their parents' traditions and cultural values. As a fifty
year old Turkish Cypriot woman reported:
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Well it's half-and-half I think. I mean you live in a country you have to adapt in
everything; otherwise, you become very isolated, you become very stressed and
everything. We do try to keep our culture, but you have to adapt to English as
well, especially when you have children, otherwise you can't live in the same
house.
This view was reiterated by the majority of the women, who felt that it was important to keep
some elements of their cultural heritages to pass on to their children. Nevertheless, as
highlighted in chapter seven, they also believed that it was necessary to adapt to living in
British society, and to provide a balance between the two socio-cultural systems.
Those still living with parents, or in some cases those who had parents living with
them, tended to maintain more traditional Turkish or Pakistani customs. When asked to
describe her cultural life at home, where she lived with her parents, one young Turkish
Cypriot woman stated: 'Some things I think are pretty Turkish but other things are not.
Sometimes obviously we argue with our parents about this'. Living at home she felt that she
was obliged to 'be more Turkish' than she might otherwise choose to be if she was living on
her own or was married. Nevertheless, she felt that her parents' traditional values were still
important to her, and that she would wish to maintain certain traditions and customs. Another
Turkish Cypriot woman, who was separated from her husband, also felt that she maintained
aspects of Turkish culture to a greater extent because her mother lived with her and the
children:
I mean if I was on my own with my kids I'd be more European, but my mum is
very old fashioned, you know, she's very 'you can't wear shorts, don't wear
make-up', you know, she's very behind because that's the way she was brought
up. That's why I 'm saying, when our kids grow up they're going to be completely
different. But there is a lot of the Turkish side, what you wear, what you cook,
what you eat, you know, is all based on that sort of side.
A few of the women felt that their home life was far more English culturally, and some
of the 'practising' Pakistani women felt that they maintained few Pakistani traditions, but
followed a more Islamic framework, infused with various aspects of British culture. In terms of
influences that they felt were especially English, many mentioned such things as
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entertainment and leisure activities, as well as things like food and dress. The majority of the
women celebrated Christmas to a certain extent, although some simply because it was a
time when all the family was at home, unlike Eid or Bayram, when most of the family would
still be working. In terms of influences that they felt were especially Turkish or Pakistani, they
mentioned music, dinner dances, weddings and religious celebrations. Food was one of the
major influences for both groups. As a Turkish Cypriot woman commented:
Just the food really, my cooking, that's it really nothing else (she laughs). I don't
look at myself as anglicised and I don't look at myself as a normal Turkish
Cypriot; I just regard myself as a person first, and then maybe my culture goes
into it. It's just he fact that I do like food, and I learnt cooking from my mum, so
that's the only reason.
These comments illustrate the extent to which the second generation have adapted and
changed their lifestyles in comparison to the first generation. All of the women felt that it was
important and necessary to adapt to some of the British traditional cultural values, but this did
not mean that it was necessary for Turkish Cypriots and Pakistanis to abandon their parents'
traditional values and customs completely. Consequently, all of the women, like most of the
second and third generation, felt comfortable with this 'mixing' of cultural values, which they
utilised in different ways and in different contexts.
Some of the informants felt that many of the second generation were taking a renewed
interest in their religion and/or culture, as they grew older. A Pakistani woman in her forties
stated, 'we have been enjoying our lives exactly the way we wanted, now we're running back
to ourselves, because you know when you grow up you revert back to your own selves
again'. Others pointed out that as people became older and parental pressure had
decreased, the second generation was able to appreciate their culture and/or religion to a
much greater extent. A young Turkish Cypriot woman stated that she had hated being
Turkish when she was at school, but since leaving and especially since working within some
of the Turkish speaking communities, her parents' traditional values had become much more
important to her:
I mean we try to adapt to the British way of life, yet try to keep our culture,
preserve our culture. But with the pressure I think we become even more
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confused. I remember when I was 18, 19 I used to hate being Turkish (she
laughs), you know, because I was never allowed out, even at school when I was
13, 14, never allowed out and I used to say 'Oh, I hate being Turkish', you know.
But obviously you realise that there's more to life than that, when you get a bit
older, it's important to preserve your culture.
Many of the women believed that the majority of the second and third generation did come to
appreciate their ethnic heritages more, in the same way as some of the Pakistani women had
developed a greater commitment to Islam as they grew older and their priorities changed.
They believed that although many of the traditional Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot values and
customs were being modified and adapted in Britain, the core elements would still be
maintained by most of the younger generation. Some of the 'practising' Pakistani women,
however, hoped that many of the traditional cultural values would be replaced by more
Islamic-based values, providing a more Islamic Pakistani heritage. While some Pakistani and
Turkish Cypriot customs and traditions were beginning to fade in Britain, the key elements
were still being maintained.
Many of the Turkish Cypriot women, however, argued that far from fading, aspects of
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 'cultures' were becoming much more prominent in Britain. One
woman pointed out that Turkish cultural traditions were now experiencing revival as a direct
result of the arrival of more Turks in Britain:
I don't think they're fading to be honest, I think they're resurging more now.
Because there's a lot of Turkish people coming into this country, all the
weddings are starting again, every week there's a dinner and dance. It's like
there's something on every week now, whereas in the late eighties, it was
fading, it was like there was nothing basically and they were more embracing
English culture, but now I think it's resurging. I mean now you walk through
Haringey, before it used to be all Greek shops, now it's all Turkish shops
basically. And Green Lanes, it used to be traditionally Cypriot, it's not now: it's
Kurds and Turks.
Although the second generation had lost much of their parent's culture and had become very
'western', the third generation were finding their cultural heritages again. As a twenty-year-old
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Turkish Cypriot pointed out, comparing her own experiences at school to those of young
people now.
I think before when I was at school, you weren't proud to be Turkish. It was like,
you know, if you're Turkish it means your parents don't let you go out, it means
you can't have boyfriends, it means you don't drink, you don't smoke, you know,
you're parents are really strict. But now there's not so much of that, because
there are more Turkish people, it's like there's a lot of people you can relate to.
Before, like when I was young, it was like everybody was acting English, acting
black, basically being into hiphop and that. It's not like that anymore. There's
more, you know, 'I'm into Turkish things, I like my culture', but before you
wanted to be something that you weren't, you wanted to have more in common
with your English friends, and you would change your name. I had a different
name at school; well I was called Emma. People don't have that anymore. All
my friends were like that, we used to change our names, my sister was Aisha.
It's not like that any more, you admit, you didn't like not admit it, but you would
adapt to being English, basically. But kids don't do that any more, they don't
need to I don't think.
Many pointed out that Turkish 'cultures' had 'almost been lost' in Britain, but there now
seemed to be a 'new sense of pride' about their 'culture'. One woman, who worked in a large
Turkish speaking youth centre, believed that the main reason for this cultural revival was the
influence of Turkish television, bringing Turkey back into many homes.
But now that's all coming back and I think that's mainly due to the fact, and this
is very important I think, that Turkish television plays a big role in promoting
Turkishness amongst young people. it's played such a big role in attitude. I
mean when Turkish television first came along, we thought 'oh no, turn it off'.
But now we look forward to the Turkish programmes in the evening. It's made a
very big difference in our community, a very big difference. It's promoted their
culture, not so much their religion, but the culture, and the fact that you do get
really sort of high fashion imagery from Turkey and it's not such an uncool
place. It's just brought Turkey back into their home, in a fun way.
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AU of the Turkish Cypriot women mentioned the influence of Turkish satellite television,
and many felt that this had played a vital role in fostering a positive Turkish identity amongst
young people. As one woman commented:
The fact that you now have television, cable TV, I think it was quite an eye-
opener for the younger generation to realise that their parents' version of what
Turkish culture is, isn't actually what the reality is, because they can see on
television that's not the case. There are women who wear bikinis, and there are
women who dress in certain ways, and do certain jobs. As well as they can see
this in reality because they can go back and meet those people who are lawyers
and doctors, go to discos etc. So their parents created this world from their
history and cultural background, but that is no longer the case. And the kids can
see it with their own eyes; they don't have to take their parents' word for it. So in
a way, Satellite TV has led to a shattering of all those ideas, that father and
mother know best, and that you do what I say because I know best, because
this is how it is in Cyprus, or this is how it is in Turkey. it is no Jonger valid for the
kids. So it's kind of nice, I like it. It can cause some problems, but it's good.
Turkish Cypriot young people, it was argued, were using this increased knowledge of Turkish
cultural lifestyles that they had gained from watching Turkish television to question their
parents' traditional norms and values. In a similar way that many Pakistani young people
were using their increased knowledge of Islam to challenge their parents' cultural values,
which they felt inappropriate to their lives in Britain.
Turkish music was another area that many of the Turkish Cypriot women mentioned.
Young people were allegedly becoming much more interested in Turkish music than was
common when the informants were younger, largely as a result of the influence of Turkish
television, but also, as one young woman pointed out, because the tapes and CDs were so
much cheaper:
Like before you would never admit that you were into Turkish music, because it
was like 'oh my God, you sad person', but now all the young people they go to
all the concerts when the singers come over. Because before it was like more
old fashioned, it was like the arabesque music, it was like oh my God, and it was
231
the most depressing music on earth basically. But now it's like pop music,
Turkish pop music and good-looking stars and they've got the satellite, and it's
like everybody's getting in to it. And even though we haven't got it, we're still in to
it as well. And the tapes are really cheap basically, you buy an English CD for
£15, a Turkish one's £3, so it's a big difference.
A youth worker also believed that Turkish music had become a lot more popular in the youth
centre, among the young people, and there were even Turkish raves now which would have
been unheard of when she was at school:
It's surprising, because when I was young we thought it was so uncool to listen
to Turkish music. So Turkish young people are getting more into it. There are
Turkish raves, that was unknown ten years ago, it would have been so uncool to
go to a Turkish rave. The DJ downstairs he used to do like lots of English raves,
he's been doing it for years, and now most of his records are Turkish, because
that's what he gets requested. It's amazing I think, It's very much like the
Bhangra scene, but I would say we're about ten years behind. It's changing.
They've created their own culture, sort of fused it with what's happening here.
And because of the Turkish television coming into their homes, it's not all culture
and Turkishness; it's something new. They're actually influenced by America
and Italy and places like that. So some things are completely new and different.
Another woman reiterated this point that the music was not just about simply adopting
something from Turkey, but fusing with other music forms that they had experienced living in
Britain:
There are some younger people who are actually generating their own music
here which is very much influenced by other ethnic minority music particular
from the black communities, African Caribbean origin, and rap music from the
States which is kind of an expression of living in the ghettos, rebel music. That is
very much with the younger generation here.
This synthesising of different cultural elements was not solely confined to the area of
music, but to their lives in general, as many of the women pointed out. They believed that the
younger generation were not abandoning their parents' culture, or finding themselves torn
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between two cultures (contra Anwar 1979), but were creating a new culture and identity for
themselves in Britain. An identity that not only represented a synthesis of their experiences
and their influences that they considered important to them, but also one that suited their own
personal needs and aspirations.
The Pakistani women also believed that the younger generation was forging a new
identity for themselves in Britain, fusing together aspects of their parents' cultures, British
cultures and Islamic values. In the opinion of a Pakistani woman:
They've been brought up in a certain way, I don't think it's an adaptation, it's a
case of finding their own identity. Look at what they've learnt from their parents'
and their culture and religious background, and what they have learnt from
British backgrounds' and their religious background. Islam tells you to learn.
But at the same time these new identities also reflected the differing experiences of these
young people. Each individual was utilising different elements according to their own specific
needs. As a young Pakistani woman commented:
The children attend an English school and they meet with other Muslim, Asian or
English friends, so I think the new generation are in a different position to the
older generation. That doesn't mean that they want to give up their culture or
anything, but they do like to have the best, and decide what is the best for them.
What's the best for me might not be the best for someone else. We all have
different needs, and our needs are different. I am a Muslim and at the same
time I am a Pakistani, but also at the same time I live here, so you take the best
of the three.
Second and third generation Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots are therefore synthesising
aspects of their cultural heritages with those they have experienced in Britain, actively
creating new cultural patterns and identities based on their own individual needs and
aspirations.
However, as a Turkish Cypriot woman argued, much of this changing and synthesising
of traditional cultures is often criticised by parents and established institutions generally
because they think they have the monopoly on traditional culture:
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So I think the culture is changing, and it's changing maybe in the ways that
parents don't understand, or may not like. But the parents were in a similar
position when they were growing up, their parents didn't like what they were
interested in or the way they were changing. And this is partly because of the
intolerance or some people who actually think they have a monopoly on what
culture is. Not only parents, I'm also talking about established institutions:
religion may say this is what culture is, or classical music may say this is what
culture is. And when we talk about the culture of Britain, or cultures, we can't just
talk about one culture. And the danger is that you try and straightjacket
communities who share a language, as sharing one single culture which is
impossible.
As this comment illustrates, cultures can not be viewed as static and homogeneous entities,
which represent a particular place and its people. Cultural heritages are always diverse,
always multifaceted, and always in a process of transition. The fusing of different cultural
elements on the part of the younger generation, therefore, represents their experiences of
other traditions and cultural values growing up in British society, as well as a commitment to
certain elements of Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot cultural traditions and values. As Anwar
(1998) and Kucukcan (1999) argue, they represent both continuity and change in the lives of
the second and third generation.
The Importance of Mother Tongue Languages
The maintenance of mother tongue languages is often viewed as an indication of ethnic
allegiance, and is believed to be one of the first elements to disappear over the generations
among migrants. For all of the informants, the maintenance of mother tongue languages
among future generations of Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain was considered
important. Some felt that it was vital in order to keep in touch with relatives in Pakistan or
Cyprus, others felt that it was a way of passing on elements of their cultural heritages to their
children. According to a young Turkish Cypriot, for example: 'I think it is important because
you have to preserve your culture and obviously the language is part of the culture'. In
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addition, the inability of some young people to speak and understand their parents' language
was believed to lead to a lack of communication between parents and children, and
subsequently to a lack of understanding for the second generation of their religion and
culture.
There was a significant contrast here between the two groups in terms of the number
of languages spoken and the degree of fluency. Among the Pakistani women, the majority
spoke Urdu to some extent, but several of the women also spoke Punjabi and one could
speak Arabic as well. Indeed many of these women could read Arabic in order to study the
Qur'an in its original language, but only one of the Pakistani women could understand or
translate it. The others relied instead on the English translation. Two of the women had been
to school in Pakistan and were therefore fluent in Urdu; one had also taken Urdu at GCSE
and A-level. All but one of the remaining women could speak Urdu to some degree although
few could read or write it. One of the women spoke no other languages at all; her parents
were from mixed ethnic backgrounds, her father from Pakistan and her mother from
Malaysia. They had always spoken English in the home. All the Turkish Cypriot women spoke
Turkish and could read and write it to a certain extent. One young woman also spoke Greek.
Her mother had come from a bi-communal village and preferred speaking Greek to Turkish.
Five of the women considered themselves fluent in Turkish, and two of these stated that they
were bilingual. One of these women had been to school in Cyprus; the other had lived there
for a year after her marriage.
Generally it was believed that the majority of the second generation can speak their
mother tongue, but to a limited extent. In addition, although the majority of women spoke
mainly Urdu, Punjabi or Turkish to their parents, and often used it in their work, they very
rarely spoke it with friends or siblings. Several of the women said that they felt a great loss at
not being able to speak Urdu or Turkish fluently. As a Pakistani woman lamented:
I feel the loss inside me, because when I am with the Asian community I feel
that they make fun of me when I speak Punjabi or Urdu because they are
obviously more equipped and more versatile. And I just happen to say
something which is not the right word, you see. And I feel as if I am illiterate.
And if you want to work with an organisation or want to go back you are at a loss
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because you can't mix with them so much. I feel that when I'm with the Asians
who have the know-how of the language, I do feel inferior to them, very much.
No matter how educated I feel I am, I am totally out of touch. And when they
speak to each other using different speeches I am on a different level because I
don't understand. So I feel sad, we should have that language.
Furthermore, many of the women felt that although they were keen to teach their children
Turkish or Urdu, their own inability to speak the language properly meant that the third
generation would have even greater difficulties learning it. They felt that it was important for
Urdu, Punjabi or Turkish to be spoken in the home in order that the younger generation could
become more familiar with it.
However, although many of the women were concerned that their mother tongue
might be lost with the third or fourth generation as a result of their own lack of knowledge,
several felt that with the increase in supplementary schools for Pakistani and Turkish
speaking young people many of the third generation were now learning Urdu or Turkish to a
far greater degree than their parents. As one woman suggested:
(think maybe we've lost one generation, my generation for example didn't have
the opportunities that are around now because there weren't as many Turkish
people and most of the families who came here in the fifties and sixties were
struggling to survive. But the next generation, like my children's generation, are
far luckier because we've got the schools, we know more about it, we speak
both languages, whereas our parents didn't speak both languages, so it was
difficult to find out where to get information. But now this generation has my
children for example, my older daughter did A-level in Turkish, she passed that.
Her Turkish is much better than mine, technically speaking. I speak slang
Turkish; she speaks far more what the proper Turkish is. She corrects me,
which for me, I mean I never thought that my children would one day grow up
and have that Turkish language on that level, which is wonderful. But that is
because of these voluntary groups that are around, and it is possible.
One of the Turkish Cypriot women had been directly responsible for setting up some of
the first Turkish supplementary schools in London, and establishing O-level/GCSE and A-
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level classes in Turkish. She argued that many of the second generation, who are now
parents themselves, are encouraging their children to learn Turkish; for them to attend
supplementary school was a way of maintaining the culture. She felt that such classes have
been vital for young people: 'it was important because it gave self-confidence to the kids.
These kids who would not even have thought about being GCE, in those days, material; they
were able to pass in Turkish, which gave them a confidence and a boost about being able to
tackle other classes and other subjects'. Since this time, the number of Turkish
supplementary schools has grown significantly in London, and many of the young people
seem as keen as their parents to learn Turkish. She stated:
I think for some kids, that's almost like an assertion that they're different and
they're OK being different. It's an assertion against racism, the racism of the
school system for example, which still does not allow bilingual children the
space to be comfortable with their language or value it. The message that is
given to the kids is you're not OK speaking your mother-tongue, and for some
kids that's almost like claiming that, and creating almost like a sub-culture, a
youth culture, in wanting to maintain their language and wanting to exert that
feeling of identity. And also at times, what always happens in sub-cultures, is
that when they're talking to their friends, they get a buzz talking in a language
that the teacher doesn't understand. So there are a lot of reasons for kids to go,
apart from the parental reasons for sending kids.
Language was considered one of the many ways in which a greater pride in being Turkish or
Turkish Cypriot was being expressed by young people. Several mentioned that although they
would never have spoken Turkish at school themselves, it was becoming more common in
recent years. Young Turkish speaking people no longer felt embarrassed about being
Turkish or felt they had to hide it as many of the women claimed they had felt. However, as
one bilingual woman shrewdly observed, although for some speaking Turkish was seen as
an affirmation of their identity and of their cultural heritages, this was not reflected in their
desire to acquire information in Turkish. Thus, as she pointed out: 'There is quite an
interesting dilemma there, their opinions are formed without having total access and
command of the language'.
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Although both the Pakistani and the Turkish Cypriot women considered the
maintenance of language to be important, the Turkish Cypriots seemed to be much more
certain about its survival. Generally second and third generation Turkish Cypriots seem to
have a greater command of Turkish. An advice worker for a Turkish speaking youth centre
argued that this was largely because the Turkish-speaking community was so tightly knit, and
because many of the young people eventually ended up working within their own
communities, often in family run businesses or shops. In addition, it could also be argued that
because Cyprus is very near and fairly inexpensive to travel to, young Turkish Cypriots tend
to visit quite regularly. This is also likely to improve their language skills.
However, it is also important to point out that although Urdu is the official language of
Pakistan, it is estimated that only one-tenth of the population use it as their first language.
Punjabi is spoken by about half of all households, with Pashto, Sindhi, Saraiki, and Baluchi
also spoken by many people. For many Pakistanis, therefore, it is not simply a case of
learning two languages, Urdu and English, but often three or four, Punjabi being spoken by
many of the first generation, as well as learning Arabic for religious translation. Such diversity
is bound to lead to a 'watering down' of language acquisition on the part of Pakistani young
people. What language tuition is available in the Madrassahs and some of the Pakistani
centres, is always Urdu, which is often a language with which the second and third
generation is unfamiliar. Nevertheless, the views of the women on the decreasing influence
of Pakistan on the younger generation, and the fact that visits to the country are becoming
much less frequent, may also be a contributing factor to the lack of interest in learning Urdu
on the part of young Pakistanis.
Identity and Belonging
As highlighted earlier, the Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani informants displayed significant
contrasts in terms of their attitudes and opinions towards their religion and their parents'
countries of origin. At the end of the interview the women were asked 'Which of the following
do you most identify with?' The categories included Pakistani, Asian or Turkish, Turkish
Cypriot, Cypriot, British and Muslim. The responses to this question again reiterate the major
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contrast between the two groups of women. All but two of the Pakistani women felt that being
Muslim was the most important part of their identity. One considered themselves to be first
and foremost Asian, and another felt that the most specific she could be in defining herself
was a 'Pakistani Black Briton'. Among the Turkish Cypriot women on the other hand, twelve
considered their Turkish Cypriot identity to be the most important to them, two stressed
Cypriot, and one woman considered herself to be British and Turkish equally. Many of the
women also mentioned other categories that they considered important to them, but most
chose one as primary.
For the overwhelming majority of the Turkish Cypriot women, their Turkish Cypriot
identity was fundamental to their sense of identity. The reaction of a 48-year-old woman was
interesting:
I've never thought of it like that before. I think what is very important to me is that
people know me as a Turkish Cypriot, I'm very proud to be a Turkish Cypriot
because for years we kept it hidden. We never talked about what a Turkish
Cypriot was, they never identified us as Turkish Cypriot or even Turkish. And I'm
proud to be a Turkish Cypriot, there are times when I'm not very proud, we're
not 100% in everything we do, there are lots of wrongs, but I am very proud of it.
One woman, who had been born in Cyprus, argued that it was important to publicise the fact
that she was Turkish Cypriot because she believed that Turkish Cypriots generafly received
less recognition in Britain than Greek Cypriots:
I'm a Turkish Cypriot British person, so to speak. I'm Turkish Cypriot first,
because of my beliefs about my own original country so I do publicise that,
because of the war implications and the division of the country and how I feel
that our particular community has not had the recognition perhaps as much as
the Greek Cypriot community. So I do publicise it in that way. It's not the fact that
I don't want to live with Greek Cypriots, that's another issue, it's the fact that
we've been undermined so to speak.
This comment reiterates some of the views expressed earlier and in chapter seven about the
continued importance of the Cyprus issue and of the distinction between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots in the maintenance of Turkish Cypriot ethnicity. However, while the overwhelming
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majority of informants identify themselves first and foremost as being Turkish Cypriot, two of
the women stated that they considered themselves Cypriot rather than Turkish Cypriot. One
of these women, who had been born in Cyprus, asserted:
I'm Turkish Cypriot, but I would actually say that I'm Cypriot, more than saying
I'm a Turkish Cypriot. I think I identify with that strongest, and within that division
I would call myself a Turkish Cypriot because of my origins. But from emotional
and intellectual commitment, and how I identify myself, I identify myself as a
Cypriot, which is very rare in our communities, and then I'm a Turkish Cypriot
within that. But very much I know that I am also something which I've created
myself, which it's not possible to define in certain categories. So I'm a Cypriot
living in London, which doesn't say very much (she laughs), and a woman.
The other woman had been born in Britain, but her family had come from a bi-communal
village in Cyprus. She subsequently believed that she had much in common with Greek
Cypriots, and indeed her mother preferred speaking Greek to Turkish. Both of these women
were actively participating in groups in Britain aimed at resolving the problems in Cyprus.
Only one of the Turkish Cypriot women mentioned being Muslim as an important part
of her identity, and this she stated came very much third, after Turkish Cypriot and British.
Nevertheless she found it offensive to be referred to as a Muslim, but instead wanted to be
recognised as Turkish Cypriot:
I find now that politicians don't refer to us any more by nationality, but they're
using more religion, and I object to that. I object to being called Muslims. I'm not
saying that I am ashamed or don't want to admit I'm Muslim, but I'm a Turkish
Cypriot and I want to be called a Turkish Cypriot. You find politicians nowadays
are using that because of the way Iran is now.
This comment again reiterates the views of the Turkish Cypriot informants towards their
religion and the fact that Islam was considered to have little importance for the majority of
Turkish Cypriots.
Only five of the Turkish Cypriot women mentioned Britain as an important part of their
identity, and this was always considered very much second to their Turkish Cypriot identity.
Four of the informants said that they could not consider themselves British, despite the fact
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that they regarded Britain as their home. Nevertheless, one woman who had been born in
Cyprus commented that despite not identifying with being British she would still defend it
against criticism.
I'm Turkish Cypriot, I can't say I'm a British subject. I always have been, and my
parents, my grandparents, etc, because Cyprus is under British rule, but I am
still Turkish Cypriot. But equally you will find amongst the second generation that
if someone says something bad about Britain you defend it. The worst is during
Turkey verses England football matches, people don't know who to support.
For the majority of the Turkish Cypriot women, however, being British was not mentioned at
all, or if it was, it was merely considered to represent a passport to them. In the words of one
young British-born woman:
I don't say I'm English, although I was born here, I'm Turkish Cypriot. Probably
because of my parents, but we've had debates about this in the past. People
have said 'but you're British', but I never say I'm British, I feel more Turkish.
The responses of the Turkish Cypriot women are markedly different from those of the
Pakistani women. Not only did the overwhelming majority of the Pakistani women consider
their Muslim identity to be the most important to them, a much greater number also identified
with being British, and only four of the women considered their Pakistani identity to be of any
relevance at all. The majority of the women described themselves as 'British Asian Muslims'
or simply 'British Muslims', thus highlighting their allegiances to both Islam and their country
of residence. All of the women who considered themselves 'practising Muslims' stated that
that being a Muslim had helped them to deal with many of the conflicts and contradictions
that living in Britain can produce for second and third generation Pakistanis. One young
woman, who considered herself to be a Muslim first and foremost, nevertheless also
identified with living in Britain. She felt that for her there was no conflict being a Muslim
woman in Britain, for she had all the rights she needed to practise her religion. Furthermore,
she felt that her British identity was of far greater relevance to her than being Pakistani,
despite having a Pakistani passport. Another young woman explained how discovering Islam
had given her a clearer sense of identity than she had previously felt, being of mixed
parentage and living in Britain:
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I was wondering about this for a very long time, so that my identity could have
been anything. But recently, having learnt all about Islam, I definitely would say
that being Muslim is the most important to me, definitely. Even now, when I go to
visit my Asian family, because I'm not completely Asian, I'm not completely
accepted, and by my Chinese family, I'm not completely accepted either. I used
to let it bother me, but I don't care any more, because I feel good about myself, I
have Islam.
Another felt that becoming a 'practising' Muslim had also helped her come to terms with her
British identity.
I used to really hate living in Britain. I used to really hate it because I felt that to
be British was to be white. So I hated being British, but now I say this is my
home, I couldn't live anywhere else. And being British is important to me too
because in this country there is so much more opportunity for me as a coloured
Muslim woman. Here I've found that some of my friends have had other
opportunities.
Several of the 'practising' Pakistani women felt that being a Muslim had helped them to deal
with racism and prejudice more easily. One woman reported that she had subsequently
grown to like English people more since becoming more religious:
I'll tell you since I've become Islamic I don't hate the English as much as I did
before. The reasoning is that I see them in a different light. Before I was feeling
that they were biased, they do this and that. I mean if there's a racist in English,
there's a racist in black, Asian, everywhere. So I don't see it from that point of
view. I look at them, they are very humane people, you know, I admire that, very
just and humane and Allah has given you all that you want. There's no poverty in
your lives, you've got whatever you want, it's like a heaven for you in one
respect.
Among the two women who did not cite being Muslim as the main influence on their
sense of identity, Britain was also considered important to them. One young woman stated
that although she identified with being both Muslim and Pakistani it was her British and Asian
identity that she considered most important to her. 'I would consider myself a British Asian,
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I've been brought up here and I've mixed with different people'. Another woman initially
considered herself to be a Black Briton, but also felt that her Pakistani and Muslim identity
were equally integral to her sense of self, as she explains:
Well I said before Black Briton, but then I would also have to add in Pakistani,
born in Black Briton, something like that. It's very confusing, there are just so
many different things that affect me, that shape me, that I've been influenced by,
that I couldn't pinpoint it down to one thing. So I wouldn't say I'm a Pakistani
person first and foremost, I wouldn't say I'm necessarily black first and foremost,
or British first and foremost. It's a combination of all those things. I don't know if
anybody's come up with a term yet. I mean I know at college, everybody who
was non-white called themselves black, only because it just represented
someone who was non-white, and that's how I used to call myself black.
Ethnically it's a little bit difficult now; I'm a mixture of everything, so I'd find that
hard. And I don't feel sufficiently strong about my Pakistani identity or my British
identity or even my kind of religious identity. It's all three, I'm shaped by all three.
Furthermore, she pointed out that defining herself as Pakistani was very different from her
parents' own definition:
Yes there's differences, they're probably more passioned about it and I'm not.
To me it's just one of those things, you know, I don't feel the same love for the
country. Having said that if there's a cricket match and Pakistan is playing I'm
like very nationalistic all of a sudden. And if anybody says something derogatory
about Pakistan I do find myself getting very uptight. So there must be something
inside of me that doesn't like that. But I wouldn't say I have this kind of yearning
to go back. There isn't the same passion that my parents have.
These comments highlight the complex processes involved in identity formation and the
range of different influences that can affect these processes for specific individuals. They
also demonstrate the major contrast between the two groups. For the majority of the
Pakistani women interviewed, their religion would seem to form the main basis of their
identity, as suggested in much of the literature on Pakistanis in Britain. For the Turkish
243
Cypriots, it was their nationality that was overwhelmingly cited as forming the basis of their
identity.
The importance that the women placed on either their Muslim or Turkish Cypriot
identity can also be seen quite clearly in their preference for suitable marriage partners. As
marriage is often seen as the fundamental element in the maintenance of ethnicity among
minority groups, preferences for marriage partners is therefore a significant determinant of
ethnic or religious consciousness. Two of the single Pakistani women stated that they would
prefer to marry another Pakistani. Two felt that nationality was unimportant as long as they
were Muslim, and one believed that religion and nationality were unimportant in terms of a
suitable marriage partner. One woman, who identified herself as a Pakistani Black Briton,
explained her reasons for preferring a Pakistani partner as follows:
I guess over the last couple of years my own ideas have changed and I think
yes, I'd like to marry someone Pakistani. Partly because I suppose I feel that if I
had children I would like to be able to pass on the kind of religious and cultural
thing to them, and there's a common understanding about the way we'd like to
live our lives together, and what's expected of us, by Islam as well. Because if I
was married to a non-Muslim, I don't know if that person would be able to
understand. It would be very unfair to marry someone who wouldn't know what
he was letting himself in for. So I guess at least you know what the boundaries
are if you're married to a Pakistani guy.
Among my Turkish Cypriot informants, however, one had no intention of getting married, the
other three single women all felt that they would prefer to marry someone Turkish or Turkish
Cypriot because they felt they would understand them better and that it was important for the
children. One of the women stated that she would prefer to marry a Turkish Cypriot herself
and would also like her future children to do the same. She felt it was important in terms of
passing on the culture:
Yes (she laughs), yes, I'm quite old fashioned aren't I for a 25 year old. Maybe
it's an ideal, I don't know, I don't like to think of myself as idealistic. It's to do with
the family as well, I mean you just don't want there to be any conflict within the
family. Before it wouldn't have mattered that much, when I was 18 or 19. I
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would've said 'well it's got nothing to do with my parents, it's my life and I just
want to be happy'. But they've kind of done so much for us, they've had a
struggle, they've come here and they've struggled a lot. They expect us to marry
a Turk, and it would be nice if we could. It would be nice for our children as well.
It's hard enough with the two cultures we have now, I mean English and Turkish.
Of those informants who were already married, all had Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot partners
except two, a Turkish Cypriot and a Pakistani woman both had white 'English' husbands. The
majority felt that it was important to marry someone of a similar ethnic background, and many
hoped their children would do likewise, although they all pointed out that their children would
be free to choose their own partner, regardless of religious or ethnic background. Indeed,
one woman who spoke about her children's future marriages said she had changed her
opinion on this issue since becoming a 'practising' Muslim:
I said to them choose your own, but it's up to you. If you want me to choose it's
fine, if you want to choose your own, as long as they're Pakistani it's OK. But
now I say to them, as long as they're Muslim I don't care which country she's
p
from. That's changed my values hasn't it, traditionally? Isn't that amazing? I said
to them anyone really. Because you know when you are all Islamic, and when
you are all practising Muslim, do you know something, whether you're Indian or
Jamaican, because tradition is not important there, and you go the Islamic way,
there's no problem. There's no culture in there any way. Tradition and culture
doesn't come into Islam when people are together from different backgrounds.
Isn't that amazing?
All of the 'practising' Pakistani women felt similarly in terms of their own or their children's
marriages, again emphasising the distinction they made between the importance of religion
and that of culture.
These preferences which the informants displayed, again outline the differing
attitudes towards their religion, their parents' country of origin and traditional cultural values.
All of the women preferred a partner for themselves or their children who mirrored their own
orientations, allegiances and aspirations. However, these marriage preferences are not
simply significant in terms of crystallising and supporting individual categories of self-
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categorisation, they are also indicative of the very survival of Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot
ethnicity in Britain. As Kucukcan (1999) argues, the specific Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani
communities in Britain owe their existence and survival to marriage between their members.
It is these marriages that help safeguard the continuation of traditional ethnic norms and
values, and reproduce the bonds of ethnicity by forming new relations between families, and
subsequently widening social networks of family and kin.
The changing preferences among the 'practising' Pakistani women for 'Islamic', as
distinct from simply Pakistani, partners, therefore demonstrate the re-prioritising of religion
over that of ethnicity or nationality. Nevertheless, as an 'Islamic' preference does not of
course preclude Pakistanis, and as the majority of parents would still prefer their children to
marry another Pakistani, the likelihood is that for the time being at least few will marry outside
their communities. Despite the changes reported in marriage and wedding norms, as
highlighted in the previous chapter, marriage is likely to remain a central value within the
Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot communities, further reinforcing traditional ethnic values and
patterns of relationships and behaviour. The prioritising of a Muslim or Islamic identity over
that of a Pakistani ethnic identity among many of the second and third generation, could
however have a profound effect on maintenance of a specific Pakistani ethnicity in the future,
especially if young people begin to choose Muslim partners from other ethnic groups. Among
the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, the continued commitment to a Turkish Cypriot
identity and marriage partners from the same ethnic group would seem to indicate that their
ethnicity is still very strong, with events in Cyprus and relations with other ethnic groups in
Britain further reinforcing their identity as a distinct ethnic group.
Summary
The discussions presented in this chapter, while demonstrating the diverse range of attitudes
held by my informants, nevertheless allow for certain clear distinctions to be made between
the two groups. Although religion can be seen to have a major influence on the lives of
Pakistanis in Britain, as indicated in much of the literature, the influence of Pakistan and of
Pakistani customs and traditions was generally considered much less important. It is
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interesting to note that those who considered themselves less religious tended to be less
critical of their parents' traditional norms and values and country of origin than those who
considered themselves to have a greater commitment to Islam. For the Turkish Cypriots, on
the other hand, the influence of Cyprus was believed to be very important, distinguishing
them clearly from other groups. This distinction is apparent not only in relation to their
attitudes towards, and opinions of, Islam and Cyprus, but also in terms of their strong
commitment to the maintenance of their language and their preference for Turkish Cypriot
marriage partners. These were considered vital for the maintenance of their Turkish Cypriot
identity.
Another significant contrast between the two groups was their degree of allegiance to
Britain. While all of the women considered Britain their home, the Pakistani women seemed
to be able to identify with being British more easily than the Turkish Cypriot women. Country
of birth does not seem to be a factor here, as many women born in Pakistan or Cyprus
identified with being British as readily as those born in Britain. Rather, this contrast seems to
indicate, as Afshar (1993) and Jacobson (1997) point out, that a Muslim or Islamic identity
enables young Pakistanis to navigate the contradictions that they experience between
Pakistani and British cultural norms and values. An Islamic identity provides a more universal
source of identity with clear-cut and pervasive boundaries that do not depend on allegiance to
a specific country. Being Muslim does not prevent individuals from identifying with Pakistan or
with Britain, but it helps them make sense of some of the contradictions that they experience.
The majority of the Turkish Cypriot women, on the other hand, believed that their allegiance
to Cyprus and the importance they placed on their Turkish Cypriotness, together with their
awareness of racial and ethnic discrimination in Britain, made it more difficult for them to
identify with 'being British', despite the fact that they considered it their home.
Despite these differences, a factor common to both groups was the extent to which
their identities and allegiances were not necessarily dependent on their observance of
religious or cultural norms and values. Although all but two of the Pakistani women
considered Islam to be very important to them and to constitute the basis of their identity, the
majority of the women did not observe all of the Islamic laws; and indeed, many did not try to.
Similarly, among the Turkish Cypriot women, their allegiance to Cyprus was considered a
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major influence on their identity as Turkish Cypriots, or Cypriots, and despite the recent
interest in Turkish cultural traditions, their maintenance of traditional values and customs was
very similar to that of the Pakistani women. Thus in Hutnik's (1991) terms, their individual
'strategies of self-categorisation' are not dependent on their 'style of cultural adaptation'.
Many of the women do not have to behave as 'traditional' Muslims or Turkish Cypriots in
order to feel like them. It is their method of ethnic or religious identification that is important,
of which their allegiances, social and cultural values and patterns of behaviour form a part.
These different 'styles of cultural adaptation' reflect the different cultural and social
experiences that the second and third generation have experienced. Growing up in British
society they have obviously been influenced by their surroundings. Nevertheless, it is clear
that the younger generation is not completely abandoning their parents' way of life in favour
of British norms and values, nor does it seem that they are finding themselves 'torn between
two cultures', as some commentators have suggested. It would appear that the second
generation is astute enough to adapt to both cultural systems. What the findings of the
research demonstrate is that second and third generation Turkish Cypriots and Pakistanis,
such as the women interviewed, are in the process of actively creating a new role and identity
for themselves in British society, utilising established beliefs and traditions from both British
and Pakistani/Turkish Cypriot cultural systems. There are aspects of both that they can use
to construct appropriate roles for themselves in Britain.
What it is important to emphasise here is that this process of cultural redefinition is
not purely a case of individuals choosing one ideology over another or, indeed, selecting
elements from several ideologies. In order to understand why one cultural model triumphs
over another it is necessary to analyse the structural constraints and historical circumstances
within which such cultural models compete for supremacy. Factors such as 'race', ethnicity,
class and gender inevitably affect the choices that individuals make. What is significant about
these new 'hybridised' ethnicities (Bhabha 1994, Hannerz 1992) is the way in which
difference is appropriated and given meaning by the individual, and how it is used as a basis
of collective identification. At the same time it is essential to heed Anthias's (1999) criticisms
of the way in which 'hybridity' has been used, especially the implication that the dominant
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groups' power to define cultural boundaries has been seceded in hybridised cultures. It is
these issues that will be addressed in the conclusion.
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Conclusion
In chapter one I explored debates about the concepts of ethnicity and culture, highlighting some
of the criticisms levelled at studies of ethnicity in Britain. It was argued that while any concept of
ethnicity must acknowledge the desires of specific groups to maintain a sense of common
identity and cultural exclusion, such a concept must also take account of the structural
processes that affect all members of society. It must be acknowledged above all that different
individuals and ethnic groups possess different degrees of power. What is needed therefore is a
redefinition of the concepts of ethnicity and culture which goes beyond a purely descriptive
account of cultural attributes and belief systems but encompasses the social, political and
economic processes that shape these beliefs. Cultural beliefs are not fixed and impermeable,
but flexible, dynamic and continually changing, formed and transformed in relation to the
historically specific structural processes operating in a given society. Such a perspective enables
us to view culture in terms of the processes, categories and knowledges through which
communities are defined, that is, how they are rendered specific and differentiated.
Furthermore, an emphasis on the social construction of difference acknowledges the
fact that individuals play an active role in the creation, maintenance and transformation of
meaning. Nevertheless this process takes place within particular historical and structural
contexts that limit individual choices and make certain behaviour and cultural responses more
likely than others. In order to understand the factors that influence these processes, it is
necessary to examine social consciousness, inter-group behaviour and social structure.
Ethnicity, in this light, can be seen as a way of articulating every day life in and through
the processes of boundary formation. It represents the way in which notions of difference and
commonality are created, transformed and resisted, as well as how they are influenced by the
specific political, cultural and historical forces in operation (Brah 1996). The significance of
ethnicity lies in the particular power relations that operate to articulate these differences. These
power relations produce and reproduce patterns of domination and subordination within and
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across different fields of social differentiation, which affect individuals and groups in different and
often contrasting ways.
The analysis of interview data in chapters six, seven and eight, supports the claim that
Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot women display difference and diversity in terms of their
experiences and identities. They are also actively shaping their own identities and destinies in
response to these diverse experiences, producing new strategies of action. Yet they are
inherently influenced and affected by the structural processes operating in British society.
Chapter six demonstrated the importance of interaction with others of both similar and different
ethnicities for the creation, maintenance and transformation of ethnicity. 'Race', ethnicity, class,
gender and generations are all significant factors, but they are experienced in different ways
producing diverse and multiple outcomes. The greater interaction and participation of the second
generation provide them with more resources for managing ethnic disadvantage. Similarly, the
middle classes also have more opportunities and choices available to them as a result of their
greater resources. Nevertheless, they too must operate within the confines of multiple social,
political, economic and historical processes that locate them within different fields of social
differentiation producing contradictory social outcomes.
The exploration of the influence of gender in chapter seven highlighted the significance
of gender relations to the maintenance and transformation of ethnicity and identity. Pakistani and
Turkish Cypriot women were believed to face specific difficulties arising from traditional
patriarchal norms and values that seek to control their identity and conduct. The views of my
informants on the issues of major importance to second-generation women were very similar;
these concerned the need for more freedom in relation to marriage, education and employment.
It was believed that some aspects of traditional values needed to be transformed in order to
allow women to develop their own potentials, and to fulfil their own desires and aspirations.
Resisting gender oppression for these women does not merely involve challenging the dominant
discourses, institutions and practices of wider society where 'race', class, gender and ethnicity
combine to produce and reproduce their subordination; it also requires challenging prejudice and
discrimination from within their own communities that combine to restrict their choices further.
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Nevertheless, it is clear from the analysis that these multiple forms of oppression and
discrimination are not experienced uniformly by my informants, nor are they experienced in a
void. The women's own experiences, attitudes and aspirations are crucial for an understanding
of their position in society. While they may have been in agreement over the major priorities for
Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women in Britain, they differed considerably in terms of where they
felt the cause of these inequalities rested, as well as in the strategies they chose to adopt in
addressing these priorities.
These differences were highlighted further in chapter eight, which identified significant
contrasts both within and between the two groups of informants. The majority of the Pakistani
women considered Islam to be the most important element in their identity, and were critical of
many Pakistani cultural norms and values that they believed were oppressive to women. The
Turkish Cypriot women, on the other hand, believed that Cyprus was still an importance
influence on individuals, and the majority considered their Turkish Cypriot identity to be most
important to them. They were also critical of Islamic norms and values which, they believed,
brought about inequality between men and women within their communities.
Identity
Why did the majority of Turkish Cypriot respondents identify primarily with being Turkish Cypriot,
and the majority of Pakistanis with being Muslim? Part of the answer to this question lies with the
history of Pakistan and Cyprus themselves, yet my informants' experiences in Britain are also
crucial to an understanding of this contrast of identities. Pakistan was created to provide a
separate Islamic state for Indian Muslims, and was granted independence from India by the
British at the end of their colonial rule in 1947. Although initially the country consisted of two
parts, West Pakistan and East Pakistan, in 1972 the latter established the independent state of
Bangladesh. For Pakistanis, therefore, religion is the principal focus of their national identity. It is
their religion that makes them distinct from other Asian groups with whom they are most closely
identified. Religion played an important role in creating the feelings of minority status both in
India and Britain, differentiating them from other ethnic groups. The Pakistanis' conception of
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themselves as a religious minority has been reinforced further by anti-Islamic feelings in the
West. The Rushdie affair and the Gulf war provided focal points for the mobilisation of Muslims
in Britain committed to maintaining Islamic values. These events acted as a catalyst for many
young Pakistanis who had begun to question their parents' religious and cultural values. With
their religion under attack, young Pakistanis joined forces with their elders in defence of Islam
and of their rights as a religious minority in Britain.
For Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, the conflicts in Cyprus have much more to do
with maintaining their rights as a Turkish minority. Disputes between Turkish Cypriots and Greek
Cypriots can be seen in terms of the Greek Cypriots' desire for union with Greece, on the one
hand, and the Turkish Cypriots' desire to maintain their rights as a Turkish minority on the other.
Language, ethnicity, and religion all contributed to these disputes. Bitterness and hostility
increased between the two groups with the threat of intervention of Turkey and Greece, which
continued throughout the 1960s. In 1974, Greek Cypriots in opposition to the President staged a
coup and Turkey used her treaty rights to intervene militarily. The Turks gained control of the
northern third of the island and the Turkish Cypriots set up their own administration. In 1983 the
Turkish Cypriots declared their own Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
The identity of Turkish Cypriots in Britain is further reinforced by relations with other
ethnic groups, and in particular with Greek Cypriots and Turks, as chapter six highlighted. The
majority perceive the persistence of the unequal distribution of power between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots in Britain as a factor prolonging the dispute. On the one hand, there is more
equality in Britain than there is in Cyprus; on the other, rivalries and disputes persist in Britain
and are projected on to multicultural identity. There would be more chance of a united Cypriot
identity in Britain if there were less inequality between the two communities. This is linked to
their failure to attract public attention in Britain, for example, in terms of underachievement. This
is much more of a problem for Turkish Cypriots than it is for Greek Cypriots, again reinforcing
the different power relations between them. All of this rests on ethnic identity as distinct from
religion to a large extent, but closely related to national identity.
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Turkish Cypriots are as keen to preserve their distinct way of life and their language in
Britain as they are in Cyprus. With reference to religion, however, their more relaxed approach to
Islam was considered a significant factor in distinguishing them from people from Turkey. A
more passive approach to religion is therefore believed to be part of their Cypriot identity. For
many, to become more religious means becoming more Turkish and less Cypriot. Although there
has been a slight increase in religious activity among Turkish people in London, many
informants suggested that this had come about since the migration of more people from Turkey.
Turks, it was argued, are in a different situation from Turkish Cypriots. They have always been
considered more religious and more 'traditional' than Turkish Cypriots, which may help to explain
their distinctiveness. In addition, in Turkey they have the history of having to fight for their
religious rights as a result of the secularisation of Turkey under Kemalism. Culture is not an
issue, but religion is. The situation is still the same in Britain. The recent rise in religious activity
in Turkey is therefore beginning to filter into Britain as the number of Turks has increased.
These differences are significant not only in terms of their influence on both individual
and collective identities, but also in terms of their sense of belonging and allegiance to Britain.
Although the majority of my informants regarded Britain as 'home', the Pakistani women seemed
to be much more able to envisage a British identity than did the Turkish Cypriots. This confirms
the distinction between religious and ethnic identities, outlined by Jacobson (1997, 1998) who
argues that the greater significance of religion as a source of social identity lies in the contrast
between the universal relevance of Islam with its clear-cut and pervasive boundaries and that of
the increasingly permeable boundaries of Pakistani ethnicity that relates to a particular place and
its people. Islam with its central concept of umma and its detailed code of behaviour covering all
aspects of daily life provides a much more concrete and all-embracing source of identity than the
flexible, constantly fluctuating boundaries of ethnicity or nation (Jacobson 1997, 1998).
In this way, Islam can be seen as providing a universal set of prescriptions that enable
young people to deal with the ambiguities and contradictions they experience in their lives.
Whilst in practice, religious and ethnic boundaries are not so clear-cut, but closely interrelated,
they are increasingly coming to be seen as separate or alternative bases of self-definition. This
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situation shows some similarities with that of black identity in the 1970s, in the sense that it
provided a means by which different Muslim groups and communities could come together to
and produce a potential challenge to their marginalised position in British society and increase
their rights of representation. Religion, therefore, is a useful platform for challenging British racist
imperialism, which seems to be so evident in the recent anti-Islam propaganda. It is important to
point out, however, that this strategy is only one of those available to Muslim women in Britain.
In addition, Muslims in Britain have as yet failed to contain internal differences in their attempts
to develop a unified solidarity (Hall 1991, Afshar 1994, Brah 1996).
Although many of the Pakistanis were critical of other Muslims who sought to push
forward their views on religion with which they did not agree, this did not make them any less
religious. They were just more prepared to challenge such views. Similarly, Turkish Cypriots still
see negative aspects of their culture, with which they disagree, but this does not make them any
less Turkish Cypriot and feel less proud of their identity. They merely seek to transform those
aspects that they consider inappropriate to their own lives in Britain. A renewed pride in being
Turkish Cypriot or being Muslim is part of that. It is through criticism that many come to
appreciate the positive sides of their religious or ethnic heritage. Criticism of their religion or
ethnicity makes them focus on the positive side to a greater extent.
This is very different from the idea that ethnic minorities are forced back to their religion
or culture as a result of rejection from white mainstream society. This is not reactive ethnicity;
the ethnic or religious allegiance was already there. Criticism of it allowed many informants to
focus on the positive side and for them to realise just how important it was to them. In addition,
they seek positive identification with religion or ethnicity in order to achieve solidarity, to form a
common basis for struggle and resistance to this threat and criticism. For those who have limited
ethnic or religious allegiance the effect would not be the same, the foundations would not be
there. Furthermore, these foundations are reinforced by others, by Muslim, Pakistani or Turkish
Cypriot institutions, by Urdu or Turkish supplementary schools, by regular trips to Cyprus,
Turkish music, Turkish television, etc.
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Thus while both sets of informants face similar problems and difficulties arising from
their experiences of 'race', gender, class, and ethnicity, they are adopting different strategies for
dealing with these experiences, as exemplified in their different identities. These different
identities, however, do not seem to be dependent on religious or ethnic observance on the part
of individuals. As Hutnik (1991) notes, their 'strategies of self-categorisations' may be quite
unconnected to their 'styles of cultural adaptation' and may subsequently obtain 'functional
autonomy'.
If ethnicity, allegiance, and belonging are not dependent on styles of cultural adaptation,
what are they dependent on? Whether an individual identifies first and foremost as Muslim or
Turkish Cypriot, Asian or British, it does not preclude that individual from identifying with other
factors and the cultural values and norms associated with them. This is the idea behind
hybridised identities. The idea is that individuals display different and often competing cultural
symbols, values and patterns of behaviour that can be appropriated at different times and within
different contexts. Such identities involve what Robbins (1991) refers to as translation, the
negotiation and evaluation of difference and diversity, commonality and solidarity. They
represent allegiances to new ideologies that involve consciousness of thought and action as
they redefine traditional norms and practices of previous ways of life (Swindler 1986). Crucial to
this process is an understanding of the way in which individuals use the various cultural
resources at their disposal to maintain and transform their identities.
With the expansion of the global system, it is argued traditional sources of authority and
identity have become fragmented and decentred, detaching cultural differences from their points
of origin and assimilating them into the global consumer market by the process of 'cultural
homogenisation' (Robbins 1991, Hall 1992). Within such decentring, the marginal has the
potential to become a powerrul space to challenge dominant discourses both nationally and
globally. It is within these marginalised spaces that hybridised identities can be seen,
representing identities of resistance and struggle. What is significant about these new identities
is how difference is constructed and appropriated and given meaning by the individual, and how
it is used as a basis of collective identification (Hannerz 1992, Bhabha 1994).
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However, as Anthias (1999) points out, what theories of hybridised identities fail to
acknowledge is the power of dominant groups to define cultural boundaries. Which cultural
resources an individual 'chooses' depend on those available to him or her. Access to cultural
resources is severely limited by the social relations of differentiation and subordination operating
within a given context, at a given time. Individuals are not 'free-floating', but positioned in a
system of constraints that leads to the unequal allocation of cultural resources through the social
processes of "race", class and gender. An emphasis on hybridisation, while providing alternative
notions of culture and ethnicity to those of the static and homogeneous concepts of previous
theories nevertheless underplays the ways in which forms of social differentiation serve different
ends in different contexts. As Anthias argues: 'the bringing together of different cultural elements
syncretically transforms their meaning, but need not mean that dialogue between cultural givens
is necessarily taking place' (1999:171). Hybridised identities may possess the power to
transform their own meanings, but they are limited by social relations of subordination and
domination to transform meanings in wider society, or indeed globally. In attempts to deconstruct
difference, Anthias argues, they run the risk of producing their own form of essentialism, that is,
the essentialising of difference, reifying the places in which this difference is located and
constructed.
According to Brah (1 996:246), what is needed is a 're-thinking of the multi' by examining
the way in which differences and commonalities are played out, that is: 'how these are
constituted, contested, reproduced or resigned in many and varied discourses, institutions and
practices'. Such a process for Brah involves moving beyond notions of the primacy of specific
social divisions over others and focusing instead on the articulation of these axes of
differentiation. For Anthias, this articulation of social divisions can be seen in two ways: as
'crosscutting and mutually supporting' one another in terms of systems of domination and
subordination, or in terms of 'multiple and uneven social patterns of domination and
subordination' (1999:177). The latter refers to individuals who are positioned differently within
and across different axes of differentiation, producing contradictory positions and identities.
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The potentially contradictory nature of cross-cutting social divisions, as Anthias points out,
raises fundamental political questions. If the individual is shown to possess diverse and multiple
identities and positionings in relation to social relations, this renders the notion of social
categories problematic, particularly in relation to a politics of identity: 'for such a politics assumes
a unitary subject whose identity and political struggle is given by a position, say as a woman or
as a member of a class or a member of a racialised group' (1 999:177). In this way, the individual
is conceived as the 'main protagonist' in political struggles against systems of subordination and
domination. However, Anthias argues: 'the recognition of diversity need not dispense with
provisional and contextual commonalities - as oppositional consciousness, multiple otherness'
(1999:161). Awareness of such commonalities is necessary for the formation of political
struggles. What is needed therefore is a 'politics of multiple identifications', which takes on board
struggles around the subordination of both selves and others, increasing levels of
communication and collaboration between groups whose organisational bases centre on specific
struggles as opposed to specific identities.
In such a schema, the collective 'we' of modernity and the problematic of the self in
modernity as a unitary phenomenon becomes replaced with the investigation of
sets of articulations and narratives relating to realms of existence, and identified
through investigating their place in personal experience and its depiction, in
practices between social agents, some of whom will be persons, the organisational
arrangements implicated and the representational forms that are produced.
(Anthias 1999:178)
Understanding the intersectionality and articulation of social divisions and relations helps explain
the diversity of social outcomes, but it is also necessary to understand how these can be
appropriated to form collective representation and struggles. This involves a focus on agency
and its interaction with the public, the institutional and the representative.
What is needed is an understanding of how 'race', class, gender and ethnicity are
appropriated, transformed and resisted to form individual identities as well as to elicit the
possibility of political identification. As Brah states (1996:246): What we prioritise in a specific
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context is contingent, but whatever has been prioritised, be it gender, racism, or class, it cannot
be understood as if it were an autonomous category, even though it can certainly have
independent effects'. Individuals are not unitary subjects but are affected by, and subsequently
made up of, different and often competing social and political elements, and can belong at one
and the same time to a number of different social categories: as women, as a class, as a
racialised or ethnic group.
How does a politics of identification take on board our own diverse positioning and
those of others, and well as the social processes that affect them? The new cultural politics of
difference claims to encompass these differences, but it makes struggles around collective
actors such as class, 'race' and gender difficult. It is necessary to prioritise certain forms of
inequality and relations of subordination and domination in order to produce effective struggles.
Yet we must still be aware of the differences in terms of evaluation (both individual and
collective) and effects (social outcomes).
As Brah (1 996:247) points out, by seeing the individual in this way, 'as constituted in the
interstices of the articulation of "difference" (and "commonality")' is to understand agency 'shorn
of its voluntarist connotations'. Identification and differentiation must be seen as related
processes marking experience, identity and social relations. As such, identification, whether
individual or collective, represents a reconstruction of notions of difference and commonality.
Furthermore, as Brah argues, there is no necessary link between individual and collective
identity; collective identification may therefore entail considerable 'psychic and emotional
disjunction'. This does not mean that we cannot feel a sense of belonging to a collective, but this
sense of belonging is specific to the individual; it is based on her own evaluation of belonging
and positioning. Individuals are ultimately positioned by the social process operating within
specific contexts, at specific times, but how we evaluate them is important for our strategies of
actions and hence for collective representation.
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Collective Representation
The organisations and associations analysed in chapter five demonstrate the diversity of
struggles and the multiple effects of positioning, fighting the gender, class, ethnic and racial
biases of the dominant discourses and organised institutions, and well as prejudice and
discrimination from within my informants' own communities. Many struggles therefore arise on a
variety of different platforms, yet they are inherently interconnected. My informants, for the most
part, were aware of this, and subsequently aware of their and others' multiple identities (despite
prioritising one).
In this way, the organisations can be seen to represent 'diaspora spaces' (Brah 1996)
where the diverse and heterogeneous experiences of women meet and collide. It is within these
organisations that different identities are contested, transformed, and resisted, and where power
relations and hierarchies are negotiated and combated. These organisations therefore represent
elements of both tradition and translation, as traditional values and norms are invented and
transformed. Although these organisations maintain strong links with their ethnic origins they
nevertheless represent a reinterpretation and re-siting of these origins, as more and more
migrants and their descendants come to acknowledge Britain as their home. Here the production
and reproduction of cultural processes converge and combine with multiple political, economic
and social processes expressed in power relations. In this way, notions of difference and
commonality are re-appropriated and transformed to produce new relations with diverse
outcomes.
In their own individual, specific and multiple ways they are contributing to the re-
imaginings of the national identity, both Pakistani/Turkish Cypriot and British. They represent
important spaces for the empowerment of women, both within and outside the communities they
serve or 'represent'; challenging the stereotypes and assumptions both inside and outside their
own groups. In their own ways these organisations represent an example of struggle through
difference. They are not attempting, in most cases, to provide a united front but to demonstrate
that Pakistani, Muslim or Turkish Cypriot ethnicity, in all its multiple forms, is as much a part of
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the British national identity as it is of their own ethnic identity. Being proud of the traditions and
ethnic heritage does not mean that they cannot or are not contributing to collective British
identity. Their sense of belonging is as much related to Britain, as it is to Cyprus and Pakistan.
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Glossary
Allah
Bayram
Biradari
Bu rqa
Duppatta
Eid
Eid-i-Milad
Eid-ul-Aazha
Eid-ul-Fitr
Hadith
Hajj
Halal
Haram
Imam
Izzat
Madrassah
Mevlit
Mullah
Mushaira
Namaz
Purdah
Qemiz
Qu r'an
Ramadan
Salat
Shalwar Kemiz
Sharia
Shia
Sunni
Surah
Ummah
Zukat
Arabic word for god
Festival within Islam (Turkish)
Brotherhood; localised inter-marrying 'caste' group
Traditional clothing worn by some Muslim women to cover themselves
when leaving the home
Chiffon scarf used by Muslim women to veil themselves
Holy day and festival within Islam
Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad
Festival of sacrifice
Festival at the end of Ramadan
Records relating to the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad
Pilgrimage to Mecca
Permitted
Prohibited
Muslim leader of prayer; community leader
Honour
Religious or mosque school
Religious meeting, usually held in memory of someone who has died
(Turkish)
Man educated in religious matters
Verse reading from the Qu'ran
A prayer, usually performed by Muslims five times a day (Urdu)
Curtain or veil; often used to indicate the physical separation of unrelated
men and women
A dress or shirt, worn on top of shalwar
The holy book of Islam
The month of fasting in the ninth month of the Muslim calendar
Prayer
Loose shirt and trousers
Islamic law
A sect within Islam, which believes that Ali (Muhammad's son-in-law)
was the rightful successor of the Prophet
A sect within Islam, which believes that Caliphate should have become
successor to the Prophet on the basis of merit
Chapter of the Qur'an
Islamic community
Compulsory almsgiving, one of the five pillars of Islam
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